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## School of International Affairs

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#### **THE EU'S EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND REGIONAL POLITICS**

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On December 13, 2010, the second Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers Meeting was held in Brussels, making this a useful time to evaluate the European Union's latest initiative towards its Eastern neighborhood. Reviewing a report submitted by the Commission on the implementation of this program, the Foreign Ministers of the 27 EU Member States and the 6 partner countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) discussed both what has been achieved and what they hope to achieve to enhance "political association and economic integration" throughout the region (European Commission 2010).

After gathering steam at the time of its inception—not least because of its denunciation by Russia—the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative has since been receiving less attention in EU foreign policy debates, but this year could mark a turning point because of favorable developments both within the EU—the Hungarian and Polish presidencies of the EU—and regionally—EU-Russia rapprochement, but fleshing out what remains for now a rather limited program will ultimately depend on a more cohesive vision within the EU and a more consistent involvement from the partner countries. In other words, it will rest on the capacity of the various actors involved to converge—or at least not to disagree—on what to put behind this project.

The EU's role as an actor in international relations depends on an interplay between internal political factors and the perceptions and expectations of outsiders (Bretherton & Vogler 1999). More than for its actual content, which fails to innovate much beyond traditional neighborhood policy tools, the EaP is interesting because of the meanings various stakeholders attach to it. Their understanding of, and reactions to, this initiative thus are an indication of their broader strategies for and visions of the region.

Consistent with the broader European Neighborhood Policy, the European Commission designed the EaP as a platform to foster peace and stability in its periphery. Despite that, however, the EaP is sometimes accused of lacking ambition, as it streamlines rather than radically transforms existing policies; but before discussing its reception, the three geopolitical priorities it serves—the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA), energy and migration—ought to be emphasized.

Simply put, by means of the EaP, the EU aims at integrating neighbour countries within the European geo-economic space and thus fostering economic growth in the region. Such integration requires a legislative harmonization based on the '*acquis communautaire*,' in other words the adoption of a large number of rules, which the EaP is meant to facilitate. While neighbours are expected to benefit in the long run, such a process can also be costly and difficult for the economies involved. For instance, post-Soviet countries are experiencing great difficulties in moving away from former agricultural standards (the 'GOST') toward more demanding European standards. The common implementation of DCFTAs may lead, in the medium term, to a "neighbourhood economic community."

Energy security is also high on the European agenda, particularly since the mid 2000s and the recurrent Russo-Ukrainian gas disputes. The 2009 gas crisis in particular had dire repercussions in several Member States, Bulgaria and Slovakia being the most affected. Energy security is mainly conceived in the EaP through the "Southern Corridor," an approach, which purports at diversifying sources and routes. The Nabucco project, in competition with the Russo-Italian South Stream project, aims at carrying 31 bcm annually, directly from Central Asia and the Caucasus (mainly Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) toward Europe, bypassing Russia.

Finally, the migration issue is crucial although in different ways for the EU member States as well as for the partner countries. The EU emphasizes fighting the organized crime networks controlling and exploiting migration flows. The partner countries, for their part, oppose to security another overarching principle, that of freedom of movement, thus stressing visa liberalization.

In addition to its specific content, the EaP is important symbolically as the first EU external policy conceived and promoted by the (formerly) 'new' Member States. Poland has been calling for an Eastern dimension in EU's foreign policy since it joined; and in 2008, it teamed up with Sweden to submit the concept paper, which laid the foundation for the EaP. The Czech Republic, which was extremely interested in finding a flagship policy for its EU Council Presidency (2009), had been working along similar lines. Slovakia and Hungary, as well as the Baltic countries to some extent, have joined in supporting the initiative in its early stage, thus making it a Central European project.

The Central European countries (also known as the Visegrad Countries) managed to seize upon favorable conditions—that is, the launch of EU's equivalent program for the Mediterranean and the Georgian crisis of August 2008—to advance an institutional framework for EU's policy toward its Eastern periphery and thus tip the Union's geopolitical spotlight toward their own area of interest. The EaP stands out as a region of strategic importance for the Visegrad Countries, whether in terms of geography (all but the Czech Republic have a common border with it), historical legacies (minorities in Ukraine and Belarus), economics (migration of labor forces) or energy considerations (high dependence on regional transit routes). Accordingly, they have a strong interest in promoting political and economic reforms in the region. But the development of the EaP was also serving intra-EU objectives, namely the endeavor to create a niche for Central European Member States and thereby increase their agenda-setting capacity.

The expectations of the Neighbourhood countries regarding the EaP differ not only from that of EU Member States but also among themselves. They do not share the same situations, resources or weaknesses. The EU neighbours seem to face a trade-off between (destabilizing) political pluralism and (more stable) recentralization of powers—at least in the short run. Brussels, however, wants a neighbourhood that is both democratic and stable. It supported the democratic movements in Ukraine (2004) and Moldova (2009) but remains ill-at-ease with political instability. Nevertheless, these events heightened EU's attention toward these two countries. And both demonstrated their interest in cooperating more closely with Brussels: EUBAM—the EU operation monitoring the Ukrainian-Transdnistriean border since 2006—is a case in point. Similarly, the governmental coalition in Moldova ('Alliance for European Integration') has been consistently endeavouring to secure support among Brussels' circles while Ukraine, even after Yanukovich's return to power, seems to favor carrying forward a DCFTA with the EU over joining the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan customs union.

