Vugar Seyidov

Independent Analyst

Budapest, Hungary

August this year was a hot month and not just in terms of the weather.  Within a single week, two parallel wars began and ended.  One was an intra-state war between Georgia and South Ossetia which Tbilisi won quickly and decisively.  The other was an international war between Russia and Georgia, which Tbilisi lost equally decisively.  This second war was the second time (after the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict) that two former Soviet republics have fought. 

But if this was a military defeat in which Georgia lost many of its people and much of its key infrastructure, it was not a complete loss because NATO countries have pledged to rebuilt and improve on what was there before.  And if this was a military victory for Russia, it was truly the pyrrhic one because it entailed a diplomatic loss of enormous proportions.  Yes the Russian army triumphed in the field.  But never in its history had Moscow been as isolated after a military victory.  Except for Cuba and Venezuela, not one country came out in support of what Moscow had done. 

Most analysts and governments around the world dismissed Moscow's claims about defending its citizens and Georgian aggression and identified actions of the Russian Federation as an invasion of a sovereign country.  Indeed, Moscow's isolation has been so complete that in Sochi on August 15, President Dmitry Medvedev complained about how the world was covering and treating what Russia had done without asking the question, “who started this war?”  

But even if it is the case that Georgia's moves in South Ossetia provided Moscow with a pretext for action, it certainly did not justify Moscow's drive deep into parts of Georgia which have never been in dispute.  And consequently, both people in the West and people in Russia itself soon recognized that Moscow had gone to war primarily to overthrow the pro-Western government of Mikheil Saakashvili, prevent Georgia from joining NATO, and re-establish Russian control over oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian basin to the West. 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov admitted that Moscow wanted Saakashvili out during a telephone call with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a desire that no Russian official has contradicted. [1] And Lavrov added that Moscow will not negotiate with Saakashvili whom he called “part of a special US project” and whose actions the foreign minister said prove that “he cannot be our partner.” [2] The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice immediately dismissed this argument by pointing out that “Georgia is a democratic government in the Caucasus that has elected its leaders.  To call it a project of anyplace, of anybody, perhaps belies more about the way Russia thinks about its neighbors than the way it thinks about US policy.” [3]

A closer look at what happened in South Ossetia unveils many similarities with other regional crises of the past.  One way or the other, Mikheil Saakashvili, by his attempt to emulate Russian actions in Chechnya to restore his country’s territorial integrity, proved to be the best student of Vladimir Putin who himself proved to learn much from the West by applying the Kosovo blueprint in Georgia to return the boomerang to the Euro-Atlantic camp.  Indeed, on August 16 during the course of the current crisis, Russia's representative at NATO Dmitry Rogozin said that “if someone doesn't respect Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo and Metohija, then they better shut up about the territorial integrity of Georgia,” adding that “our critics behave like wolves that want to eat their sheep when hungry.  But we are not a sheep, we are the Russian bear.” [4] Two days later, on August 18, Alexander Konuzin, Russian ambassador to Serbia, said his country would ask the UN Secretary General for an explanation of how it had been possible to declare Kosovo’s independence without the UN Security Council’s approval.  “We want to know this to apply the same knowledge in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,” Ambassador stated. [5]   

But at the same time, many in the West now stress that official Russian recognition of these “unrecognized” states could boomerang on Russia.  The most obvious consequence as Carmen Eller pointed out in Spiegel would be that “Russia would have to explain why independence is right for South Ossetia and Abkhazia but not for Chechnya.” [6] It is thus unclear how many boomerangs should be flying back and forth for the great powers to decide to stop this spiral of mutual vengeance.  

A major reason behind Moscow's move was a desire to block Georgia's entrance into NATO, an organization that had always regarded protracted conflicts as an obstacle for a membership.  This discourse was broken, thus paving the way for the moves Russia opted for in Georgia, by the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier who on February 19, 2007 stated that the conflicts in Georgia would not prevent NATO from taking in Georgia, [7] a position that Georgian parliament speaker Nino Budzhanadze quickly welcomed. [8] Indeed, history provides numerous examples when divided nations nonetheless gained membership in international and regional organizations: West Germany became part of NATO, Cyprus was included in the European Union without its northern part, and consequently including Georgia in NATO should not be a problem.

