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In this issue:

- Alex Jackson, "Azerbaijan and Recent Shifts in Turkish-Iranian Relations"
- Murad Nasibov, "Why is EU External Governance in Azerbaijan So Limited?"
- Paul Goble, "Call to Resettle Armenians in Karabakh Threatens Peace Process"
- A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy
- Note to Readers

AZERBAIJAN AND RECENT SHIFTS IN TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS

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Relations between Turkey and Iran are in flux, and changes in the longstanding dynamics of cooperation and competition between them, amplified by the upheaval in the Middle East, Turkey's foreign policy shifts and the new Eurasian energy calculus, are certain to be significant for the entire region and for Azerbaijan in particular.

Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the relationship between Turkey and Iran has alternated between subtle competition and public cooperation. For Turkey's leadership, the spectre of revolutionary Islam in Iran and fears about a possible "Iranian scenario" at home have informed the thinking of many in Ankara. And for

the post-1979 Iranian leadership, the presence of a secular, pro-Western NATO country on its Western border has been a cause for concern.

After the collapse of the USSR, Tehran and Ankara competed for influence in the newly independent states of Eurasia, with Iran playing the religious card and Turkey the ethnic one. This competition limited cooperation between them and at times led each to back Kurdish separatists on the territory of the other. However, after the AKP took power in Turkey in 2002, this changed. That party's Islamist and populist roots opened the way to a warmer relationship with Iran at an ideological level, and the AKP government's policy of "zero problems with neighbors," alongside a desire to find markets and energy suppliers, provided pragmatic reasons for closer ties. Indeed, despite the tensions between Iran and the international community, Turkey in this period has sought to manage this relationship rather than engage in confrontation.

Disagreements, however, remain. Both Ankara and Tehran, for example, support the Arab revolutions, but they do so from different standpoints and for different reasons. The two countries cooperate closely on energy, but they disagree over the route Caspian hydrocarbons should take to world markets. They share some common interests in the Caucasus, but at the same time, they compete for influence and have very different approaches to regional security issues.

Recent events have both encouraged expanding cooperation and intensified competition in three key areas: the Middle East, missile defense, and security (including energy security) in the South Caucasus.

The Middle East. Iran's antagonistic relationship with Israel has been a major difference between Tehran and Ankara, but the rapid deterioration of Turkish-Israeli ties has caused a significant shift in the geopolitics of the region. Turkey's motivations in this case are mixed, but alongside genuine anger and domestic politics is the desire of Prime Minister Erdogan to become a champion of the "Arab street" and of the Palestinians in particular. Criticizing Israel and embracing the revolutionaries is enabling Turkey to outflank Iran. Tehran has traditionally seen itself as a key player in the region, but the bloody repression meted out by its Syrian ally and the secular nature of the revolutions is marginalizing Iranian influence and boosting Turkey's. Put in simplest terms, Turkey appears to be on the side of the revolutions, while Iran does not.

Turkish-Iranian relations will be profoundly affected by the course of the Arab Spring. Civil war in Syria or Turkish intervention there would damage ties. If the AKP succeeds in setting itself up as "a model" for the revolutionary states, Tehran will become suspicious about losing regional influence.

These shifts have consequences for Azerbaijan. For years, Azerbaijan has endured complaints from Iran about its burgeoning defense and economic relationship with Israel; now it may have to endure them from its close ally Turkey, too. On September 19, Turkey's ambassador to Baku, Hulusi Kılıç, stated that "the problem of a brotherly state should be a problem for Azerbaijan, too" and suggested that Azerbaijani oil exports to Israel via Turkey should be reconsidered. Worsening relations between Turkey and Israel might also lead Israeli pressure groups to align themselves with the Armenian diaspora, a move that would in turn worsen ties between Tel Aviv and Baku.

This places Azerbaijan in an awkward position. An escalation would leave Azerbaijan's relationship with Israel without Turkish support: for although Azerbaijan is mature enough to deal with other states alone, it has benefited from Turkey's close cooperation with Israel, which served as a springboard for Baku's own relationship, particularly in defense and joint industrial ventures. The harmonizing of Turkish and Iranian views on the Israel issue may therefore make it increasingly difficult for Azerbaijan to maintain close ties with the Israeli state.

Missile defense. Despite concerns about the AKP's alleged slide into anti-Westernism and Islamism, Turkey has recently agreed to host part of NATO's planned missile defense network, a network assumed to be aimed at Iran. The decision has provoked anger in Tehran, with Tehran warning that the system "will definitely have complicated consequences" and will not improve Turkey's security. This is a serious, "hard security" issue which Tehran views as a direct threat and it may lead to a significant deterioration in ties.