The EU leverage is more limited in other countries, as in Belarus where recent presidential elections were marked by irregularities and the repression of the opposition. President Lukashenka has been sending mixed signals to the EU, often giving the impression to attempt to play off Brussels and Moscow against one other to maximize its benefits. Georgia and Armenia are currently in very difficult and uncertain positions. The enthusiasm that followed the 2003 "Rose Revolution" in the former now seems to be fading, especially in the aftermath of the war of August 2008. Thanks to its gas resources, Azerbaijan has an increasing geo-economical weight, as far as energy politics is concerned. Baku is eager to further develop relations with the EU but is unhappy with what it perceives as a lack of European will to diversify gas supply.

Overall, the neighbourhood countries received the EaP with minimal enthusiasm, notably deploring its limited financial support. More important, they have been disappointed with the EU neighbourhood policy because they, in contrast to the EU, view it as a means of counterbalancing Russia instead of a process of domestic implementation of European standards.

Paradoxically, the greatest public attention to the EaP came from a country that refused to take part in it; during its first month, Russian policy-makers were among those referring most often to the initiative. Moscow openly criticized the EaP as a divisive policy pushing the countries of the region to "choose" between the EU and Russia (Economist 2010). Russia's strong reaction was not only surprising in light of the limited content of the policy but also quite significant as, for the first time, an EU policy was condemned in terms usually reserved to NATO. Moscow's reaction appears to have stemmed from a growing realization on the part of Russian policy-makers of EU's transformative power (i.e. normative influence, potentially fueling "colored revolutions"), thus leading them to see the EaP as a platform intended to reduce Russia's influence in the region, or at least as a direct competitor to its own integration efforts.

Moscow's reaction, however, was also related to the post-Georgian crisis context, which was marked by additional contentious issues such as the Ballistic Missile Defense system or the question of NATO's enlargement. Witness the fact that in today's more conducive diplomatic configuration (internationally, with the US-Russia reset as well as regionally, with the Polish-Russia rapprochement), Moscow has notably toned down its rhetoric on the EaP. Moreover, it could also be that the Kremlin, after reviewing the content of the program and the reactions of the countries concerned, realized that the EaP actually lacks the substance to meaningfully jeopardize its own influence in the region, solidly resting on its ability to offer concrete incentives in terms of energy and visa.

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### **MOSCOW AND BAKU HAVE NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON EACH OTHER, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS**

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Despite the complexities of the Soviet inheritance and the efforts of some to play up a conflict where none exists, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan have no territorial claims on each other, Aleksandr Lukashevich, an official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said in reaction to one such effort, an article in Moscow's *Nezavisimaya gazeta* on 9 February.

"The border between [the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan] has been determined through the Caspian Sea and onshore," Lukashevich said in a posting on the Russian Foreign Ministry website, with "the land boundary set by the treaty on the state border that was signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on September 3, 2010." That line follows "the former administrative border between the Dagestan ASSR and the Azerbaijan SSR."

Because the border there follows a river, some have raised questions about which side has the right to use some of the flow. But a far more frequently discussed issue, Lukashevich said, concerns two small villages, Hrah-Uba, with 450 residents and Uryan, with 30, located on the Azerbaijani side of the border but whose residents are citizens of the Russian Federation. This situation arose, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said, more than half a century ago when "no one in the Soviet Union could imagine that a great country would fall apart."

In 1954, he continued, residents of Dagestan were given the right to pasture cattle during the winter on Azerbaijani territory for 50 years, and as a result, some of the shepherds settled there and constituted the basic population of the two villages. "No other documents" referring to the presence in Azerbaijan of territory belonging to the Russian Federation have been found in the central or national archives," Lukashevich said. Moreover, because the 1954 accord expired in 2004, there is no basis in law for asserting that these villages should be included within the border of the Russian Federation now, a reality that is reflected in the September 2010 bilateral treaty.

At the same time, however, the Russian spokesman continued, Russian Federation citizens do live in these two villages, and this lack of correspondence between political and ethnographic boundaries does present certain "complicated" problems. But he underscored that his ministry and several other Russian departments and agencies, along with the government of the Republic of Dagestan, are working on resolving them.

Lukashevich said that Moscow is "in close contact on this issue with the Azerbaijani side and the residents of two villages. Baku has recently held regular ministerial consultations. [And he added], the Azerbaijani side has assured that it will render every possible assistance in the proper settlement of the problems of Russian citizens. The Russian ambassador in Baku works closely with the migration services of Azerbaijan," and officials from the two countries plan to make a joint visit to the villages "in the near future."

The Russian Foreign Ministry statement came in response to the *Nezavisimaya gazeta* article which reported that there had been a small rally in Hrah-Uba calling on Moscow to defend that community against what its leaders said was "persecution" by local Azerbaijani officials. And in his remarks, Lukashevich reiterated that "the Russian Foreign Ministry is convinced that this issue will not be resolved by protest actions" but rather will require "a strictly individual approach to each individual and each family" in order to ensure that their interests are "not violated" (Tariverdiyeva 2011).

Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation on this issue appears assured, and consequently attempts by Armenian news outlets and others to play this up, something they have done in the past even to the point of suggesting "separatism" or "irredentism" is rampant in the northern portion of Azerbaijan, should be treated with extreme skepticism. There are real human problems, but they are the kind of problems which can be addressed only by diplomatic contacts and good will.

