



## School of International Affairs

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### Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

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#### **WHAT DOES TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT MEAN FOR AZERBAIJAN?**

*The decision of Turkey and Armenia to restore diplomatic relations that Ankara broke off in 1993 to protest Armenia's actions in the Karabakh war and the possibility that the restoration of these ties will lead to a re-opening of the borders between the two countries have sparked intense discussions in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan in the World has surveyed a group of leading commentators about their reactions and expectations. Their answers are reproduced below.*

*Azerbaijan in the World:* How do you evaluate what Turkey and Armenia have done?

*Elkhan Polukhov [Spokesperson for Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs]:* Azerbaijan has repeatedly made clear that we believe the so-called rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey should proceed in parallel with the resolution of the Azerbaijan-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We recognize that every country has the right to establish diplomatic relations with other countries. But in the current circumstances, such moves can cast a shadow on ties between Azerbaijan and

Turkey that have deep historical roots. In assessing the possible signing of these protocols, we rely on the statements of Turkish officials, particularly Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has repeatedly said that Turkey will not take any step within this process that might harm Azerbaijan.

*Asim Mollazade* [Milli Majlis deputy and chairman of the Democratic Reforms Party]: The signing of the two protocols by Turkey and Armenia have damaged the interests of Azerbaijan and created problems in the Azerbaijan-Armenian negotiation process over Nagorno-Karabakh. After securing the agreement with Turkey, Armenia has shown a particularly unconstructive approach in the talks, something that jeopardizes the peace process and raises questions as to whether the Turkish parliament will ratify the protocols. As a result, Turkey is losing politically, economically, and morally.

*Vafa Guluzade* [former national security advisor and now an independent analyst]: The signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols is the beginning of a process of geopolitical change in the region. That is, Russia will be withdrawing from the South Caucasus, and the South Caucasus will pass entirely under the control of the United States. This process will consist of two stages: the first stage will occur with the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia, and the second stage will be the resolution of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This process could have begun and ended in a possibly more just way, that is, it could have begun with the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani lands and the consequent transformation of Armenia from an aggressor state into a normal one, and after this, one could then expect the opening of its borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, this variant is more complicated to the extent that the process of the resolution of this conflict will be more problematic both for Armenians and for Azerbaijanis. The United States, in my view, is pushing that variant which it has already prepared but which it has not yet made public. The gradual drawing away of Armenia from Russia and its parallel integration with Turkey are guaranteed: Three million-strong Armenia will easily integrate in the 72-million strong Turkey in a purely economic way. But after a certain time, after Russia and Armenia come to terms with the new situation, the second stage will begin, and we will then see a change in geopolitics and a broadening of the sphere of influence of the US, after which will inevitably follow the expansion of NATO. What happened on October 10 is the beginning of this process.

*Rasim Musabekov* [an independent political analyst]: On the whole, I evaluate what has happened in a positive way. In principle, we should welcome the normalization of relations and the renewal of cooperation among all countries of the region. The signing of the protocols marks an end of Armenia's baseless territorial pretensions against Turkey and makes Yerevan's conduct of an anti-Turkish approach more difficult.

*AIW*: What do you expect will happen next?

*Mollazade*: Ankara is likely to manoeuvre and delay the ratification of the protocols in the parliament. This will however only last until the US president's traditional April speech related to the 1915 events. Azerbaijan in turn who has so far been selling its gas to Turkey for the price of USD 120 per bcm will increase the price to bring it to match the international standards.

*Guluzade:* The next step will be the opening of the border and the beginning of economic cooperation. Turkey will take control of small and mid-sized business in Armenia, which Russia does not control now. Russia has already bought the Armenian energy system, as well as other major enterprises and firms, but even taken together, these do not form a large share of the Armenian economy. Therefore, I think that gradually, Russia will lose its positions and Moscow will have to play the role in the region of a junior partner to the United States. This has already begun. For example, Russia has promised not to veto a UN Security Council resolution on Iran's nuclear program and – as per the agreement with the US – is working with Iran, whose government has now promised not to enrich uranium on its own territory but to do this in Russia. Iran, in turn, seeing that it no longer can count on Russia's support, is beginning to work with the IAEA Sestet.