The fact that Turkey has agreed to host the missile defense shield speaks volumes about its threat perception of Iran. Officially, both states have warm and peaceful ties, and to a large extent this is true; but clearly, officials in Ankara believe that Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program is a threat. Consequently, unless Turkey saw a real and direct benefit to its national interests, it would not provoke Iran by signing up to the project. Iran, as a result, is clearly revising its opinion of Turkey.

A breakdown in the security relationship between Iran and Turkey clearly affects Azerbaijan. Baku's warm, multidimensional relationship with Ankara would take precedence, of course, but its ties with Iran would also have to be taken into account. Balancing between them would be difficult.

Security and Energy in the Caucasus. Ankara and Tehran are often portrayed as engaging in a kind of "soft war" in the Caucasus, with Turkey backing Azerbaijan and Iran backing Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The reality is more complex, but Iran does represent a vital lifeline to Armenia, a bridge that allows it to partially offset the Turkish-Azerbaijani closure of borders with Yerevan. At the same time, Turkey's support is integral to Azerbaijan's security strategy. Moreover, Iran's support for pro-Islamic groups in Azerbaijan is countered by the normative example of Turkey as a secular Muslim state.

Both Turkey and Iran are publicly committed to a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but have different approaches. Turkey, after its attempt to promote a rapprochement with Armenia without consulting Azerbaijan, has linked improvement of bilateral ties with progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. Essentially, Turkey follows Azerbaijan's line. Iran's aim in contrast is twofold: to prevent Azerbaijani irredentism in northern Iran, and to limit the involvement of outside powers like the US and the EU in the region. Its main contribution is to insist that the conflict be settled through the negotiations of regional powers. At the same time and more subtly, both Turkey and Iran seek to decrease the others' influence through promoting their own model of conflict resolution. Turkey conspicuously avoided including Iran in its Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform idea in 2008, while Iran has lobbied for a more active role in the peacemaking efforts.

Competition could emerge here, particularly if a peace settlement driven by Turkey reduced Iranian regional influence. By itself, that would not be sufficient to significantly damage Turkish-Iranian ties, but given the fragility and complexity of

security in the South Caucasus, it could lead to a sudden shift in regional dynamics and spark confrontation.

Ultimately, security in the South Caucasus is in major ways a matter of perceptions. If Iran perceives that a successful, Turkish-led resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh increases the influence of Turkey—and by extension of NATO and anti-Iranian elements in Azerbaijan—it is likely to oppose it and act accordingly. For similar reasons, relations between Tehran and Ankara would deteriorate, if Turkey begins backing the EU in supporting a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) to bring Central Asian gas to Europe. Iran and Russia staunchly oppose the project, as it would limit their influence as “gateways” to Central Asia; but for Turkey, a TCGP would be a further step toward achieving its ambition of being a Eurasia-wide energy hub. An active Turkish embrace of this project would likewise be seen in Tehran as an unwanted Western penetration of the region.

In both these cases, Iran would likely stop viewing Turkey as a “Muslim” state and start seeing it—again—as a “Western” one, the agent of European and US expansion into the region. This tendency or the countervailing tendency would be reinforced and amplified by other aspects in their bilateral relationship. On its own, Turkish support for a Caspian gas pipeline is unlikely to be seen as a threat in Iran. But if it is coupled with NATO radar and missile bases in Turkey, closer cooperation with the US in Iraq, opposition to Iranian allies in the Middle East and warmer ties with Israel, then it would be viewed very negatively indeed. Turkey and Iran have a multidimensional partnership, and the alignment of multiple factors is a necessary condition to seriously affect ties.

The implications for Azerbaijan are twofold. On the one hand, Baku is more than capable of acting independently and balancing between the two powers even during temporary or one-dimensional disputes. Azerbaijan is an important state and has the capacity to sit tight during an argument between neighbors. But on the other, the reverse is also true. When Turkish-Iranian relations are good, Azerbaijan can enjoy better ties with both states, but if they deteriorate, Azerbaijan may be forced to make an either/or choice between them. Baku almost certainly would choose Turkey, given the nature of their relationship, but it would contribute to the polarization of geopolitics in the region. The constant challenge for Baku’s foreign policy is to balance between these two poles, as well as between many more in its neighborhood.

WHY IS EU EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE IN AZERBAIJAN SO LIMITED?