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### **ETHNIC RELATIONS IN BAKU DURING THE FIRST OIL BOOM**

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Tsarist Russia was a multinational state in which ethno-religious conflicts were not uncommon. They took place in different parts of the empire—in Kishinev, Gomel, Mogilev, Shusha, Ganja, Baku, Yerevan, Tiflis and Moscow, as well as in other places. But during the Soviet period, they were little studied, because the existence of conflicts among the working class contradicted communist ideology. An examination of 2000 "personal records" of workers at the Nobel Brothers Oil Company is now possible and provides insights into the way in which differences in workers' economic status, their job skills, governmental policies, and employers' practices caused the ethnic conflicts. [1]

Baku underwent enormous social and economic changes in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries as a result of the oil boom that led to the formation of a variety of companies and the proletarianization of the peasantry, which flooded into the city for work. At that time, Baku was a half-Oriental, half-European city, important for both the economy of Azerbaijan and that of Russia. The Social Democrat Yuri Larin summed up the citation in one short sentence: "The well-being and earning of millions of people in our country depend upon oil in Baku" (Larin 1909, p. 4). In the thirty years between 1872 and 1903, oil production in the Baku region increased 170 times, and in 1897, its output equaled that of the United States (Ismailov 1982, p. 6). Migration from the Russian provinces, but especially from the Caucasus and neighboring Iran, fuelled Baku's industries.

Among the great oil companies in Baku, the Nobel Brothers' Oil Producing Company was especially important. It was distinguished by a highly organized work force, higher pay, and a bureaucratically organized administration. The personnel files of 2000 workers of the Nobel Company used here contain information about every worker's name, surname, patronymic, nationality, belief, social origin, family status,

number of family members, literacy, skill-level, age, place of birth and length of service, in addition to promotions, pay, benefits, fines, illness, accidents, and dismissals. [2]

At the beginning of the century, Baku oil field workers represented, as contemporaries put it, "a mixture of tribes and nations." That "black mineral oil army" consisted of many culturally distinct national groups, within which there were also personal differences, as revealed in the workers' "personnel records." Aleksandr Stopani, an old Bolshevik from Baku, who was among the first Soviet researchers who analyzed workers' budgets, found the same variations (Stopani 1925).

Among the oil field workers, there were two clearly distinguishable ethno-religious groups—the Muslims and the Christians. On the one hand, there was no official discrimination according to ethnicity in view of efficiency considerations. Non-discriminatory practices were established as a policy. Religious holidays were paid, and the administration was tolerant of absence for religious practices. Thus, in the correspondence of the Nobel Association administration with the Baku sector in September 1911, the main reason cited for the fall in the production of oil, apart from the exhaustion of fields, was the observation by Muslim workers of religious holidays during Uraza (Ramazan), when Tatar-Muslims eat only once a day, at night, and because of religious celebration, they become ill and work very poorly." [3] Moreover, provision of housing, board and wages by the Nobel Brothers' firm was in principle non-discriminatory with regard to ethnicity. Instructions for "Hiring, Maintenance and Dismissal" of skilled and unskilled workers both in the oil fields and the machine shops stated that the "wages of Russians and Tatars are the same."

But on the other hand, practice was not always consistent with policy. A wage increase of 15 September 1916, for example, gave 1.30 roubles to Tatar and 1.50 roubles for Russian workers. [4] And the Nobel Brothers gave preference to Russians in hiring. In addition, skilled workers were mainly Russians, Armenians, and other non-Muslims, and their wage rate was higher. Muslims tended to be unskilled and semi-skilled, and they were therefore less well paid.

Table 1 shows, that most of the Nobel Brothers' workers were Russian; South Azerbaijan Azeris [5] comprised half that number. Lazgis, Kazan Tatars, Persians, Armenians, and Northern Azerbaijan Azeris were also hired in significant numbers. In addition, there were Georgian, German, Ossetian, as well as Polish, Jewish, Finnish, Tajik, Latvian and some simply "Muslim" workers. These latter groups were small in number and are therefore excluded from Table 1. The most surprising feature of this table (which details literacy, skills, marital status, and age, locus of work, job tenure and wages by ethno-religious group) is the low portion of natives of Baku and its immediate surroundings. Those listed as local workers included Muslims other than Azeris, as well as Armenians, Russians, and other Christians, but even taking this into consideration, only 131 (7%) were local. The proportion of Northern Azerbaijan Azeris working for Nobel Brothers was much lower than their share in the province (48.3%) and somewhat lower than their share in the oil producing region (Ismailzade 1991, p. 220).

**Table 1.** Nobel Brothers' Association, Baku: Ethno-religious groups of workers, 1878-1921

Groups	Workers	Literacy, %	Degree of skill, %	Marital status %	Age	Shop	(months)Length of	Wages /a v/wk, %
Azeri (Northern Azerbaijan)	38	18	5	66	32	55	30	95.3
Azeri (South Azerbaijan, Iran)	462	5	1	41	27	13	17	84.7
Persian (Iran)	96	7	6	39	28	15	48	97.2
Lazgis	234	5	4	44	27	6	34	88.6
Kazan Tatars	101	19	8	59	29	9	47	94.5
<b>All Muslims</b>	<b>931</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>88.4</b>
Russians	951	74	25	74	30	38	48	105.7
Armenians	51	51	29	69	32	22	47	114.1
Other Christians	41	83	43	63	28	68	71	147.8
<b>All Christians</b>	<b>1043</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>107.8</b>

Russians formed the largest group of the Nobel Brothers' workers. The proportion of Russians (46.5%) was much higher than in the general population of Baku provinces (23.5%) (Ismailzade 1991, p. 227) and of the oil producing region as a whole, where Russians constituted roughly one quarter of the population. The Russian immigrants to Baku, as a rule, came from the north: the central industrial region (13%), the central black earth region (26%), and middle and lower Volga regions (49%). Kazan Tatars were also originally from the Volga region (88%), the Lazgis (87%) from Dagestan (Caucasus), Persians (94%) and Azeris (96%) came from Iran. [6] The other significant uninterrupted influx of workers into Baku was from Southern Azerbaijan (Iran). "A poor person, having crossed the frontier, travels by foot to the object of his dream (namely wage employment), and hungry, ragged, hardly earning a livelihood on the way" (Ismailov 1964, p. 141).