*Musabekov:* Neither Armenia nor Turkey is likely to ratify the protocols quickly. In Armenia, the dissatisfaction of many Armenian citizens and especially within the diaspora probably means that the deputies there will insist on modifications and reservations. And the Turkish parliament won't rush. There, many parliamentarians, not only among opposition parties but even within the ruling AKP, are opposed to the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border prior to the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani lands. One also cannot exclude provocations by extremist groups who are prepared by any means to torpedo the protocols and their implementation.

*AIW:* What is your assessment of the likely impact of the accords on the security dynamics of the broader region and especially on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

*Polukhov:* Again, we rely on the promises we have received from Turkey that the ratification of the protocols in the Turkish parliament and all further steps will take place in parallel with the settlement of the Azerbaijan-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Any unilateral actions on this issue will call into question the entire security structure in the region and increase tensions across the board.

*Mollazade:* For Azerbaijan, the isolation of Armenia was the only non-violent way of pushing Armenia toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia will thus prompt Baku to begin searching for more active measures to secure the return of the occupied territories. And Turkey's decision may also lead some in Yerevan to try to exploit Armenian separatist views in Georgia in the Javakh region.

*Guluzade:* The process of the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will not proceed in parallel with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First will be the opening of the borders and then as a separate question will be resolved the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. An American plan will be offered, and it is possible that it will be presented as a joint Russian-American plan in order not to offend Russia as much. In general, one should not deny that the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border can have a positive influence on the process of the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Any new cooperation will have a positive influence on the situation in the region. Indeed, the antagonism between Turkey and Armenia in fact is part of American-Russian antagonism. Armenia as such does not represent a great deal. Its interests are not a matter of serious concern for the great powers except as pawns in a larger struggle. Armenia as a state in the region will have to

cooperate with Azerbaijan and with Turkey because it cannot move to California, where the diaspora is.

*Musabekov:* Work on the protocols allowed the Turkish leadership to put pressure on the US, Russia and France to accelerate work on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Purely at a psychological level, many in Azerbaijan felt that Ankara was distancing itself from Azerbaijan by these actions, but the Turkish leadership reaffirmed its commitment not to open the borders without progress on Karabakh, thus killing off the hopes of those in Armenia who thought they could set Baku and Ankara at odds. Whatever the Armenians say, there is an opportunity to synchronize the process of the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Joint efforts of Ankara and Baku can make this happen.

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### **TURKMENISTAN'S "MIXED" SIGNALS**

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Over the two months, Turkmenistan has sent Azerbaijan and the world decidedly mixed signals. In August, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammadov announced that Ashgabat would build a new naval base on the shores of the Caspian Sea in order to protect his country's borders and to protect it and its coastline "from evil-minded foreigners," but then in September, at the United Nations General Assembly session in New York, he called for "an international conference on disarmament issues in the region of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin," saying that his government "would also welcome constructive proposals of the international community and individual nations to promote disarmament processes."

The Turkmenistan president's first declaration came only weeks after he declared on July 24<sup>th</sup> that Ashgabat would go to the International Court of Arbitration to get a ruling on the ownership of disputed sections of the Caspian Sea, including Sardar/Kapaz and what Turkmenistan calls Oman and Osman. As of this writing, the Turkmenistan government has not yet filed this case, apparently because the country's foreign ministry has not yet succeeded in finding "the international experts" and "qualified lawyers" the president told his chief diplomat Rashid Meredov to assemble in order to examine documents dating back to Soviet times.

It is of course possible that this International Court would conclude that it lacks jurisdiction unless Azerbaijan were to voluntarily submit to that body's ruling. Ashgabat may face yet another problem: its own lack of clear-cut standing. But if Turkmenistan does follow through and files a brief, Baku almost certainly will have its own lawyers working just as hard to counter the Turkmenistan appeal.

What do all these moves mean for Baku? An answer to that question lies with Turkmenistan's policy of *bitaraplyk*, or "neutrality." That concept, which is repeated constantly, is an essential part of Turkmenistan's national psychology, of its sense of what in fact the country is. It helps to explain why Ashgabat is so proud of its

hosting of the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, why it avoids both joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization despite Russian pressure or having an American base, which some in the United States have proposed.