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None of the numerous articles on EU-Azerbaijani relations has addressed them from the increasingly influential perspective of EU external governance. Instead, all of them have focused on what can be called the EU foreign policy approach. This article seeks to fill that gap and clarify the differences of these two approaches. On the one hand, while the foreign policy approach focuses mainly on agents, the

external governance approach focuses on structure. And on the other, unlike the EU foreign policy approach, the EU external governance approach considers systems of rules.

As a result of the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, the number of countries in the EU's neighborhood increased, and that in turn generated a perceived need for a different approach to the EU's external actions. The reasons for that are two-fold. First, the enlargement increased challenges to the European Union itself, and second, the enlargement itself created new expectations for EU action in the neighborhood region. Because of these two factors, EU external governance approach prospered in the academic literature.

This approach is consistent with the argument of Michael Smith (1996, p. 5), who suggests that "after spending most of its life practicing the "politics of exclusion," the European Union has moved toward a "politics of inclusion" to reflect the changing demands of the European order." The European Neighborhood Policy proposed by the Commission in March 2003 as a new framework for relations with the EU's eastern and southern neighbors also resonates well with the EU external governance approach.

The mode of external governance in a particular case can be explored by analyzing the degree of institutionalization and legalization of relations between the EU and a third country. The mode of external governance could be determined by discovering ways of rule transfer in accordance with the three ways of EU rule transfer—convergence toward EU rules, convergence toward international rules, convergence based on bilaterally developed rules—provided by Barbé, et al. (2009, pp. 835-838).

The EU began to cooperate with Baku after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the start of negotiations, the EU has emphasized three groups of issues: democracy, human rights, good governance, economic and social reforms; trade and energy; and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This prioritization is reflected in the documents concerning relations between the parties including National Indicative Programs of European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. In particular, the ENP Azerbaijan Action Plan lists these priorities in the following order: a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; the strengthening of democracy in the country; and the strengthening of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Additional priorities in order are about investment climate, fighting corruption, economic reforms, as well the strengthening of EU-Azerbaijan energy bilateral relations. The last two priorities are related to Justice and Human Affairs (JHA) and regional.

In analyzing the attitudes of the parties toward these objectives, it becomes evident that one of the parties is reluctant to seek the achievements of either of these objectives or does not want to be involved in its implementation. One of the reasons of this containment could be the EU's hesitance to intervene in the area of Russian influence. If the EU decides to participate as a co-chair of Minsk Group of the OSCE instead of France, its partner in the group will be Russia with whom it should work on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

For its part, Azerbaijan is lagging in meeting the requirements of the second group of objectives. The government is unwilling or not yet able to launch substantial reforms in the sectors mentioned above. As ENPI NIPs for 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, ENPI CSP for 2007-2013 mention, Azerbaijan's commitments to the implementation of

ENP AP remains slow and uneven, albeit there are few developments. The 2007 report of Azerbaijan National Committee on European Integration also confirms this fact (ANCEI 2007). However, the European Union continues to follow closely the situation of human rights and rule of law in Azerbaijan.

The situation with regard to the third group of objectives is different. Both parties are strongly interested in enhancing trade relations, especially in energy. Indeed, economic and political links between Azerbaijan and the European Union began in 1991 within the framework of TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States). This cooperation was primarily based on energy and transportation. However, bilateral cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan was in fundamental ways only implemented following the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in 1999. Moreover, according to the EU-Azerbaijan ENP AP, until the signing of new Association treaty, the PCA remains the main legal basis of EU-Azerbaijan relations.

As a rich country with oil and natural gas resources, Azerbaijan is an alternative supplier of energy to Europe, which could decrease the EU's dependence on Russian energy supplies. The energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 underscored the importance of Azerbaijan for the European Union, and that importance is stressed in the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and Azerbaijan in the field of energy. The latter explicitly mentions the perspective of "gradual convergence with the EU's internal energy market aimed at integration" as a shared priority of both parties. In addition to the Memorandum, President Ilham Aliyev and the president of European Commission José Manuel Barroso signed a *Joint Declaration on Southern Gas Corridor* during the latter's visit to Baku (President.az 2011). In addition to its role as an energy supplier, Azerbaijan is also a transit country for Central Asian energy resources.

The bargaining power of Azerbaijan in energy relations is much stronger than it is in the other two groups of objectives. Convergence in energy relations thus is toward bilaterally produced rules, rather than toward EU-originated rules. The EU's failure to exert influence on Azerbaijan in the achievement of the second group of objectives convert EU-Azerbaijan relations from integration to cooperation, because the second group of objectives are the main elements of integration or in other words, external governance. There is also, what can be called, "the politics of discourse" by the Azerbaijan government. President Aliyev has said several times that Azerbaijan is aiming toward integration with Europe or Euro-Atlantic world (Trend 2009; Yeni Azerbaijan 2009), while Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov noted that "Azerbaijan aspires toward cooperation with European Union and NATO, but it is not going to join these organizations" (News.az 2010).