Although there was no official discrimination, Muslims were assigned low level "dirty" jobs because of their lower rates of literacy (Garskova & Ahanchi 1994). This is shown by the analysis of career patterns of separate groups of workers in connection with their place of origin, their nationality, age, skill-level, literacy, and the like, as well as comparison of these patterns with those of labor in the Baku oil industry as a



whole, and in the Nobel Brothers' firm in particular (e.g. Garskova & Ahanchi 1995). Despite these differences, workers did experience much in common and in many cases showed solidarity (Bertenson 1897, p. 38).

The workers knew their strength. The Nobel oil field reports of the manager to the head office of the firm in St.Petersburg in 1905 repeatedly mention political activities, with workers periodically going on strike. [7] The oil field workers were famous not only for their willingness to make demands, but also for their specific requests: For example, they demanded that the time allowed for Muslim prayers be increased from five to fifteen minutes. But, as one of manager's report stated: "The main persistent demand [was] the housing question, where the workers insist[ed] on satisfaction of the housing needs for all of the workers without exception." [8]

These demands seem to testify to a united workers front. But this picture is misleading, because simultaneously with the revolutionary spirit and uprising in all of Russia in 1905, there were serious Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes in Baku. Most of the evidence about clashes among workers is not to be found in archival documents, but rather in the memories of contemporaries. But some documentary evidence does exist. One is a manager's report, which said: "The disorders are in the city [Baku], our workers are working quietly, peacefully." But, he continued, "the events have spread from the city to the oil fields, where have been pogroms and fires." [9].

In addition, some of the "personnel records" in the section "Date and Reasons of Worker's Dismissal" contain pieces of information such as "Was killed during the events of 1905," "was killed in February 1905," "was killed during the Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes," "has disappeared during the August events, 1905," has left home country during the events of 1905," and the like. This leads to several questions: Did the inter-ethnic conflicts in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century result from economic discrimination? What kind of interrelations did workers have with each other during these conflicts? What were the workers' positions with regard to these events? And to what extent did the workers take part in these conflicts?

The proletariat of Baku in terms of its social composition did not differ much from that of other industrial regions of Russia. It was composed of people from both urban and—mostly—rural backgrounds. The "personnel records" of the overwhelming majority of the Nobel Company's workers state "peasant" under the heading "Title and Social Origin." As a result, industrialization in Russia was a time when feudal bond relationships in the villages were breaking apart and social differentiation was occurring among the peasants, some of whom became permanent workers while others eventually returned to the villages.

The high proportion of peasant workers in the Baku oil fields was reflected in their low level of literacy, which, in turn, resulted from the low level education in all of Russia. The first national census of Imperial Russia in 1897 gave striking evidence of this. "The percentage of school children in elementary school in relation to the entire population was as follows: in the United States 20%, in Switzerland 19%, in England 18%, in Germany and Austria 16%, in France 14%, Belgium 15%. [...] In Russia this percentage did not reach 3,7%." [10]

As noted above, the industrial workers in the Baku oil fields were socially heterogeneous. Most were peasants, but they came from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. These workers, called "backward" in Soviet times because of a low level of "social consciousness" in terms of their leaning towards Marxism, were

much involved in oil field conflicts during the period of historical crisis described here. A single spark was enough to cause conflict. Moreover, there were recent memories of expulsions in Turkey and Iran, where anti-Russian movement during the Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish wars was intertwined with anti-Christian movement; therefore, Armenians had been protected by the Czarist government.

Moreover, this situation was further complicated when—as a part of Russian policy “Christianization of the Caucasus”—Armenian refugees were settled in the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia with little consideration for the needs or even at the expense of local peasants. Muslim seasonal workers, who remained closely connected with their villages, possibly might have been involved in the conflicts in connection with the “unbidden guests” who might lay claim to a piece of their land. Czarist settlement policy, thus, may have added to already existent discontent or tension (Griboedov 1989, p. 387).

Although it may sound like Soviet rhetoric, Sergey Potolov’s argument that “Baku police authorities repeatedly provoked bloody conflicts among Azerbaijani and Armenian workers for the purpose of distracting them from revolutionary struggle” is convincing (Potolov 1994, p. 75). Because tsarist bureaucrats feared the spread of political demonstrations by the workers, they had little interest in containing ethnic conflicts, and both the government and employers used these events to weaken movement directed against them by oil field workers. [11]

One of seemingly unimportant, but in fact very important regulations of the Nobel Company’s factory commission was the setting of the closing date for the submission of the declarations of losses or applications for benefits. It was set on 1 May 1906, after which date no further application would be accepted. [12] But Muslim workers were in the overwhelming majority illiterate and could not read these announcements. After expiration of the submission date they lamented: “We are illiterate people [...] and nobody has explained to us the content of the announcements orally. We were full of hope that before all has declared orally.” [13] For this reason the Muslim workers who had suffered losses during the events declared their losses only later, after the expiration of the closing date for submission of applications. This applies in particular to Persian workers, who, almost in panic, had deserted the oil fields and had crossed the border to return to their homes. Of course, they did not know about the material help to the workers by the Nobel Brothers’ Company either.