Given that set of attitudes, it appears likely that the Turkmenistan president's announcement of plans to set up a naval base was intended as a bargaining chip in negotiations over projects like the Nabucco pipeline. Some actually saw the decision to arbitrate as a progressive option. Ilham Shaban, for example, an Azerbaijan-based energy expert, has told RFE/RL that a court verdict – if “fair,” of course – would be a “natural step,” and that arbitral resolution could actually help relations between the two countries and could even stabilize the political ground for a project of the size and scope of Nabucco.

Another part of the explanation for this set of mixed messages reflects Ashgabat's shift in its economic policies from the time of former president Saparmurat “Turkmenbashi” Niyazov. This December will mark the third anniversary of the death of Niyazov who kept the country isolated, and in that intervening period, his successors have shown themselves to be far more open to foreign investment than he was. Given that new openness, Turkmenistan clearly enjoys the interest it has attracted because of its resources and location.

Many countries, not least of which is the People's Republic of China, have manifested an interest in developing Turkmenistan's South Yolotan-Osman gas field, the full extent of which has only recently been announced. China has been involved in Turkmenistan for many years and now would like to expand its position and has built a new gas pipeline from Turkmenistan's Eastern fields to China. That links Ashgabat to Beijing and helps to explain why Turkmenistan has resisted Russian pressure to join a new gas cartel. And together with the China pipeline, the Nabucco project, if it is realized, will also link Turkmenistan into a broader web of interrelationships than it has had at any time since 1991.

An accident last April not only opened a window of opportunity for the United States and Europe but also provided hints about Turkmenistan's new pragmatism. The April 14th explosion ruptured Ashgabat's main pipeline to Russia. That line is now close to being repaired, but the damage done to Ashgabat's bottom line appears to have been far more significant and longer-lasting than many had expected. While the pipeline to Russia has been repaired, it is far from clear whether relations with Russia's Gazprom have been rebuilt as well.

Because it was not able to export gas for an extended period, Turkmenistan suffered significant losses, and those losses in turn have led Ashgabat to a new appreciation of the value of diversification of routes lest it suffer again. That pragmatism has little to do with any anti-Russian sentiment as some have thought but rather reflects a very sober calculation of the country's best interests as a gas exporter.

Indeed, Ashgabat continues to work with Russian firms like the independent Itera which in early September announced that it had reached agreement with Turkmenistan to develop an offshore block in the Caspian. Itera has a long history in the Turkmenistan and Russian petroleum markets, and the composition of its management team – technocrats and politicians from Soviet Turkmenistan – gives it advantages as a middleman for Turkmenistan in reaching Western markets via Russia.

At the same time and reflecting Turkmenistan's new pragmatism and appreciation of its own natural wealth, Ashgabat has reached out to other firms, including Germany's *Rheinisch-Westfaelische Elektrizitaetswerk* (RWE), to gain access to Western expertise and markets and guaranteeing that Turkmenistan will never again be dependent on a single route or a single firm. That approach helps to explain why some of Turkmenistan's statements and actions appear contradictory: In fact, together they suggest that for all the attention any one of them may receive, Ashgabat will pursue the very best deals it can for the development of its hydrocarbon reserves.

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### **TURKIC REPUBLICS REAFFIRM TIES TO TURKISHNESS AT NAKHCHIVAN**

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The presidents of Azerbaijan, three of the five Turkic republics of Central Asia, and Turkey reaffirmed their common cultural and political heritage at the 9th Summit of the Turkic States in Nakhchivan, a meeting of particular symbolic importance given Turkey's decision to restore diplomatic ties with Armenia and not without practical significance because of the decision of the leaders to create a new Turkic Cooperation Council and to re-energize the TURKSOY cultural cooperation organization.

As they have done eight times before since October 1992, the presidents of Turkey and of a majority of the Turkic countries – the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan again did not attend – met at the beginning of October to reaffirm their linguistic, cultural and political commonalities. This time, they were hosted by Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev in the city of Nakhchivan, the capital of the non-contiguous portion of Azerbaijan, whose border as both Turkey's President Abdullah Gul and other leaders pointed out extends to Turkey and thus symbolizes the even more important underlying connections between the Republic of Turkey and the post-Soviet Turkic states.