A major constraint on EU-Azerbaijani relations is Russia-Azerbaijan and CIS-Azerbaijan relations. Since 1991, the role—economic and political—of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space has precluded all the former Soviet republics, except the Baltic states, from pursuing a fully Western orientation. Moreover, the collapse of the USSR sparked ethnic-territorial conflicts in many of post-Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan. And it remains the view of most in Baku that "the key" to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict lies with Moscow. Indeed, basing itself on its National Security Concept, the Russian Federation has simultaneously maintained a military presence in Armenia and been a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group.

Russia remains Azerbaijan's third largest trading partner, and at least in the first post-Soviet years, Azerbaijan was forced to export its energy resources via Russian territory, something that made Baku even more dependent on Moscow. Following the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, Azerbaijan gained some room for maneuver, but Russian pressure on Azerbaijan increased with SOCAR and Gazprom agreeing in October 2009 to the export of Azerbaijani gas to Russia (Socor 2009). The amount of Azerbaijan's gas exported to Russia was increased in 2011 to reach 2 bln. cubic meters (Krishtalyev 2010a). At the same time, Azerbaijan continues to export oil through Russia's Novorossiysk pipeline. Russia-Azerbaijan relations are thus clearly network-mode relations, which means that convergence is toward mutually produced rules, but informal patterns of relations cast shadow over formal relations.

In contrast to its relations with Russia, Azerbaijan's ties with the CIS are quite limited. At one point, in fact, Russian analysts talked about the possibility of Azerbaijan leaving that organization (Vlasov 2008). More recently, however, Baku made clear that Azerbaijan supports the continued existence of the CIS (ActualComment 2010). Relations within the CIS are based on equal rights and convergence toward both bilaterally and collectively produced rules. Azerbaijan, however, is not participating in Organization of Treaty on Collective Security, neither it is part of Customs Union. The sole rationale behind its remaining within the organization is to maintain good relations with Russia. Thus, unlike the case of Russia, the CIS as such does not represent a constraint on EU-Azerbaijan relations.

As this article has shown, since external governance is a way of dealing with interdependence, and interdependence cannot be controlled by rule-transfer only, the concept of governance does not only consist in rule-transfer, but also involves avoiding obstacles and problem-solving. At the same time, both Azerbaijan-Russia and Azerbaijan-CIS relations are network-mode relations based on equal rights and bilaterally produced rules. However, because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russian influence over its possible resolution, Moscow retains strong influence over Azerbaijan and over Azerbaijan's relations with the EU.

In this situation, the EU is seeking to apply the conditionality method on its relations with Azerbaijan, but fails to meet the requirements for the effectiveness of conditionality: speed and size of rewards, credibility of conditionality and veto players and costs. First, not all of the EU's rewards are attractive for Azerbaijan. Nor is Azerbaijan ready to conduct the comprehensive reforms the EU seeks. That is unlikely to change, because the EU does not possess enough mechanisms to influence Azerbaijani government. Second, the EU is reluctant to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, because of the strong Russian influence over the conflict and in the entire region. And third, in the field of energy, Russia and the EU are competing over Azerbaijan's energy resources.

Thus, EU-Azerbaijan relations are formally hierarchical and aimed at economic integration and political cooperation through convergence on EU rules. However, in practice, these relations remain largely confined to cooperation in the field of energy and transit, based on equal rights and network mode of relations, rather than integration. In contrast to EU-Azerbaijan relations, Russia-Azerbaijan relations are formally network-mode relations with convergence on bilaterally produced rules, but Russia's strong mechanisms of influence cast shadow over formal relations. Thus,

EU external governance in Azerbaijan is constrained by Russian informal influence, on one hand, and—at least partially—Azerbaijan’s reluctance to embrace the latter.

To cope with these constraints, the EU almost certainly will have to become more actively involved in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and thereby lessen the Russian influence over Azerbaijan. In addition, the EU will have to make its “rewards” more attractive to Azerbaijan. Finally, the EU will have to devote more attention to transforming economic integration into other forms of cooperation with Azerbaijan, even as it keeps an eye on Russian-Azerbaijani relations.