As a result of the events of 1905, many workers of all nationalities left jobs in the Nobel Brothers’ Company permanently. This is to be seen in the “Lists about the granting of payments and benefits to workers for a long-term service in the company.” The company gave these workers a lump sum benefit. [14] But there were also those who left their place of work without giving notice. In connection with the disturbances of 1905, 1839 workers had left their place of work at different oil production sites in the area “without the knowledge of the company.” [15]

Another problem in connection with these events and industrialization in general concerned peasants in villages near the oil fields. If oil was found on their land, this land was confiscated by employers and companies. This, of course, evoked the peasants’ discontent. The fact that they were Azeris and Muslims, while employers were mostly Christians, added to that discontent. The same thing happened to peasants in villages located on the bank of the river Kura with its rich fisheries. Armenian employers had obtained fishing rights and forbade the peasants to fish,

one of their traditional activities. For the Muslim peasants in the above mentioned villages the Baku events represented a favorable moment to avenge themselves on the lessee-invaders of their lands. Also in this case, social conflict was more important than ethnic, although the conflict tended to express itself more or less in ethnic terms. [16]

At the time, social democrats and members of the intelligentsia throughout the Russian empire blamed these clashes on the government and the nationalists, who deliberately incited or exploited these ethnic tensions, [17] and not without justification drew parallel with the anti-Jewish pogroms in Gomel and Kishinev (Kir'yanov 1993). Indeed, immediately after these events, a workers' meeting took place on 11 February 1905, in the lodging of the Balakhany Hospital of the Council of the Congress of the Oil Producers of Baku. Nearly one thousand people gathered and declared that "There are no serious reasons for the national enmity between Muslims and Armenians in Baku, which is clearly confirmed by their longstanding peaceful life side by side." [18]

Two days later, another meeting of more than 2,000 people of different nationalities and origin again condemned the Baku events and adopted a resolution to denounce the tsarist government as the organizer of the inter-ethnic clashes. [19] Another resolution rejected the official claim that this "slaughter" occurred for reason of national animosity. It said this was misleading and based on deliberately falsified reports by local officials. [20]

The activities of the Azerbaijani social democrats organization "Hummet," which included M. Azizbayov, M. Vasil'ev-Iuzhin, M.B. Gasymov, M. Mammadyarov, P. Montin, A. Stopani, H. Safaraliev and S.M. Efendiev, had a strong influence among the workers. Thanks to their activities, Sultan Medzhid Efendiev was able to report six months later their efforts at educating oil field workers had reduced ethnic conflicts, so that the clashes of August 1905 were much less serious than those of the beginning of the year.

In conclusion, it should thus be noted that there was, in general, no real conflict between Muslim and Christian workers. The principal factors involved broader patterns of historical development among the ethno-religious groups in this region. The ethno-religious factor was used not infrequently by local authorities and employers in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to distract the attention of the oil field workers from their social and political problems. The oil industry workers themselves were not the initiators of inter-ethnic conflict. [21] Even more, the history of that time underscored the possibilities for peaceful co-existence between these two Caucasian people.

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### Notes

[1] "Tovarishestvo Neftyanogo Proizvodstva Brat'ev Nobel", founded on 18 May 1879 by Nobel family's three brothers—Ludwig, Robert, Alfred and Colonel Petr Alekseevich Bilderling.

[2] Azerbaijan State Historical Archive (further, ASHA), F. 798, List 3, Rec. 46, 47, 48, 125.

[3] Russian State Historical Archive (further, RSHA), F. 1458, List 1, Rec. 239, p. 2.

[4] ASHA, F. 798, List 2, Rec. 3583, p. 222.

[5] According to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century Gulustan and Turkmanchay agreements, which have completed a series of Russian-Iranian wars, Azerbaijan was divided between Russian and Persian empires into two parts: Southern and Northern Azerbaijan. Southern Azerbaijan now forms part of Iran. Northern Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

[6] ASHA, F. 798, List 2, Rec. 351, p. 13.

- [7] ASHA, F. 798, List 2, Rec. 4028, p. 2.
- [8] RSHA, F. 1458, List 1, Rec. 836, pp. 21, 22.
- [9] ASHA, F. 798, List 1, Rec. 504, p. 16.
- [10] RSHA, F. 1458, List 1, Rec. 239, p.2. Cf. Guroff & Starr (1975, p. 336).
- [11] ASHA, F. 798, List 2, Rec. 3911, p.47.
- [12] ASHA, F. 798, List 1, Rec. 535, p. 1 verso.
- [13] ASHA, F. 798, List 2, Rec. 3911, p. 52-52 verso.
- [14] ASHA, F. 798, List 1, Rec. 525, pp. 1, 2, 3, 12.
- [15] ASHA, F. 798, List 2, Rec. 3911, pp. 48, 52, 56, 60, 64, 72.
- [16] ASHA, F. 484, List 1, Rec. 23, p. 37- 44.
- [17] Listovki Bakinskikh Bol'shevikov 1905-1907 gg., 1955, Baku, pp. 29-30.
- [18] Listovki Bakinskikh Bol'shevikov 1905-1907 gg., p. 30.
- [19] Listovki Bakinskikh Bol'shevikov 1905-1907 gg., p. 32.
- [20] Listovki Bakinskikh Bol'shevikov 1905-1907 gg., p. 35.
- [21] ASHA, F. 798, List 1, Rec. 3914, p. 81 verso.

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## **A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY**

### **I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy**

President Ilham Aliyev reaffirms that "the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is not subject to negotiation" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252279.html>).

Defense Minister Safar Abiyev tells the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs that "Azerbaijan is carrying out serious preparation for the liberation of its lands from occupation" and that "no one can accuse Azerbaijan" in this regard (<http://news.day.az/politics/252738.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, the executive secretary of the ruling *Yeni Azerbaijan* Party, condemns attempts by Iran to interfere in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/251505.html>).

## **II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan**

Matthew Bryza, the incoming US ambassador to Baku, says on his arrival that Washington "hopes for a deepening and strengthening of cooperation with Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251754.html>).