The importance of that symbolism would be hard to overstate, especially since the Nakhchivan meeting took place only one week before Turkey signed two protocols with Armenia that will upon ratification restore diplomatic ties between Ankara and Yerevan, an action many especially in the Turkic world have viewed so negatively that Turkish leaders have had to reiterate again and again, including at Nakhchivan, that Turkey will do nothing to harm the interests of Azerbaijan and that Ankara will not open the Turkish border with Armenia until there is significant progress on the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Republic of Azerbaijan.

But in addition to the symbolism, the Nakhchivan session will be remembered for three concrete actions. First, the assembled presidents agreed to the formation of a Council of Cooperation of the Turkic Countries (to be known as "the Turkic Council") that is intended to serve as a narrow, executive arm of the recently established

Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Language Countries which met in Baku at the end of September.

Second, the leaders agreed to increase the funding and activity of TURKSOY, which works to preserve and develop Turkic culture, a task that is likely to become especially important as negotiations for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan proceed. In his speech to the meeting, President Aliyev made it clear that efforts in this direction were especially important from his point of view not only for his own country but "for all Turkic lands."

And third, the meeting, like its predecessors, adopted a resolution which commits the member states to promote through multi-lateral and bilateral arrangements humanitarian, cultural, economic and political linkages among them and which also reaffirms that all of these states are committed to the principle of territorial integrity.

One Moscow expert, Aleksandr Karavayev, observed following the Nakhchivan sessions that "the main plus" of the meeting was its reaffirmation of the importance of culture in the political lives of these countries. References to such "blood family ties in the family of Turkic leaders sounds much more organic and convincing than talk about Eurasian brotherhood out of the mouths of Russian leaders" (Karavayev 2009).

Indeed, he said, "the civil national paradigm, established by Kemal Ataturk, represents a unique bridge to the West for peoples following these principles and 'Turkism' is a mental link to a more modernized social construct than is Islam." As a result, those who dismiss these meetings because there are few "practical" actions miss the point: it is that reaffirmation which is critically important for all the peoples of the countries whose leaders take part.

In his concluding remarks, President Aliyev as host said that "at one time, the historical territory of Azerbaijan was cut off and handed over to Armenia. As a result, not only was Nakhchivan cut off from Azerbaijan, but the entire Turkic world was geographically cut into pieces. And it is thus symbolic that today we are taking decisions here in Nakhchivan which re-establishes the moral and political unity of the Turkic peoples."

That unity may soon matter more than ever before. As political observer Eleonora Abakuliyeva told Moscow's *Nezavismaya gazeta*, recent events in this broader region mean that Turkic unity may soon be something more than declarative language but serve as the basis for "an 'idea of unification' like that of the Council of Europe or the League of Arab States" (Mamedov 2009).

And because the reaffirmed Turkic unity would both cross the borders of the former Soviet space, something organizations like GUAM have not done, and be based on an ancient cultural tradition whose followers are now committed to secularism, such a newly organized union could play an even more profound role in the geopolitics of the greater Caucasus and Central Asian regions than anyone can now imagine, especially at a time when changes like those between Armenia and Turkey have put so many things in motion.

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## **A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY**

### **I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy**

President Ilham Aliyev tells the 9th Summit of Chiefs of State of the Turkic Language Countries that "the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Language Countries is an enormously important event," one that "testifies to the fact that ties among [these] countries are developing ever more dynamically." In his concluding remarks, President Aliyev said that "all the Turkic language countries except Turkey are young as independent countries, and we are experiencing the youth of our independence. For any country, the formation and strengthening of independence is accompanied by great difficulties. Overcoming these obstacles requires great efforts, great political will, vision, and courage. Today, we with a feeling of great pride can say that the situation in all Turkic language countries is very positive, the political situation is stable, and the economic crisis has not had a major influence on us. The young independent lands have confirmed their independence" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175148.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev says in Chisinau where he attends the CIS summit that he is "absolutely convinced that the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border must proceed in a parallel fashion." He adds that "between these two processes there is no official link, but an unofficial one exists. This tie must be preserved and the two questions must be resolved in a parallel fashion and at the same time." Otherwise, "the status quo in the region could change in a negative way" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176095.html>).

The Foreign Ministry releases a statement on the occasion of the signing of the two protocols by Turkey and Armenia saying that without contesting the right of any state to enter into such arrangements, the normalization of relations "between Turkey and Armenia before the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories directly contradicts the national interests of Azerbaijan and overshadows the spirit of brotherly relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey built on deep historical roots." Moreover, the statement continues, "the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border in a unilateral order will put into question the architecture of peace and security in the region" ([http://mfa.gov.az/eng/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=580&Itemid=1](http://mfa.gov.az/eng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=580&Itemid=1)).



Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov says that Azerbaijan is “prepared for a compromise resolution” of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as long as the country’s territorial integrity is maintained. It is obvious, he says, that “the conflict does not allow for any 100 percent one-sided solution” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175521.html>).

## **II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan**

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that “in the process of normalization of relations with Armenia, Turkey will operate within the framework of [his] speech to the parliament of Azerbaijan” in which he repeated that Ankara will not take any step that will undermine the rights of Azerbaijan. And he suggests that “if the problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan get resolved, the process of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations will be simplified” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176521.html>).

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that “Armenia must escape from the pressure of the international Armenian lobby” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176188.html>). He reiterates that “Turkey will not take any steps which contradict the interests of Azerbaijan” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176140.html>).

## **III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy**

15 October

President Ilham Aliyev is named Man of the Year by the Forum of Turkic Language Diasporas of Canada (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176799.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Qatar’s Culture, Arts and Heritage Minister Hamid al-Qawari (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176856.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Lithuania’s deputy foreign minister, Evaldas Ignatavicius (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176894.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov hands over a formal protest to the Turkish embassy concerning the lack of respect shown to Azerbaijan’s state flag at the Turkish-Armenian football match on October 14 (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176893.html>).

Ziyafet Askerov, the chairman of the Milli Majlis security and defense committee, says that any opening of the Turkish-Armenian border before the withdrawal of Armenia from the occupied territories would be “a knife in the back of Azerbaijan” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176876.html>).

Turkish President Abdulla Gul says that “Turkey and Armenia are not writing history but making it” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176792.html>).

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that "Turkey will do everything possible for the resolution of the Karabakh problem" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176784.html>).

Bankers from the Caucasus, Central Europe and Central Asia create a Central-Eurasian Federation of Bank Association of Banks. Its headquarters is to be in Baku (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/176845.html>).

#### 14 October

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives a copy of the letters of credence of the incoming Netherlands ambassador to Baku, Jan Lucas van Hoorn (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176723.html>).

Vladimir Dorokhin, Moscow's ambassador in Baku, says that "the process of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement must not affect the solution of the Karabakh conflict" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176729.html>).

The Party of the Left of Azerbaijan calls on the Milli Majlis to debate the Turkish-Armenian protocols (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176662.html>).

A demonstration takes place in front of the Turkish embassy in Baku to protest Ankara's signing of the protocols with Yerevan (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176702.html>).

Samad Seyidov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that no one can undermine relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176711.html>).

Azerbaijani diaspora organizations begin negotiations with Turkish diaspora groups in Europe (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176709.html>).

Baku hosts the Second International Banking Conference of the CIS (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/176613.html>).

#### 13 October

President Ilham Aliyev sends a letter of greeting to the Sixth Conference of Ministers of Culture of the Islamic Countries underscoring Baku's desire to continue to expand cooperation with them (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176463.html>).

Hulusi Kılıç, Turkey's ambassador to Baku, says that "Turkey will always observe the interests of Azerbaijan" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176460.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, deputy chairman of the ruling *Yeni Azerbaijan* Party, says that Baku "believes that Turkey will not take any step that contradicts the interests of Azerbaijan" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176450.html>).

Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican Peoples Party of Turkey, says that "if the countries which are co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group want peace in the Caucasus, let them put an end to the Armenian occupation." Had they done so

earlier, he continues, "today the situation would be different" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176568.html>).

Mustafa Kabakchy, a Turkish parliamentarian who heads the Turkey-Azerbaijan Parliamentary Friendship Group, says that the protests in Baku about the signing of the protocols between Ankara and Yerevan are the kind of things that happens "in democratic countries." But he says that Azerbaijanis should remember and trust the promises of Turkey's leaders not to take any step that would undermine Azerbaijan's national interests" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176573.html>).

12 October

President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva visit Jordan where they are received by King Abdullah II and Queen Rani (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176280.html>).

