Mitat Celikpala

Associate Professor

TOBB University of Economics and Technologies

In the wake of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Georgia, Turkey has moved to adopt a more independent approach to the region, a reflection of both the economic and political consequences of instability in the Caucasus and developments inside Turkey itself as well.  But despite this shift in emphasis, Ankara is discovering that its options are more limited than it had hoped, although they do provide more scope for action than Turkey had felt it possessed in the past. 

 

In recent months, Turkey has pursued what its leaders call “problem-free relations with its neighbors,” an approach that underscores Tayyip Erdogan’s statement at the Mediterranean Union summit that Turkey is “a country that offers solutions” to those living nearby and was reflected in his visits to Moscow and Tbilisi immediately after the Russian intervention in Georgia.

 

To understand just how serious a shift that represents, it is worth recalling what Turkey’s traditional approach to the Caucasus has been.  On the one hand, it has supported the independence and territorial integrity of the states in the region, something that has not changed.  And on the other, Ankara has generally fallen in line behind the policies of Western countries, waiting for them to decide on a common approach rather than striking out on its own, something it is now prepared to do.

   

Turkey in fact had been moving toward a more independent position for some time.  It has not refrained from criticizing the West on issues like the Montreux Convention or supporting Russia, given Ankara’s expanding trade ties with Moscow.  But the Georgian war provided an occasion for a more public and multi-dimensional shift, one clearly intended to suggest that Ankara will now seek to play its own role as an actor in the region and beyond. 

 

Because Turkey is a Caucasus state or at least is a neighbor to that region, the war between Russia and Georgia cannot help but adversely affect economic and political projects in which Turkey is closely involved, such as the BSEC, BTC pipeline and BTK railroad.  And the increased tension after the conflict may have the effect of undermining Black Sea-centered initiatives such as the BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony, in which Turkey had invested so much hope.

 

Not surprisingly, the United States reacted negatively to Turkey’s moves seeing them as an indication that Ankara was reorienting itself away from Europe and NATO and toward closer ties with Russia.  Turkish officials worked hard to correct this perception, but the fact that they had to reflected Ankara’s relative inexperience of acting on its own, an approach that requires it explain itself more fully to traditional allies than many in the Turkish capital had assumed. 

Ankara’s new stance was also obvious in the evolution of its relationships with the three countries of the South Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Until the mid-1990s, Georgia did not play an important part in Turkish geopolitical thinking.  But its role in various Turkish energy projects, such as BTC and BTK, and transportation links, such as the BTK railroad, has changed that.  Since the Rose Revolution, Turkey has actively contributed to many civilian, military, social and economic projects to assist Georgia’s development.  Largely as a result, Turkey is now Georgia’s most important trading partner and the largest country in terms of Turkish investment in the CIS countries.  Consequently, instability in Georgia will damage Ankara’s interests and policies more than almost anyone else, and a civil war in Georgia is more of a threat to Turkey than a Georgia without the two breakaway republics but without internal civil war. 

    

If Georgia is important for Turkey’s economic interests in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan remains a crucial element in Ankara’s new calculations.  Historically and culturally, Azerbaijan retains its undisputed priority in Turkish political thinking.  Turkey remains one of the largest foreign investors in Azerbaijan and accounts for some 15 percent of foreign direct investment in the country.  Ankara, at the same time, is the largest investor in Azerbaijan’s non-energy sectors of economy.  Despite the fears of some and the expectations of others, this is unlikely to change, especially given Azerbaijan’s rising economic and political power and its status as a bastion of stability in a troubled region.  

Because Ankara’s policies toward Tbilisi and Baku reflect continuing imperatives, its approach to Armenia has shown perhaps the greatest change.  Turkey has been constrained in its dealings with Yerevan not only because of the latter’s closeness to Moscow but also because of Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjoining regions of Azerbaijan.  But the Georgian war is changing the situation: Armenia has lost its most important trade route north, and Turkey wants as noted above to have better relations with all its neighbors, especially given the current instability in Georgia.  Consequently, the two countries have been cautiously exploring a détente, via in the first instance “football” diplomacy.  However, this relative opening towards Yerevan is rather a reflection of Ankara’s expectations for Armenia to change its approach towards Azerbaijan and Turkey, than an indication of Turkish weakness.    

Looming behind the three countries of the South Caucasus is the Russian Federation, with which Ankara is pursuing what it calls “an enhanced multi-dimensional partnership.”  Trade between the two countries is growing rapidly and is expected to reach $38 billion this year – an amount equal to Russia’s trade turnover with Germany.  And that reality, combined with changes in the Caucasus and inside Turkey itself, promises to move Ankara away from its traditional moorings toward a more independent role, something that will bear watching in the coming weeks and months.