Former Turkish Foreign Minister Yashar Yakys says that "the army of Azerbaijan is ready for a military resolution of the Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251599.html>).

Sergey Lebedev, the executive secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States, says that "Azerbaijan is the only country in the CIS where there was not a decline in the economy during the last financial crisis" (<http://news.day.az/economy/251050.html>).

## **III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy**

15 February

Asef Hajiyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Armenia is standing at the edge of the abyss" and more and more of its people are fleeing abroad (<http://news.day.az/politics/253172.html>).

Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri says that his government is conducting talks with Azerbaijan about the construction of an oil processing plant (<http://news.day.az/economy/253378.html>).

Roland Kobia, head of the European Union mission in Baku, says that "a turning point is being observed in relations between Azerbaijan and the EU" (<http://news.day.az/economy/253368.html>).

The Israeli embassy in Baku resumes normal operations after a one day closure caused by "technical problems" (<http://news.day.az/politics/253286.html>).

14 February

President Ilham Aliyev signs the directive providing for Azerbaijani assistance to the Palestinian embassy in Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/253263.html>).

Ilgar Mukhtarov, Azerbaijani ambassador to Mexico who is jointly accredited to Guatemala, presents his credentials to the president of the latter country Alvaro Colom and extends an invitation to him to visit Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/253064.html>).

Elmira Suleymanova, the ombudsman of Azerbaijan, receives Heydar al-Barrak, Iraq's ambassador to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/253129.html>).

Bakhtiyar Aliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "all the words" of Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan, "are a lie" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252882.html>).

Toyli Komekov, Turkmenistan's ambassador to Baku, says that "cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the energy sector is important" (<http://news.day.az/politics/253088.html>).

The Azerbaijani and Turkish communities in the US send thousands of letters to the US Congress demanding an end to American assistance to the separatist regime in Armenian-occupied Nagorno-Karabakh (<http://news.day.az/politics/253124.html>).

### 13 February

Ali Huseynov, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that Baku has always supported the full participation of Belarussian parliamentarians in the parliamentary dimension of the European Union's Eastern Partnership (<http://news.day.az/politics/253008.html>).

### 12 February

President Ilham Aliyev reaffirms that "the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is not subject to negotiation" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252279.html>).

Novruz Mammadov, the head of the foreign relations department of the President's Office, says that "the single task both for the international community and the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group is to force Armenia to accept the proposals now on the negotiating table" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252923.html>).

Kamaladdin Heydarov, the emergency situations minister, receives Thierry Mariani, the French secretary of state for transport, to discuss expanding cooperation (<http://news.day.az/economy/252933.html>).

Milli Majlis Speaker Ogtay Asadov receives Wolfgang Grossruck, vice president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (<http://news.day.az/politics/252978.html>).

Mubariz Gurbanly, deputy executive secretary of the ruling *Yeni Azerbaijan* Party, says that Baku "expects an objective report" from the OSCE regarding the situation in the South Caucasus (<http://news.day.az/politics/252942.html>).

### 11 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Thierry Mariani, the French secretary of state for transport (<http://news.day.az/politics/252755.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (<http://news.day.az/politics/252698.html>).

Defense Minister Safar Abiyev tells the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs that "Azerbaijan is carrying out serious preparation for the liberation of its lands from occupation" and that "no one can accuse Azerbaijan" for doing so (<http://news.day.az/politics/252738.html>).

Polad Bulbuloglu, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Moscow, says that "the joint work of Russia and Azerbaijan in the area of the struggle with drug trafficking is very important" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252775.html>).

Thierry Mariani, the French secretary of state for transport, says that "Azerbaijan has ambitious plans regarding the development of railroads" (<http://news.day.az/economy/252847.html>).

The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs say, at the end of their latest visit to Baku and Yerevan, that "the time has come for decisive actions in the name of peace for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252829.html>).

Wolfgang Grossruck, the vice president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, says that "Azerbaijan is a young independent state but despite this has passed a dynamic path of development" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252705.html>).

Anvar Azimov, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE, says that "the basis for conducting a summit of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia is being prepared" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252646.html>).

The Russian Foreign Ministry says that at the present time, Russia and Azerbaijan do not have any territorial claims against each other (<http://news.day.az/politics/252640.html>).

A group of Azerbaijani female entrepreneurs meet with a Saudi princess in Riad to discuss expanding bilateral trade and strengthening the role of women in economic life in both countries (<http://news.day.az/economy/252708.html>).

10 February

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives European parliamentarians Ivo Vajgl and Pino Arlacchi (<http://news.day.az/politics/252568.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov meets with his German counterpart Peter Ammon in Berlin to discuss bilateral relations (<http://news.day.az/politics/252935.html>).



Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev receives Irena Degutiene, the chair of the Lithuanian parliament (<http://news.day.az/economy/252530.html>). She notes that Lithuania places great hopes in Azerbaijan for the resolution of problems with the supply of gas to her country (<http://news.day.az/economy/252531.html>).

Elnur Aslanov, head of the political analysis and information support department of the President's Office, says in reaction to the International Crisis Group report on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that "without a constructive approach by Armenia, it will be extremely difficult to speak about peace in the region" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252447.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, the deputy secretary of the ruling *Yeni Azerbaijan* Party, says that the manifestation of a lack of respect to Azerbaijan by "certain forces in Iran" is "a sign of a lack of respect to Azerbaijanis who form half of the population of the Islamic Republic" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252481.html>).

Nizami Jafarov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that if even Armenian media are "openly discussing" problems in Armenia, then in that country "something is really happening" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252169.html>).

Malahat Hasanova, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Armenia's aspirations will play "an evil joke" on that country (<http://news.day.az/politics/252284.html>).