A variant of this reason is that Russia invaded Georgia not to keep it out of NATO but rather because it was not yet a member.  That argument rests on an expansive reading of Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty [9] which says that an attack on one member is an attack on all but only commits the alliance to consult on how to respond.  But if Moscow hoped to delay Georgia's entrance into NATO, it has in fact almost certainly accelerated Tbilisi's admission by its action. [10] Still worse from Moscow's perspective, Ukraine will join Georgia in pressing for rapid admission and will likely succeed.  And given that Russia has shown that it is prepared to use force in violation of international law, other former Soviet republics are likely to pursue NATO membership as well.

What lessons should Azerbaijan draw from all this?  Is Moscow likely to move against Azerbaijan?  As far as Russian interests are concerned, there are many similarities between Georgia and Azerbaijan.  Both are linked to the hydrocarbon transportation infrastructure, both cooperate with NATO, and both have problematic regions that look to the north for the military, political and moral support, and thus can be manipulated by Moscow.  And there are additional reasons for a Russian focus on Azerbaijan: it is a far bigger fish to catch than Georgia and from Moscow’s point of view deserves to be “punished” for its role in re-routing the flow of hydrocarbons to the West. 

Moscow’s actions in Georgia highlighted the fragility of the security system in the South Caucasus.  Baku has been supportive of the West’s campaign against terrorism, and it has cooperated closely with NATO in many ways. [11] But the Georgian events show that Baku cannot rely on its balanced foreign policy and that it needs to declare its desire to join the Western alliance soon and work hard to become a full member of the only security system that provides any real guarantees of national sovereignty.

Notes

[1] See for example “Georgia-Russia War Intensifies”, Aljazeera.net, August 11, 2008, available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/08/2008810225659470997.html (accessed August 30, 2008).

[2] “Lavrov: Saakashvili Is Not Sane As a Negotiator”, Russia Profile.org, August 15, 2008, available at http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=CDI+Russia+Profile+List&articleid=a1218816987 (accessed August 30, 2008); “Russia Not To Hold Negotiations With Mikheil Saakashvili”, APA, August 12, 2008, available at http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=86614 (accessed August 30, 2008). 

[3] “Rice Rejects Lavrov’s ‘project’ Accusations”, TREND News, August 14, 2008, available at http://news.trend.az/?show=news&newsid=1269769&lang=EN (accessed August 30, 2008).

[4] “Territorial Integrity of Georgia Impossible Without Territorial Integrity of Serbia”, Free Republic, August 16, 2008, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2062593/posts (accessed August 30, 2008).

[5] “Россия потребует объяснений от ООН”, Московский Комсомолец, August 18, 2008, available at http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2008/08/18/srochno/366725/ (accessed August 30, 2008).

[6] Eller, Carmen. “How Tight Should the Bear Hug?”, Spiegel Online, August 12, 2008, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,571532,00.html (accessed August 30, 2008).

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, “Georgia’s Separatist Conflicts ‘No Obstacle’ to NATO Entry”, Press Kit, February 19, 2007, available at http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=85&info_id=3481 (accessed August 30, 2008).

[8] “Russia Alarmed By Prospect of Georgia’s NATO Membership”, RIA Novosti, April 23, 2007, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/04/mil-070423-rianovosti01.htm (accessed August 30, 2008).

[9] The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO On-line Library, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed August 30, 2008).

[10] See “Merkel Signals Support for Georgia’s NATO Membership Bid”, Deutsche Welle, August 17, 2008, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3570539,00.html?maca=en-newsletter_en_Newsline-2356-txt-nl (accessed August 30, 2008).

[11] See for example Рзаев, С. “В НАТО нас понимают”, Эхо, №20 (1501), February 3, 2007, available at http://www.echo-az.com/archive/2007_02/1501/politica01.shtml (accessed August 30, 2008).