Murad Ismayilov

Research Fellow

Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

The Azerbaijani government is becoming ever more involved with Azerbaijanis living abroad, hoping to use them to influence other states.  Baku’s efforts in this direction are making the various members of this community more self-conscious of their identity if not yet a single united group.  And this new self-consciousness among Azerbaijanis abroad appears likely over time to have an influence on Azerbaijan itself, regardless of how much influence they may have on the countries in which they live.

Given the importance of diasporas in general, it is not surprising that many scholars have considered their role in the formation of national identity.  Shain and Barth (2003, p. 459), for example, note that diasporas, because they are “outside the state but inside the people … often attach more importance to national identity than those inside the state.”  Consequently, at a minimum, they serve as a source of ideas for those living inside the state as well.  That is clearly true for Azerbaijan.

Obviously, as various scholars have shown, tracing this influence is far from easy.  There are simply too many causal chains involved in any particular shift of views either among diaspora communities or among officials and citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  But it is clear that this influence exists to a greater or lesser extent, and this essay focuses on four areas where there are some indications that it already is having an impact.

First, an obvious example of this concerns attitudes toward the war with Armenia.  Although few in the diaspora actually participated in that conflict, it became for them both a defining feature of their identities as Azerbaijanis and a primary focus for their activities in the countries where they are living.  And as Baku is increasing its interaction with them, some of the attitudes of the diaspora may reinforce or even modify the views of some officials and groups at home.

Indeed, these developments may be witnessed already today in, among other things, both the increasingly determined statements of President Ilham Aliyev about his willingness to use military means to recover the occupied territories and his recent remarks about the decision of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic to give up Yerevan and public debates those remarks have prompted.  

The second way in which the diaspora may be having an impact on the homeland Azerbaijan concerns the content of Azerbaijani national identity.  While for most of the last decade, the Azerbaijani government has stressed an inclusive, civic definition of Azerbaijanis’ national identity – the one they have labeled as Azerbaijanism – it now gets increasingly inclined to use the language of ethnic kinship to get Azerbaijani and Turkic diasporas to work together.  While deeper cooperation with Turkic diasporas may only be welcomed, there is a risk that this stress of a pan-Turkic unity may lead to an increasing gap between the definition of Azerbaijani identity for those inside the state (which combines the notion of nationality and citizenship) and that for those outside (based on ethnic kinship and thus excluding representatives of other ethnic groups who might otherwise identify as Azerbaijani). 

On the one hand, that division, especially if it grows, could cost Baku an important tool for promoting the country’s interests abroad, for it may deprive the state of the support of a considerable number of people in diaspora who might otherwise be willing to serve the interests of what they would consider their motherland.  On the other hand, the diaspora’s view is already having an impact on the thinking of many Azerbaijanis within Azerbaijan, potentially leading to a change in their national identity that could create a self-perception of marginalization among many of the ethnic minorities living there and call into question the country’s well-deserved reputation for tolerance.  Moreover, it is not improbable that this may eventually cause the “political conflict over the determination of national identity” (Shain and Barth 2003, p. 459; for pertinent theoretical discussions, see also Bloom 1990, pp. 79-81). 

  

To avoid either of these developments, none of which is in Azerbaijan’s national interests, those institutions in Azerbaijani government and society which shape the discourse about national identity need to develop a uniform conceptualized approach to nation-building and work together towards the creation of a single national identity shared by Azerbaijanis both inside and outside the political borders of the state.  Besides, state bodies concerned should work more actively to reach out to diasporas of states with whom Azerbaijan has strategic and/or friendly relations based on its national interests rather than ethnic kinship. 