Peter Semneby, the special representative of the European Union for the South Caucasus, says that "the EU must devote means for the prevention of conflicts in the South Caucasus" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252528.html>).

Bernard Fassier, the French co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, says that organization "will try to achieve approval of 'basic principles' for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252519.html>).

## 9 February

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives copies of the letters of credence from Matthew Bryza, the incoming US ambassador to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/252350.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives copies of the letters of credence from Teymuraz Sharashenidze, the incoming Georgian ambassador to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/252353.html>).

Ali Hasanov, head of the social-political department of the President's Office, criticizes international organizations for failing to accurately assess the situation in Azerbaijan and its progress in numerous spheres over the last years (<http://news.day.az/politics/252232.html>).

The Defense Ministry criticizes the International Crisis Group for its assessment of the situation surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/252363.html>).

Milli Majlis Speaker Ogtay Asadov says that Baku and Vilnius have signed three cooperation agreements in the course of the Azerbaijani-Lithuanian business forum in Baku (<http://news.day.az/economy/252239.html>).

Vagif Sadykhov, incoming Azerbaijani ambassador to Italy, presents his credentials to Italian President Giorgio Napolitano (<http://news.day.az/politics/252395.html>).

Experts from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia meet in Baku to discuss security issues in the Caspian (<http://news.day.az/politics/252320.html>).

Govhar Bakhshaliyeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "there was never any 'Armenian genocide' in history" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251997.html>).

Samad Seyidov, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that the Council is "applying a policy of double standards with regard to Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252280.html>).

Mammadbaqir Bahrami, Iran's ambassador to Baku, says that there has been no interference by Tehran in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and that the comments of some Iranian journalists that have disturbed Azerbaijanis reflect ignorance rather than ill will (<http://news.day.az/politics/252362.html>).

Andre Will, a member of the French Senate, says that the OSCE Minsk Group is "limited in its possibilities and actions" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252341.html>).

Ambassador Roland Kobia, the head of the EU delegation to Azerbaijan, says that discussions between the EU and Azerbaijan on easing the visa regime should begin in the near future but he does not give any exact date (<http://news.day.az/politics/252299.html>).

The European Commission opens a three-day seminar on Structural Dialogue in Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/252274.html>).

Nathalie Goulet, a member of the French Senate, says that "Azerbaijan and France must develop cooperation on the regional level" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252228.html>).

Ivo Vajgl, the former foreign minister of Slovenia and a member of the European Parliament, says that "the European Union must more actively participate in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252266.html>).

8 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Irena Degutiene, the chair of the Lithuanian parliament (<http://news.day.az/politics/252141.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives French senators Nathalie Goulet and Andre Will (<http://news.day.az/politics/252184.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that Baku is "not ready for the complete elimination of a visa regime with any country" (<http://news.day.az/politics/252162.html>).

Procurator General Zakir Garalov receives Hungarian military prosecutor Arpad Kovacs (<http://news.day.az/politics/252176.html>).

Etibar Huseynov, a Milli Majlis deputy, calls on his colleagues to boycott activities of the Iranian embassy in Baku to protest Iranian media stories critical of Azerbaijanis in Iran (<http://news.day.az/politics/252149.html>).

Railway officials from Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran sign an accord to create a joint enterprise in support of the North-South transport corridor (<http://news.day.az/economy/252109.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the OSCE mission is not in a position to prepare a balanced report" about the South Caucasus (<http://news.day.az/politics/252048.html>).

## 7 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Hakan Fidan, the head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (<http://news.day.az/politics/251899.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives a delegation of French senators (<http://news.day.az/politics/251897.html>).

The Foreign Ministry dismisses the latest statements of Armenian deputy foreign minister Shavarsh Kocharyan as "illogical" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251908.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mammadgulyev says that any cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia on building a ring road around the Black Sea is excluded (<http://news.day.az/economy/251953.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mammadgulyev says that Baku expects that the European Commission will soon announce plans for talks on a simplified visa regime with Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/251922.html>).

The Economic Development Ministry announces that it is ready to help Azerbaijani businessmen working abroad (<http://news.day.az/economy/251949.html>).

Milli Majlis Speaker Ogtay Asadov receives a group of members of the France-Azerbaijan Working Group (<http://news.day.az/politics/251973.html>).

Milli Majlis Speaker Ogtay Asadov receives Daghestani Popular Assembly head Magomed-Sultan Magomedov (<http://news.day.az/politics/251930.html>).

Musa Gasymlı, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Yerevan's claims about Azerbaijan's actions 20 years ago are intended to distract public attention from what Armenia is doing now (<http://news.day.az/politics/251905.html>).

Bakhtiyar Sadykhov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Armenia is a vassal state" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251614.html>).

Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov says that Sofia wants to accelerate its cooperation with Azerbaijan on gas exports (<http://news.day.az/economy/251888.html>).

Former Turkish Foreign Minister Yashar Yakys says that "the army of Azerbaijan is ready for a military resolution of the Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251599.html>).

#### 6 February

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov meets with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Munich on the sidelines of the 47<sup>th</sup> Munich Conference on Security (<http://news.day.az/politics/251605.html>).

Matthew Bryza, the incoming US ambassador to Baku, says on his arrival that Washington "hopes for a deepening and strengthening of cooperation with Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251754.html>).

Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus, meets with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in Grozny (<http://news.day.az/politics/251721.html>).

The Swedish-Azerbaijan Federation organizes a protest demonstration in front of the Iranian embassy in Stockholm (<http://news.day.az/politics/251749.html>).

#### 5 February

José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, says that "the Caspian Basin occupies an important point among the priorities of the energy policy of the European Union" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251708.html>).