Cemal Çiçek, deputy prime minister of Turkey, says that "Ankara will act according to the interests of Azerbaijan" on the question of opening the borders with Armenia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176422.html>). Meanwhile, the Turkish embassy in Baku releases a statement of regret about inaccurate Baku media reports that had suggested Ankara is about to open the border (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176401.html>).

Oktay Asadov, speaker of the Milli Majlis, is received by Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka during his visit to Minsk (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176364.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, deputy chairman of the Milli Majlis security and defense committee, says "Azerbaijan cannot remain silent and indifferent" to the consequences of the protocols Turkey has signed with Armenia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176340.html>).

Turkish President Abdulla Gul says that "resolving all Turkish-Armenian problems in one instant is impossible," adding that "an enormous iceberg cannot thaw in a single moment. Difficulties are possible; however decisiveness and will will help resolve them" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176291.html>).

Azerbaijan opens an honorary consulate in Genoa (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176286.html>).

10 October

Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov meets with Korean officials in Seoul for the second round of political consultations between the two countries (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176181.html>).

Nabi Shensoy, Turkey's ambassador in Washington, says that one of Ankara's "main interests is the interests of fraternal Azerbaijan" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176151.html>).

Asef Gadzhiyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says after meetings in Brussels that "the European Peoples Party is interested in cooperating with Azerbaijan's PEA" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176150.html>).

9 October

President Ilham Aliyev meets with his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko in Chisinau (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176117.html>).

Gabrielle Keller, French ambassador in Azerbaijan, says that in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict three principles must be observed: territorial integrity, the right to self-determination and the non-use of force (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176034.html>). The ambassador adds that Azerbaijan is "a very important partner for the European Union" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176020.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that Azerbaijan's vote for Movlud Chavushoglu was "decisive" in his election as president of that body (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176094.html>).

Vladimir Dorokhin, Moscow's ambassador to Baku, says that "in Azerbaijan have been created all conditions for believers," including those of the Russian Orthodox Church (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176084.html>).

Sheykhulislam Haji Allahshukur Pashazade, Head of the Caucasus Muslims Spiritual Board, is presented with the medal of St. Bartholomew by Bishop Aleksandr of Baku and the Caspian Region of the Russian Orthodox Church (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/176072.html>).

8 October

President Ilham Aliyev meets with his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan in Chisinau, on the sidelines of the CIS Summit (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175984.html>). The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group say there was progress (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175972.html>).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says that the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia should give results on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175962.html>).

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says that Ankara "expects a great deal from the meeting of Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175912.html>).

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says that "Turkey will do nothing which could harm the rights of Azerbaijan" as Ankara works to normalize relations with Armenia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175821.html>).

The Russian foreign ministry confirms Moscow's willingness to operate the Gabala and Armavir radar sites together with the United States (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175948.html>).

The Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry says that Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan's statement to a UNESCO conference "at a minimum elicits surprise" because the Armenian diplomat failed to talk about the massive destruction of

Azerbaijani cultural sites in the occupied territories but rather acted as if no such destruction had occurred (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175913.html>).

Fakhraddin Gurbanov, Baku's ambassador to London, says that "Azerbaijan intends to increase its positions in the energy markets of Europe" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175822.html>).

Agricultural Minister Ismat Abbasov receives South Korean agricultural official Kim Jung Zhin to discuss cooperation (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/175910.html>).

## 7 October

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives incoming Italian Ambassador to Baku Mario Baldi (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175802.html>).

Philip Gordon, US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasian affairs, says that Washington hopes that the meeting of President Ilham Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan in Chisinau on October 8 will be productive (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175676.html>).

Hulusi Kılıç, Turkish ambassador to Baku, says that those attending the Turkey-Armenia football match on October 14 will be permitted to carry Azerbaijani flags, media reporting to the contrary notwithstanding (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175748.html>).

Zakir Hashimov, Baku's ambassador to Ankara, says that "Azerbaijan is certain in the seriousness of the declarations of the Turkish government" that Turkey will not take any steps "contradicting the interests of Azerbaijan" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175719.html>).

Ilgar Mukhtarov, Baku's ambassador to Mexico, meets with Javier Ramirez, the speaker of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175675.html>).

Baku hosts a session of the GUAM counter-terrorism subgroup (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175790.html>).

Bruno Pouezet, UN resident coordinator in Azerbaijan, says that 74.3 percent of Azerbaijanis moving abroad are going to Europe (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175712.html>).

