Jamil Hasanly, Dr.

Professor of History

Baku State University

Editorial Note: As a contribution to the unveiling of the history of Soviet policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan in the World offers what is the final section of a three-part article on the origins of Soviet policy on this region that was prepared by distinguished Azerbaijani historian Jamil Hasanly.  It originally appeared in Russia’s Regnum News Agency at http://regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/armenia/1429705.html.  The previous sections of Professor Hasanly’s account were published in the preceding issues of Azerbaijan in the World.

Armenian authors and politicians who try to place all the blame on Stalin must certainly be familiar with the documentary picture of those dramatic sessions of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b).  Every detail of what happened is made explicit in Protocol No. 11 of the session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) on July 4 and in Protocol No. 12 of the session on July 5.  While it is clear that I. Stalin was present at both sessions; neither on the fourth nor on the fifth of July did he speak on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.  Besides, Protocol No. 8 of the session of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) of July 2-3 is kept in the very same file of the very same archive that holds the protocols of July 4 and July 5.  

If one pays attention, one could see that among those present Stalin’s name is listed first in all these protocols. [1] Moreover, it is precisely in the attachment to Protocol No. 8 that attention is drawn to “the fact of the formation of nationalistically ‘communist’ groups in the communist organizations of the Transcaucasus, stronger in Georgia and Armenia and weaker (in quantity and quality) in Azerbaijan.” [2] 

Indeed, the discussion on June 3, 1921 of the Zangazur issue and on July 4-5 of the Nagorno-Karabakh question were directly linked to the fact that the Nakhchivan issue was reflected in the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, an accord which generated a wave of communist nationalism in Armenia and with attempts by the Center to break this wave.  Suffice it to direct one’s attention to the text of the extensive protest addressed by the chief of the Armenia delegation at the Moscow negotiations, Armenian Commissar of Foreign Affairs A. Bekzadyan, to G. Chicherin on April 15, 1921.  A. Bekzadyan accused Soviet Russia of failing in the talks with Turkey to stick up for the interests of Armenia.  He wrote that “the Armenian delegation considers it vitally important to note that the Turkish delegation to the conference at all times speaks in the role of the defender and protector of the Muslim population of the Transcaucasus and in particular of the interests of Soviet Azerbaijan.” [3] 

Bekzadyan was especially disturbed by the fact that Turkey was able to retain Nakhchivan as part of Azerbaijan, something Turkey considers very important for ensuring security of its eastern borders.  He stressed that, “Given the way in which the Nakhchivan and Sharur-Daralagez issues were resolved, Armenia is deprived of the possibility to administer Zangazur, which belongs to it, in a normal fashion.” [4] 

On this occasion, G. Chicherin wrote to Ter-Gabrielyan, the representative of the Armenian Soviet Government in Russia, that he was quite surprised by the attempt of Bekzadyan to whitewash the actions of the Armenian delegation at the conference in Moscow and to lay all the guilt on the Russian delegation.  Chichern noted that the Armenians were perfectly well informed about the chief goal of this conference.  Moreover, at the time of Chicherin’s special and continuing contacts with the Armenian delegation, the latter never complained about the decisions taken. [5]  

Chicherin used this similar wording in a telegram he sent to B. Legran in Tiflis.  More specifically, he wrote that he “protest[s] against the effort of Bekzadyan who is attempting, first of all, to transfer blame to the Russian delegation and, second, to clear the Armenian delegation from accusations by some unknown to me readers or listeners by means of distorting the facts and concealing something which the Armenian delegation could not fail to be aware of.” [6] 

Apparently, by such deception, the Armenians were attempting to use the conditions created by the closed discussion around the Moscow Treaty for the advancement of their own claims on Karabakh and to enlist the Center’s support in this game.  Behind the actions of the Armenian leadership, which was silent during the Moscow Conference but now spoke out with claims to Soviet Russia, stood the desire to receive compensation.  In more concrete terms, “the subject of compensation” would have to be Karabakh.  As concerned the repeated introduction of the discussion of the question about Nagorno-Karabakh on July 5, this as we see took place precisely at the insistence of G. Ordzhonikidze and A. Nazaretyan.  Certain Armenian authors for obvious reasons mistakenly write that it was not A. Nazaretyan, but N. Narimanov who on July 5, together with G. Ordzhonikidze, raised this issue (Melik-Shakhnazarov 2008, p. 311). 