The effect of this interest-based diasporic cooperation will be the formation of changed perception among the Azerbaijani diaspora that the unity of action with Turkic and other diasporas is generated by the convergence of national interests of their respective states, rather than sheer kinship considerations; with the important side-effect being the increase of their allegiance to the state, rather than to a single ethnic group.  Working towards further solidifying the links and relations with the Jewish diaspora may be a good starting point and an exemplary model for establishing similar relations with other ‘friendly’ diasporas in future.  Also important in this regard would be organization of regular multi-lateral forums with the participation of Azerbaijani, Turkic and other states’ diasporas, which will contribute to the formation of the sense of unity among diasporas based on common interests rather than ethnicity or religion.       

 

Third, the increasing activities of Azerbaijani communities in countries like Iran, the Russian Federation and the United States and their multicultural influence on Azerbaijan almost certainly will contribute to a further strengthening of Azerbaijanism as a state-promoted national identity and thus to what Baku calls its balanced foreign policy.  But for that to be sustained in the future, the Azerbaijani government will need to find new and strengthen existing mechanisms to increase its own contacts with various parts of the Azerbaijani diasporas around the world, and their contacts with each other.  Not only will such mechanisms provide for intercultural exchange among Azerbaijanis coming from different cultural contexts and thereby keep up the multicultural content of their national identity, but they will also serve as a constant reminder of a single idea that binds them all together, that of allegiance to and affection for the state of Azerbaijan. 

 

Toward that end, Azerbaijan might find it useful to introduce the concept of “dual nationality” (as opposed to “dual citizenship”), thus promoting the notion that Azerbaijanis are part of Azerbaijan regardless of where they live and what citizenship they have.  That will increase the linkages between the diaspora and the homeland and slow any assimilation of the diasporas into their host societies.  This institution may be especially attractive, for it will promote travel and contacts without allowing the diaspora to play a direct political role in the homeland through voting (see King and Melvin 1999-2000, p. 114).  

Fourth, the Azerbaijani diaspora may have an important influence on Azerbaijan’s domestic polity by turning into a valuable force behind democratization of their homeland.  Because of their natural concerns about their own image in the hostland, which is derivative from the way in which Azerbaijan is viewed by the peoples and governments of the countries in which they live, members of the diaspora are likely to push the democratic governments and relevant international organizations (e.g., Council of Europe, OSCE, EU) in the countries of residence to adopt a more critical approach to the issue of Azerbaijan’s democratization.  Also, not only are they likely to insist that Azerbaijan act in ways that will attract positive notice but also regularly to report to Azerbaijanis through various channels of the way in which other countries view what the Azerbaijani government is doing at home.  Besides, those members of the diaspora who hope to return to the country in the future have the greatest interest in the homeland’s welfare and democratic development and thus in pushing it in a positive direction.   

Obviously, the impact of Azerbaijanis living abroad is far broader than on identity issues alone.  Indeed, while Azerbaijani community in Iran does not fall under the classic definition of diaspora and is not treated as such by the Azerbaijani government, it may in the longer term become a factor to be considered by both Azerbaijani and Iranian governments in their efforts to strengthen the bilateral relations. 

 

If the relationship of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis living abroad continues to expand, if the latter not only links itself increasingly to the homeland but also becomes more united, then it will be easier to trace these lines of influence.  But as was noted above, there are already indications of just how important this influence could be if the Azerbaijanis living outside Azerbaijan find a common voice and raise it in their dealings with Baku.

 

References & Recommended Literature

Armstrong, John A. (1976). ‘Mobilized and Proletarian Diaspora’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, June, pp. 393-408.

Bloom, William (1990). Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R. (2005). ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, January, pp. 1-19.

Clifford, James (1994). ‘Diasporas’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 3, Further Inflections: Towards Ethnographies of the Future, August, pp. 302-338. 

Cohen, Robin (1996). ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 72, No. 3, Ethnicity and International Relations, July, pp. 507-520.

King, Charles and Neil J. Melvin (1999-2000). ‘Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia’, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter, pp. 108-138.

Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth (2003). ‘Diasporas and International Relations Theory’, International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3, Summer, pp. 449-479.