## 6 October

President Ilham Aliyev receives Ivetta Macejkova, the chairman of the Constitutional Court of Slovakia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175598.html>).

Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Safar Abiyev receives Robert Bradtke, the new American co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175611.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov says that Azerbaijan is "prepared for a compromise resolution" of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as long as the country's

territorial integrity is maintained. He adds that "the conflict does not allow for any 100 percent one-sided solution" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175521.html>).

The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group do not present any documents to the Azerbaijani or Armenian governments during their meeting in Chisinau (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175502.html>). The co-chairs do meet with Bayram Safarov, the head of the Azerbaijan Community of Nagorno-Karabakh, during their visit to Baku (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175487.html>).

Farkhad Badalbeyli, the rector of Baku's Music Academy, says that "negotiations between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Karabakh should take place on neutral territory" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175510.html>).

Mihaly Bayer, the special representative of Hungary for the Nabucco project, says that "Azerbaijan always will be a reliable supplier of gas for Europe." He adds that "in principle Nabucco could transport Iranian gas" (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/175534.html>).

Boris Klimchuk, Kyiv's ambassador to Baku, says that the supply of Azerbaijani oil for processing in Ukraine will promote the development of the Odessa-Brody pipeline project (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/175475.html>).

Rafael Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Sweden, Norway and Finland, speaks to the Aleksanteri Institute of Finland on "Azerbaijan and Regional Dynamics" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175629.html>).

## 5 October

President Ilham Aliyev receives the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175425.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Daniel Poneman, US deputy energy minister (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175426.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Gen. Tarik Majid, chairman of the Committee of the United Staffs of the Armed Forces of Pakistan (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175427.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that "the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan must be resolved in the shortest possible time for prolonged peace in the region" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175442.html>).

Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Safar Abiyev receives Andrew Weber, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Programs (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175443.html>).

Murat Yalchyntash, head of the Istanbul chamber of commerce, calls for Qatar to be a participant in the Nabucco project (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/175359.html>).

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan officials from numerous ministries meet in Astana for consultations on a wide range of bilateral issues (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175400.html>).

Israel's largest defense industry company, Elbit Systems, opens a representative office in Baku (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/175323.html>).

#### 4 October

Alexander Vershbow, US assistant secretary of defense, says that "the United States is considering cooperation with the Russian Federation at the radar sites in Gabala and Armavir" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175265.html>).

Bernard Fassier, French co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, says that talks between the co-chairs and Armenian officials in Yerevan were "constructive" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175258.html>).

#### 3 October

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that "Turkey wants to establish friendly ties with [all] neighboring countries" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175222.html>).

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says that "Turkey is optimistic on the question of the normalization of relations with Armenia and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175140.html>).

Tehran's economics ministry announces that it has signed economic cooperation accords with Azerbaijan, as well as with Russia, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/175207.html>).

Seoul names Lee Jie Ha its new ambassador to Baku. Lee will take up his post in November (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175164.html>).

#### 2 October

President Ilham Aliyev receives Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev and tells him that political and economic relations between their two countries are both "at a very high level" and growing. The two sign a series of bilateral cooperation agreements (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175005.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev arrives in Nakhchivan to host the 9th Summit of the Chiefs of State of the Turkic Language Countries (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175133.html>).

National Security Minister Lt. Gen. Eldar Mahmudov receives Amangeldy Shabdarbayev, the chairman of Kazakhstan's National Security Committee, to discuss cooperation between their two agencies (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175126.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, a deputy in the Milli Majlis, says that the declarations by Washington and Moscow about the use of the Gabala radar station are "a positive factor" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175078.html>).

Samad Seidov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that reports Azerbaijan had voted to deprive Russia

of its voting membership in that body are not true  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175056.html>).

The office of the chairman-in-office of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, at the insistence of the Azerbaijani delegation to that body, calls in the Armenian PACE delegation to tell its members that their distribution of a brochure and DVD about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is impermissible  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175076.html>).

Vahid Ahmadov, head of the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan inter-parliamentary working group, says that Azerbaijan has already shown its willingness to compromise on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/175032.html>).

### **Note to Readers**

The editors of "Azerbaijan in the World" hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email ([adabiweekly@ada.edu.az](mailto:adabiweekly@ada.edu.az)). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.