The mistaken view that the decision making Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan happened on July 5 only because of the pressure of I. Stalin is again repeated in the article by V.A. Zakharov and S.T. Sarkisyan, published in Moscow (Zakharov & Sarkisyan 2008, p. 221).  However, it is known that Stalin was in Tiflis already from the end of June 1921.  Apart from this, why at all did I. Stalin arrive in Tiflis at that time?  This question is answered by materials of the plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Georgia, which took place at the same time as the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b).  Thus, on July 7, the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) continued its work and, with I. Stalin present at the session, the decision was adopted to join to Armenia the neutral zone between Georgia and Armenia.  At the very same session, the second issue taken up was the proposal to unite to Armenia the districts of Akhalkalaki and Khram.  That issue was transferred for consideration by the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Georgia so that it could be addressed at the next plenum.

The documents reveal that a plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b) also took place on that same day, one at which all members of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) except for N. Narimanov were present.  There is even a note featured in the protocol that all members of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) arrived at the session at 11:00 and that I. Stalin and G. Ordzhonikidze arrived at 12:25.  The first issue discussed was the Batumi issue.  I. Stalin was asked to make a report about the course of his talks with the Adzhar delegation.  The next issue was related to N. Narimanov’s declaration at the July 5 session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) about the need to intensify work among the Muslim population of Georgia.  The plenum proposed to the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Georgia to use Omar Faig [Nemanzade] to this effect.  

The agenda of the plenum of the Central Committee of the party on July 7 included the issue “on the establishment of a peoples Commissariat for the affairs of Muslims of Georgia.”  The plenum, however, only approved the establishment of a special institution for the affairs of Muslims of Georgia, while for the definition of the organizational forms and functions of this institution a commission was established, with Omar Faig in charge and Kavtaradze, Kvirkeli, and Tumanov as its members.  A request was also forwarded to the Central Committee of Azerbaijan to send three or four Communists-Muslims meant to form the nucleus in the institution being organized. 

The plenum then discussed two additional issues (“On the press” and “On the activity of the Extraordinary Committee of Georgia”) and passed on to the main question, which was the reason I. Stalin had come from Nalchik to Tiflis, namely, the issue of the replacement of the leadership of Georgia.  Filipp Makhardze, the chairman of the revolutionary Committee of Georgia who had been sticking to a relatively independent line in administering Georgia and had therefore been in tense relations with G. Ordzhonikidze, did not satisfy the Central Committee of the RKP(b).  Under the pretext of the difficult situation in the country, I. Stalin proposed removing F. Makharadze from the post of chairman of the Revolutionary committee of Georgia and naming to this position Budu Mdivani.  By a majority of votes—six votes in favor, four abstentions; including the members of the Caucasus Bureau nine votes in favor and four abstentions—B. Mdivani was named the chairman of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee.

For many years, Armenian and certain Russian historians sought to find a “Karabakh” link in Stalin’s arrival from Nalchik in Tiflis in July 1921, but clearly the real goal of this trip was to remove Filipp Makharadze from a position of power in Georgia and to install Budu Mdivani, someone more closely linked with Moscow, in his place.  And even in November of the same year, G. Ordzhonikidze raised the question about distancing F. Makharadze not only from Georgia, but from the Caucasus as a whole.  On November 2, 1921, he wrote to Lenin and Stalin that “Filipp absolutely must be immediately taken from the Caucasus.”