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CALL TO RESETTLE ARMENIANS IN KARABAKH THREATENS PEACE PROCESS

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An Armenian diaspora effort to convince Armenians living abroad to resettle in the Nagorno-Karabakh not only violates international law, which specifies that an occupying power cannot change the ethnic mix of a region in advance of a referendum by introducing its citizens or co-ethnics into a region, but threatens progress under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group to a resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Elman Abdullayev, the press secretary of the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry, noted that in connection with the 20th anniversary of the independence of Armenia, Armenian groups have launched a program called *Armenia-3500*, which is intended to convince 3500 Armenians living in the diaspora to move to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, thus continuing Yerevan's policy of "artificial and illegal settlement of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan," a policy that "contradicts all norms and principles of international law." [1]

While the Armenian project appears intended in the first instance to try to attract members of the Armenian diaspora to come to Armenia and thus help compensate for that republic's loss of more than 1.3 million residents since 1991—an effort that has failed up to now to convince more than 10,000 Armenians to return—[2] it is clear from the project's website and coverage in the Armenian media that the organizers are most interested in getting Armenians from the diaspora to move to Nagorno-Karabakh.

That is because, as the *Armenia 3500* project notes, [3] those Armenians from the diaspora who elect to move to occupied Nagorno-Karabakh will receive free housing, something that those who move to the Republic of Armenia will not get. But according to an article on *Eurasianet*, such incentives have not had much effect: Only 12 diaspora Armenians have agreed to move to Armenia itself since the project was announced at the end of September 2011—and apparently none of them has agreed to move to Nagorno-Karabakh. [4]

The exact relationship of this project to the Armenian government is not clear, but those Armenian activists behind it appear to be acting on the basis of two calculations. On the one hand, they may hope, despite past failures to attract members of the diaspora, to change the ethnic balance in Nagorno-Karabakh and thus give Armenians a stronger voice in any future referendum there. And on the other, they may believe that the appearance of even a miniscule number of new members of the Armenian diaspora in Nagorno-Karabakh will have an impact on the governments of the countries from which they come.

However that may be and despite the likelihood that Yerevan will fail in this effort, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry's Abdullayev is clearly right when he observes that "the attempts of the Armenian leadership to change the demographic situation in the country unilaterally and illegally will inflict great harm to the negotiating process for the resolution of the conflict" and that "once again Armenia is demonstrating its destructive position," something that all countries and international organizations interested in peace should take note of and condemn.

Notes

[1] See <http://news.day.az/politics/297308.html> (accessed 7 November 2011).

[2] See <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64435> (accessed 7 November 2011).

[3] See <http://armenia3500.wordpress.com/> and <http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Armenia3500-Project/126888134080033> (accessed 7 November 2011).

[4] See <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64435> (accessed 7 November 2011).

A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

President Ilham Aliyev tells visiting Bulgarian President Georgy Parvanov that "Azerbaijan is ready to make its contribution to guaranteeing the energy security of Europe" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298756.html>).

Ali Hasanov, head of the social-political department of the Presidential Administration, says that "a meeting of the communities of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the means of resolving the conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/299054.html>).

The Foreign Ministry describes as "a provocation from the Armenian side" Yerevan's reported plans to "build a city in occupied Zangilan for Armenians resettled at one time from Azerbaijan into Armenia" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298431.html>).

II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan

Catherine Ashton, the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy, says that if necessary, the European Union is prepared to exert itself in support of the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/299051.html>).

Lamberto Zannier, the OSCE's new secretary general, says that Turkey is "an important player in the region" and "can offer political support in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/296891.html>).

The International Monetary Fund says that the holdings of the Azerbaijani Central Bank and the State Oil Fund are "sufficient for overcoming the consequences of the world financial crisis" (<http://news.day.az/economy/296815.html>).

III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

15 November

President Ilham Aliyev receives Catherine Ashton, the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy (<http://news.day.az/politics/299049.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Taleb Rifai, the secretary general of the World Tourism Organization (<http://news.day.az/politics/299049.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Richard Morningstar, the US Secretary of State's Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy (<http://news.day.az/politics/299049.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Vladimir Andreychenko, the speaker of the House of Representatives of the Belorussian Parliament (<http://news.day.az/politics/299049.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Latifa Akherbash, the state secretary for foreign affairs of Morocco (<http://news.day.az/politics/299085.html>).

Labor and Social Protection Minister Fizuli Alakparov signs a cooperation accord with his Bulgarian counterpart Totyu Mladenov (<http://news.day.az/economy/298939.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that the Azerbaijani embassy in Damascus is operating normally (<http://news.day.az/politics/298945.html>).

Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that there is little reason to expect any breakthrough on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the near future (<http://news.day.az/politics/298884.html>).

Govkhar Bakhshaliyeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Armenia has driven itself into a dead end" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298882.html>).

Rasim Musabayov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the situation regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh talks appears "hopelessly at a dead end" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298826.html>).

The Milli Majlis confirms an agreement ending a requirement for Azerbaijanis and Poles with diplomatic passports to secure visas before visiting each other's country (<http://news.day.az/politics/298996.html>).

Azerbaijani defense officials participate in the international air and cosmic exhibit and conference in Dubai (<http://news.day.az/economy/299086.html>).

Bulgarian President Georgy Parvanov says that "Azerbaijan must play a key role in the development of the Southern Gas Corridor" (<http://news.day.az/politics/299014.html>).

Richard Morningstar, the US Secretary of State's Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, says that the United States supports the project of building the Trans-Caspian pipeline (<http://news.day.az/economy/299057.html>).

Latvian Minister of Economy Daniels Pavļuts proposed holding Azerbaijan Days in Latvia in 2012 (<http://news.day.az/politics/298910.html>).

Taleb Rifai, secretary general of the World Tourism Organization, calls on Azerbaijan and Armenia to settle their conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh so that each side can benefit from visitors (<http://news.day.az/politics/298999.html>).

Muharrem Varly, a deputy of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, calls on Ankara to put pressure on Yerevan to withdraw from the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/298916.html>).

Turkey's transportation ministry says that Ankara has completed 35 percent of the work on the construction of the 76 kilometer section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway within Turkey (<http://news.day.az/economy/298949.html>).

A Pakistani defense firm says that Azerbaijan has declared its intention to purchase military jets of the JF-17 Thunder type that are being jointly produced by Pakistan and China (<http://news.day.az/politics/298943.html>).

14 November

President Ilham Aliyev receives Doris Leuthard, Switzerland's minister of energy, environment, communications and transportation (<http://news.day.az/politics/298819.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Latvian Minister of Economy Daniels Pavļuts (<http://news.day.az/politics/298819.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Maria Victoria Scola Pliego, Spain's ambassador for special assignments for the countries of the South Caucasus (<http://news.day.az/politics/298849.html>).

Mohammed Baqir Bahrami, Iran's ambassador to Baku, says that he "already sees a common happy future of Iran and Azerbaijan," because relations between the two countries are "at a high level" and that "there are no states in the world, which are as close to one another as are Azerbaijan and Iran" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298813.html>).

Charles Lonsdale, Britain's ambassador to Yerevan, says that the United Kingdom supports talks on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the format of the OSCE Minsk Group (<http://news.day.az/politics/298762.html>).

Vladimir Andreychenko, speaker of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, says that "Azerbaijani-Belorussian relations are on the rise" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298655.html>).

The World Bank announces that Azerbaijan now ranks 77th out of 183 countries in the ranking on payment of taxes (<http://news.day.az/economy/298842.html>).

13 November

The Center for Strategic Research in the Office of the President signs a cooperation agreement with the International Institute for Political Research of Italy (<http://news.day.az/politics/298583.html>).

12 November

Turkey's President Abdulla Gul confirms the long-term program and action plan for trade and economic cooperation with Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/economy/298483.html>).

The Congress of Azerbaijanis of Sweden says that Armenian claims that the Swedish parliament has dropped plans to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because of pressure from the Armenian lobby are false (<http://news.day.az/politics/298498.html>).

11 November

President Ilham Aliyev tells visiting Hungarian President Pal Schmitt that Azerbaijan is "making its contribution to the energy security of our partners" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298201.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov says that "the drawing out of the Karabakh conflict can lead to major consequences for all of Europe" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298412.html>).

Dashgyn Shikarov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Islamabad, meets with Asif Shamdani, commander of the Pakistani navy (<http://news.day.az/politics/298341.html>).

Ziyafat Askarov, first vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says the Chisinau's dismissal of the chief of its general staff over reports that Moldova was selling arms to Armenia shows that "the authorities of Moldova relate seriously to the question of the illegal sales of arms" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298296.html>).

Fazail Ibrahimli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Armenia "already for a long time" has displayed "all the signs of a systemic crisis" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298351.html>).

Nizami Jafarov, co-chair of the Azerbaijani-Turkish interparliamentary friendship group, says that "the establishment of a common television channel for Turkish language states" is something for which there is "great social interest" (<http://news.day.az/society/298386.html>).

Bayram Safarov, the head of the Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan, says that "the idea of the Armenians about building a city on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is a major mistake" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298433.html>).