#### 4 February

Ali Ahmadov, the executive secretary of the ruling *Yeni Azerbaijan* Party, condemns attempts by Iran to interfere in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/251505.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov takes part in the Munich Security Conference (<http://news.day.az/politics/251060.html>).

Justice Minister Fikrat Mammadov receives Latvian Environmental Minister Raimonds Vejonis (<http://news.day.az/politics/251473.html>).

Arif Mammadov, Azerbaijan's permanent representative to the Council of Europe, says that Azerbaijan's energy policy reflects its ties with many countries (<http://news.day.az/politics/251685.html>).

Zahid Oruj, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Yerevan borrows international practice in a "distorted" way (<http://news.day.az/politics/251285.html>).

Wikileaks documents show that the argument between Paris and Yerevan is continuing to gather force (<http://news.day.az/politics/251540.html>).

Armenia starts major military training exercises in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/251488.html>).

Abdul Hamid, Pakistan's ambassador to Baku, says that his country "and Azerbaijan support one another in various international forums" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251459.html>).

Audronius Ažubalis, Lithuanian foreign minister and OSCE chairman-in-office, says that "the main task of the OSCE is to ensure the broad participation of the organization in the resolution of regional conflicts" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251431.html>).

### 3 February

Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, receives representatives from the regions and from Turkish municipalities (<http://news.day.az/politics/251401.html>).

Azerbaijani delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe say that the winter session of that body was "especially significant" for Azerbaijan and international backing for Baku's position on Nagorno-Karabakh (<http://news.day.az/politics/251423.html>).

Zsolt Chutora, the Hungarian ambassador to Baku, says that the level of economic cooperation between his country and Azerbaijan can satisfy neither side at present and must be increased (<http://news.day.az/economy/251265.html>).

Nevingaye Erbatur, a member of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, says that "pressure by Russia on Armenia could resolve the Karabakh problem" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251120.html>).

Pedro Agramunt, the co-rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for Azerbaijan, says that his goal is to be as "neutral, objective and independent" in his assessment of the situation as possible (<http://news.day.az/politics/251402.html>).

The Azerbaijani Society of America, the Azerbaijani-American Council and the Pax Turcica Institute create a system to automatically send letters to members of Congress and the American media (<http://news.day.az/politics/251688.html>).

## 2 February

Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev and Greece's deputy foreign minister Spyros Kouvelis sign an agreement to advance the Southern Gas Corridor project (<http://news.day.az/economy/251110.html>).

Elmira Suleymanova, Azerbaijan's ombudsman for human rights, meets with the co-rapporteurs of the PACE Monitoring Committee for Azerbaijan, Joseph Debono Grech and Pedro Agramunt (<http://news.day.az/politics/251203.html>).

Elman Arasly, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Amman, meets with the chairman of the upper house of that country's parliament, Tahir Masri, to discuss the development of bilateral ties (<http://news.day.az/politics/251129.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the Turkic world has great potential to influence world politics" (<http://news.day.az/politics/251130.html>).

Adil Aliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Yerevan does not have the resources for war with Baku" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250900.html>).

Audronius Ažubalis, Lithuanian foreign minister and OSCE chairman-in-office, says that his organization supports the efforts of the Minsk Group to find a solution to the Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/251105.html>).

Sergey Lebedev, the executive secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States, says that "Azerbaijan is the only country in the CIS where there was not a decline in the economy during the last financial crisis" (<http://news.day.az/economy/251050.html>).

Matthrew Bryza, the newly named US ambassador to Baku, tells the United States –Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce that "the main priority" of his work in Azerbaijan will be "a peaceful and just resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250990.html>).

Hasan Ercelebi, a member of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, says that "the Armenian-Turkish border will not be opened" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250899.html>).

## 1 February

Tahir Karimov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Malaysia who is jointly accredited to Brunei, presents his credentials to the Sultan of Brunei (<http://news.day.az/politics/250979.html>).

The Milli Majlis ratifies the agreement "On cooperation in the security sphere on the Caspian Sea" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250915.html>).

Milli Majlis Speaker Ogtay Asadov says that it is necessary to adopt a special law on the 220,000 Azerbaijanis who were deported from Armenia (<http://news.day.az/politics/250889.html>).

Milli Majlis Vice-Speaker Ziyafat Askarov considers "unobjective" the declaration of a PACE official about the existence of "political prisoners" in Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/250860.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, calls on Azerbaijanis living in Iran "to protest against the anti-Azerbaijani policy of that country" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250896.html>).

Zahid Oruj, a Milli Majlis deputy, calls on Azerbaijanis not to travel to Iran (<http://news.day.az/politics/250880.html>).

Siyavush Novruzov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the OSCE report on the elections in Azerbaijan was "not objective" and should be corrected (<http://news.day.az/politics/250873.html>).

Samad Seyidov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that PACE has behaved in a non-objective and incorrect way by "criticizing Azerbaijan and not taking note of violations in other countries" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250872.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, the deputy chairman of the *Yeni Azerbaijan Party*, says that he believes Baku should seek explanations from the US and UK embassies as to why they warned their nationals about a terrorist threat in Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/250878.html>).

Carl Hamilton, a Swedish parliamentarian, says that "Azerbaijan has been transformed into the central energy partner of the European Union" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250815.html>). He adds that one "should not expect that the European Union will be able to resolve conflicts in the South Caucasus" (<http://news.day.az/politics/250811.html>).

The mother of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili arrives in Azerbaijan for a visit (<http://news.day.az/politics/250832.html>).

### **Note to Readers**

The editors of "Azerbaijan in the World" hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email ([adabiweekly@ada.edu.az](mailto:adabiweekly@ada.edu.az)). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.