In the middle of August 1921 in a conversation over the direct line with G. Ordzhonikidze, A. Myasnikov noted that a sufficiently loyal attitude about the Karabakh question had been established in Armenia. [7] On July 19, 1921, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan discussed the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) of July 5 and more generally the results of N. Narimanov’s trip to Tiflis.  Concerning the report of N. Narimanov, the following statement was recorded: “Nagorno-Karabakh remains an inalienable part of Soviet Azerbaijan with the right of internal self-administration within the limits of the Soviet Constitution with an oblast Executive Committee at its head.” [8] 

N. Narimanov also made a report on the establishment of the external borders between Azerbaijan and the other republics of the South Caucasus.  He reported that Nagorno-Karabakh was to remain an inalienable part of Soviet Azerbaijan within the framework of the Soviet constitution with the right of internal self-administration.  Following this meeting of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, a joint session of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party was held.  The session heard A. Karayev’s report about Karabakh and adopted a decision to establish a commission consisting of representatives of the commissars of internal affairs, justice and foreign affairs to work on the preparation of the constitution of the autonomous oblast. [9] 

Starting on the very first days of August, a special campaign was launched in Azerbaijan to explain the July 5 decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the RKP(b).  On August 1, 1921, an extraordinary congress of Soviets of the second section of the Shusha district was held in the village of Kendkhurt at which Levon Mirzoyan, the representative of the Sovnarkom was invited to make a presentation.  In his speech, Mirzoyan showed that Karabakh from an economic, spiritual and political, as well as from a national point of view, was closely connected with Baku, the center of Azerbaijan.  L. Mirzoyan stressed the rightfulness of the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) concerning the establishment in the mountainous part of Karabakh of a special administrative unit immediately subordinate to Baku. [10] He promised that once there was an autonomy, all problems would be resolved.  Following his return from this trip, L. Mirzoyan wrote a detailed report, in which he particularly pointed out that his deep conviction was that the Karabakh question had been created and continued to be sustained by party and Soviet leading workers, on one hand, and by nationalistically inclined members of the Armenian  intelligentsia, on the other. [11] 

Following July 5, the nationalistically inclined Armenians that L. Mirzoyan’s report mentioned began to disseminate rumors according to which the Armenians had been resettled from Karabakh to Armenia.  These rumors reached even the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b).  One additional trend was noted: after the election of S. Kirov as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Azerbaijan, all those who remained dissatisfied with the July 5 decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the RKP(b) now realized their destructive actions against Azerbaijan through his medium. Yuri Petrovich (Yakov Isakovich) Figatner, the secretary of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), for example, wrote to S. Kirov in August 1921 that after the July 5 decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), supposedly “many Armenian villages from Nagorno-Karabakh began to be resettled in Armenia.” [12] 

Having received this news, S. Kirov immediately sent a query to A. Karayev and L. Mirzoyan who were in Karabakh at that time.  Their response testified to just the reverse: not the Armenians, but the Muslims were being resettled from Nagorno-Karabakh to various other places in the first months of the Sovietization of Azerbaijan. 

Following the well-known decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP (b) about giving the mountainous portion of Karabakh autonomy, the Center carefully followed the smallest nuances in this direction.  On May 22, 1922, Stalin in a letter to S. Kirov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan KP(b), inquired with sarcasm: “They say that ‘the true Karabakhite’ Fonshteyn represents Karabakh in the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan?” [13] In a response on June 18, Kirov explained to Stalin that someone had misinformed him and therefore listed by name the members of the Central Executive Committee from Karabakh. [14] 

At the same time, while yielding to the Armenian demands, the Center made certain attempts not to allow the subordination of the party organization of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Azerbaijan party organization.  In response to this, on August 1, 1922, Kirov and Matyushin, the chief of the organizational department, telegraphed to Moscow: “The territory of Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan and its party organization is thus part of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.” [15] 