Uzi Landau, Israel's national infrastructure minister, says that "Israel views Karabakh resolution in the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298312.html>).

Igor Bordiu, Moldovan ambassador to Baku, says that Chisinau does not intend to sell weapons to Armenia and that reports to the contrary are "false" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298292.html>).

The State Committee on Standards, Metrology and Patents signs a cooperation agreement with its Hungarian counterpart (<http://news.day.az/economy/298389.html>).

10 November

President Ilham Aliyev receives Uzi Landau, Israel's minister of national infrastructure (<http://news.day.az/politics/298176.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Helge Lund, executive director of Statoil Hydro (<http://news.day.az/politics/298176.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Israeli National Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau say that Azerbaijan and Israel intend to "broaden cooperation in the areas of economics, trade, agriculture and information technology" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298197.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov meets with his Russian counterpart Gennady Gatilov to discuss upcoming agendas at the UN Security Council (<http://news.day.az/politics/298189.html>).

The Defense Ministry says that recent declarations by Yerevan that "victory in the Karabakh war can also be assessed as the victory of the Armenian intelligence service over the Azerbaijani" are not only false, "but more like a fairy tale than a declaration" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298078.html>).

Oktay Asadov, speaker of the Milli Majlis, meets with his Ukrainian counterpart Vladimir Litvin in St. Petersburg, and the latter says that Ukraine is "ready to assist the negotiating process" on Nagorno-Karabakh (<http://news.day.az/politics/298063.html>).

Nizami Jafarov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the Turkish language can be accepted as the common language for the Turkic world" (<http://news.day.az/society/298196.html>).

Rovshan Rzayev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Azerbaijani deputies have always been in favor of meetings between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Nagorno-Karabakh, "but there are definite forces which want to interfere" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298084.html>).

Bayram Safararov, head of Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of the Azerbaijani Republic, calls on Azerbaijani citizens who are ethnic Armenians living on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to respect the Constitution of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/298080.html>).

Bayram Safararov, head of Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of the Azerbaijani Republic, says that efforts by Armenia to use the airport in Khankandi are "a provocation" (<http://news.day.az/politics/298090.html>).

Bayram Safararov, head of Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of the Azerbaijani Republic, calls on international organizations, including religious groups, to condemn the destruction by Armenians of historical monuments on the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/298097.html>).

Farhad Badalbayli, a member of the Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of the Azerbaijani Republic, says members of his group will meet with the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (<http://news.day.az/politics/298111.html>).

Azerbaijanis living in Poland send a letter to the Russian embassy in Warsaw protesting the statements of Vladimir Solovyev on *Vesti FM* concerning Azerbaijanis (<http://news.day.az/politics/298178.html>).

Vladimir Makukha, Ukraine's deputy minister for energy and the coal industry, says that Kyiv has approved a law on the ratification of accords with Baku relative to cooperation on the transport of oil through Ukraine (<http://news.day.az/economy/298070.html>).

Francis Gurry, the director general of the World Intellectual Property Organization, says that Armenia must follow international law when it uses Azerbaijani folklore or other works from Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/society/298211.html>).

Firuz Kazemzadeh, professor emeritus of Yale, visits Baku to speak and to launch the Russian version of his book, *The Struggle for the Transcaucasus, 1917-1921* (<http://news.day.az/politics/298157.html>).

Lord Laird, the chairman of the Consultative Council of the European-Azerbaijani Society, says that Azerbaijan is "a country inclined toward the West" (<http://news.day.az/economy/298154.html>).

9 November

Eynulla Madatli, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Ukraine, meets with Aleksandr Lavirinovich, that country's justice minister (<http://news.day.az/politics/297949.html>).

Ramil Gurbanov, Azerbaijan's vice consul in Los Angeles, takes part in a conference of the National Council for Exports in Nevada (<http://news.day.az/politics/297955.html>).

Hungarian President Pál Schmitt says that "Azerbaijan can play a key role in the projects of the Southern Gas Corridor" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297913.html>).

Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian foreign minister, says that regional conflicts like the one in and around Nagorno-Karabakh must be resolved "exclusively by peaceful means" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297967.html>).

The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development together with the World Bank says it will help Azerbaijan to increase its competitiveness in oil and gas operations (<http://news.day.az/economy/297939.html>).

Israel withdraws its warning to its citizens concerning terrorism-related dangers to visiting the countries of the South Caucasus (<http://news.day.az/politics/297963.html>).

Armenia conducts major military exercises in the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/297947.html>).

