Rovshan Ibrahimov

Head of Department of International Relations

Qafqaz University

 

A country's energy security reflects its ability to have continuing access to sufficient supplies of energy, oil and gas, either from its sources on its own territory or abroad, to allow it to develop.  But for producing countries, like Russia and Azerbaijan, it also involves using its exports or its geographical location to promote its particular geopolitical interests, sometimes by denying other exporters the opportunity to make independent decisions as to the path their supplies will pass to reach ultimate consumers or even to the political arrangements they may make as to their domestic political system or broader foreign policy goals.  

For most of the post-Soviet period, the Russian Federation has played the predominant role in using energy to promote its own security, but increasingly Azerbaijan is doing the same both because of its own supplies of oil and gas and because it has sponsored the creation of alternative transportation routes for that hydrocarbon.  As a result, the strategic importance of Azerbaijan is growing rapidly.

 

Baku launched its independent energy strategy in 1994 when it signed the “Deal of the Century” with Western oil majors to develop the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields.  Despite the political instability resulting from the Karabakh conflict and Russia's objections, Azerbaijan was able to involve companies like BP, AMOCO, and Statoil to develop its enormous reserves of oil and gas.  Since that time, the Azerbaijani authorities have signed 25 additional production sharing agreements. [1]  

Among the most important of these supplemental accords was the 1996 agreement signed with BP to develop the Shahdeniz offshore fields, a site that BP reported in 1999 contained at least 1.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and that is especially important because it is closest to Europe and thus able to supply a major market more efficiently that Russian or Middle Eastern locations.  

But identifying major fields and even signing accords with Western companies was not sufficient for Azerbaijan to be in a position to defend its energy security.  It needed to develop its own pipeline routes westward, and in 1997, it favored the construction of the Baku-Supsa pipeline to supplement the flow through the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline.  That action represented the first time when a post-Soviet state was able to export oil or gas without going through Russia and thus being potentially subject to Moscow's control.  

Azerbaijan however needed more routes in order to handle the expected oil production from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field, especially because given present infrastructure arrangements, much of the oil would have to pass through the Bosphorus, another geopolitical chokepoint.  And consequently, Baku decided to construct a new 1730 km pipeline via Tbilisi and Ceyhan as an alternative route.  Since 2005, Azerbaijan has been able to use this pipeline to export oil to the Mediterranean and hence to Western markets.  In addition, Azerbaijan was involved in building the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline to allow Baku to export gas to world markets. 

Thanks to these pipelines, Azerbaijan has become the only country other than the Russian Federation and the Middle Eastern states supplying European countries with hydrocarbons directly, a situation that enhances its geopolitical standing both absolutely and in comparison with those countries forced to export their oil and gas through Russian territory. 

The importance of this was underscored in 2006 when Russia dramatically increased the price of natural gas.  At that time, Azerbaijan was not only able to stop purchasing Russian natural gas but to help Georgia by exporting Azerbaijani gas to Tbilisi.  And since 2007, Azerbaijan has been exporting gas to Turkey and Greece and will soon send some of it to Italy as well.  

Azerbaijan's ability to do so has enhanced its influence with Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan which are interested in sending their hydrocarbons out via routes that bypass Russia.  And it has made Baku a major player in EU and US plans to build the Nabucco gas pipeline that will carry not only Azerbaijan gas but also gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.  

In addition and perhaps ultimately even more important, Azerbaijan is a major backer of the creation of a Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian energy space.  At a summit in Kyiv in May 2008, the countries of these two regions, along with Ukraine and Poland agreed to establish the infrastructure necessary to guarantee energy security in Eastern Europe.  Had Azerbaijan not agreed to participate, the other states involved could not have proceeded, one more indication of Baku's growing influence on questions of energy security. 

Note

[1] See http://www.socar.az/projects-az.html.