Following three years of preparatory work, the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan published a decree, on July 7, 1923, concerning the formation within Azerbaijan of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh.  This marked the end of the struggle over the territorial membership of Nagorno-Karabakh, one that broke out in the first years of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus.  N. Narimanov, having analyzed this process, on May 27, 1924, wrote to Stalin: “Nagorno-Karabakh under the intense pressure of Mirzoyan has been declared an autonomous oblast.  While I was in power, this was not done not because I was against this autonomy, but simply because the Armenian peasants themselves did not want this.  Mirzoyan at that time with the help of his Dashnak teachers prepared the groundwork for the creation of the autonomy and raised the question in the Transcaucasus kray committee” (Narimanov 1992, p. 59).

N. Narimanov very well understood that the misfortunes of Azerbaijan would not end with this.  He foresaw that the offering of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh was not the end, but only the beginning of a great tragedy.

References

Melik-Shakhnazarov, G. (2008) “Politicization of History as a Source of Tension in Inter-Ethnic Relations,” Mayendorf Declaration of 2 November 2008 and the Situation Around Nagorno-Karabakh, a collection of articles, in Russian, Moscow.

Narimanov, N. (1992) On the History of Our Revolution in the Provinces. Letter to Stalin, Baku, 1992. 

Zakharov, V.A. & S.T. Sarkisyan (2008) “Azerbaijan-Karabakh Conflict: Inception and present,” Mayendorf Declaration of 2 November 2008 and the Situation Around Nagorno-Karabakh, a collection of articles, in Russian, Moscow. 

Notes

[1] Protocol No. 8 of the session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), 2-3 July 1921, Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (hereafter RSASPH), f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 87-88; Protocol No. 8 of the session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP with the representatives of local party and professional organizations, 2-3 July 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 18, d. 59, l. 14.  

[2] Protocol No. 8 of the session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP with the representatives of local party and professional organizations, 2-3 July 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 18, d. 59, l. 12, 14.

[3] Letter of A. Bekzadyan to G. Chicherin, 15 April 1921, Foreign Policy Archive of Russian Federation (hereafter FPA RF), f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 53001, l. 58-59. 

[4] Letter of A. Bekzadyan to G. Chicherin, 15 April 1921, Foreign Policy Archive of Russian Federation (hereafter FPA RF), f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 53001, l. 62. 

[5] Letter of G. Chicherin to Ter-Gabrielyan, 21 April 1921, FPA RF, f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 53001, l. 63. 

[6] Telegram of G. Chicerin to B. Legran, 22 April 1921, FPA RF, f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 53001, l. 65.

[7] Conversation of A. Myasnikov by direct line with G. Ordzhonikidze, August 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 18, d. 177, l. 4.

[8] Protocol of the session of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, 19 July 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 31, l. 122.

[9] Protocol No. 22 of the session of the Political and Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Azerbaijan, 20 July 1921, Political Documents Archive under the President of Azerbaijan Republic (hereafter PDA PAR), f. 1, op. 2, d. 18, l. 94; RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 92, l. 51. 

[10] Protocol of the Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the second section of the Shusha district, 1 August 1921, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 2, d. 18, l. 120-120 ob.

[11] Report of L. Mirzoyan to the Central Committee of the AKP (copy to the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP) about a visit to the mountainous part of Karabakh, 3 August 1921, RSASPH, f. 84, op. 1, d. 95, l. 3 ob. 

[12] See the Information of the Secretary of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP Figatner to Kirov, August 1921, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 129, d. 107, l. 58.

[13] Letter of I. Stalin about the situation in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and about the representation of Karabakh in the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, 22 May 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, op. 11, d. 746, l. 1.

[14] Secret letter of S. Kirov to I. Stalin, 18 June 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, op. 11, d. 746, l. 2.

[15] Telegram of Kirov and Matyushin to the Central Committee of the RKP(b), 1 August 1922, RSASPH, f. 80, op. 25, d. 2, l. 1.