Mitat Celikpala

Associate Professor

TOBB University of Economics and Technologies

  

Despite the attention Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s clash with Israeli president over Gaza attracted in the media, a far more important event at the Davos session as far as Ankara was concerned was a successful exchange between the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers which appears likely to set the stage for the two countries to move beyond the football diplomacy of last fall when Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan.

Following their meeting in Davos, both Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and his Armenian counterpart Edvard Nalbandyan said “normalization in Armenian-Turkish relations is no longer a dream” and that “we have never come this much closer to normalization in bilateral relations.”  And Turkish commentators pointed to talks in Helsinki in December 2008 and Istanbul at the end of January this year as indicative of forward progress in the relationship as well as to the visit of Nalbandyan to Istanbul in his capacity as chairman-in-office of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation are examples at détente between the countries. 

And at the people-to-people level, not only are more Armenians visiting Turkey as tourists but also more Armenians are working there, a trend to which Turkish officials are turning a blind eye.  But despite all this, the glass is still half-empty rather than half-full, with many critical issues, including Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, Nagorno-Karabakh, the genocide issue, and the negative attitude of the Armenian diaspora toward Turkey still far from any resolution.

Given the enormity of these issues, the Turkish foreign ministry has found it extremely difficult to craft a policy for Armenia and the South Caucasus.  And perhaps as a result, many people in Turkey and abroad have criticized Ankara for what it has not done.  Here, I want to avoid that approach and to consider somewhat different issues: what is or at least might be the reason Turkey is pursuing an opening with Armenia and where could that pursuit lead. 

The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 not only focused Turkish attention on the Caucasus, but prompted Ankara to elaborate a security proposal largely independent of its traditional alliances and thus open to a rapprochement with Armenia.  Despite diaspora criticism, Armenia has responded positively to this.  But other forces may be at work here as well.

Some have speculated that Ankara took this step not so much as an intiative of its own but rather as a way to block the US Congress from passing a resolution that would declare official American support for the idea that 1915 was a genocide.  Those who make that argument point to comments made during the recent American electoral campaign by both now President Barack Obama and now Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 

Beyond any question, however, Armenia occupies a prominent place in Turkey‘s policy toward the Caucasus.  Ankara’s economic and strategic engagement with the region has developed in many cases with an eye to the relations of the various players, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, toward Armenia.  And its backing for the principle of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and many of its geopolitical and economic successes in the region show that it is possible for Turkey to pursue a successful regional policy without Armenia and sometimes despite Armenia.   

That achievement gives Ankara important leverage in Yerevan, especially since an increasing number of Armenians recognize that their country must develop stable relations with neighboring countries like Turkey if Armenia is to prosper economically and succeed politically.  But the two countries are far apart on key issues and so progress toward that state of affairs almost certainly will be slow, even though Turkey too would benefit from improved ties.  And nowhere is progress likely to be slower than in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Turkey and Armenia occupy diametrically opposed positions.  

The possibility of three party talks on that subject, including Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, represents a step forward, but far from a conclusive one.  Nonetheless, statements by Turkish and Armenian officials about “approaching normalization” do make sense and could lead to a thawing of this “frozen” conflict, especially if the talks take place and public opinion is swayed as a result.

Another element in this emerging relationship between Ankara and Yerevan is Turkey’s hope that it can use such ties to reduce the influence of the Armenian diaspora.  If the Obama administration ends up supporting the diaspora position on 1915, that would not only increase tensions between Ankara and Washington but also reduce the significance of Armenia for Turkey, something officials in Ankara and Washington certainly know.  

And consequently, just how important each of these factors is in Turkish and Armenian calculations will become clear very soon, although because there are so many at work, the impulse for normalization at one speed or another between Turkey and Armenia is likely to continue.