8 November

Javanship Akhundov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tehran, meets with senior Iranian ayatollahs in Qum (<http://news.day.az/politics/297830.html>).

The Foreign Ministry protests Armenia's inclusion of a segment on Nagorno-Karabakh at the World Travel Market exhibition in London (<http://news.day.az/politics/297833.html>).

Rasim Musabayov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Azerbaijan has "the complete right" to block the use of the Khankandi airport through the offices of the International Organization of Civil Aviation (<http://news.day.az/politics/297871.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, deputy chairman of the *Yeni Azerbaijan* Party, visits China at the invitation of the Communist Party of China (<http://news.day.az/politics/297869.html>).

The North-South Political Science Center for the development of scientific and information ties with the countries of the South Caucasus opens in Moscow (<http://news.day.az/politics/297858.html>).

7 November

Tahir Rzayev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the crisis situation in Armenia has intensified" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297209.html>).

Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić invites Baku to invest in the privatization effort in his country (<http://news.day.az/economy/297766.html>).

6 November

Turkish officials and citizens are pleased that Azerbaijan was the first country to respond to the earthquake near Lake Van in Turkey (<http://news.day.az/politics/297600.html>).

5 November

Gursel Ismailzade, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tokyo, says that Baku intends to involve Japanese companies in the development of the country's highway infrastructure (<http://news.day.az/politics/297551.html>).

Fazil Mustafa, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Armenian "friends" prompted Vladimir Solovyev on Moscow's *Vesti FM* to slander the Azerbaijani people (<http://news.day.az/politics/297552.html>).

The Union of Student Organizations of Azerbaijan sends an appeal to senior Russian officials denouncing statements by Vladimir Solovyev on Moscow's *Vesti FM* about the Azerbaijani people (<http://news.day.az/politics/297589.html>).

Günther Oettinger, the European Union commissioner for energy, says that "the projected Nabucco gas pipeline is expensive and that careful investors need to be convinced to invest money in it" (<http://news.day.az/economy/297544.html>).

4 November

Energy and Industry Minister Natic Aliyev meets with his Argentinian counterpart Lino Baranao (<http://news.day.az/economy/297389.html>).

Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev, Azerbaijan's permanent representative to the United Nations, sends a letter to the UN Secretary General concerning Armenian violations of the ceasefire and attacks on civilians in the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/297453.html>).

Gursel Ismailzade, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tokyo, has an interview published in various Japanese newspapers on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the restoration of Azerbaijan's independence (<http://news.day.az/politics/297456.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that Armenia in violation of all norms and principles of international law continues its policy of artificial and illegal settlement of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/297308.html>).

The Foreign Ministry responds to threats from Hezbollah to "expel" the Azerbaijani consulate general from Tabriz by saying that "the security of the diplomatic missions of Azerbaijan abroad are always at the center of attention of official Baku" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297368.html>).

Bahar Muradova, vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says that all possible influential people, including religious leaders, should be used for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/297361.html>).

Zahid Orudzh, a Milli Majlis deputy, criticizes the statements about Azerbaijanis by Vladimir Solovyev on Moscow's *Vesti FM* (<http://news.day.az/politics/297445.html>).

Azay Guliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Armenian officials are quitting because they are "afraid" of being judged by the Armenian people (<http://news.day.az/politics/297136.html>).

Ayдын Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that he is profoundly angered by the statements by Vladimir Solovyev on *Vesti FM* about the Azerbaijani people (<http://news.day.az/politics/297291.html>).

Azerbaijan is elected to the intergovernmental councils of international development programs for hydrology and communications at the 36th General Conference of UNESCO (<http://news.day.az/politics/297898.html>).

Azerbaijani and Georgian consular officials consult in Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/297440.html>).

Azerbaijan signs agreements with three international lobbying agencies to advance its campaign to be named the site of the 2020 Olympic Games (<http://news.day.az/sport/297520.html>).

US President Barak Obama greets President Ilham Aliyev on the occasion of the Gurban holiday (<http://news.day.az/politics/297460.html>).

Mustafa Kabakci, a deputy in Turkey's Grand National Assembly, says that Armenian actions have prevented the ratification of the Zurich Protocols (<http://news.day.az/politics/297252.html>).

Semyon Ikhilov, head of the religious community of Mountain Jews of Azerbaijan, says that the declarations of Vladimir Soloyev on Moscow's *Vesti FM* are "hypocrisy, a diversion and slander" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297422.html>).

The Russian and Jewish communities of Azerbaijan appeal to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and other Russian officials to take action against Vladimir Solovyev for his false and slanderous statements on *Vesti FM* about the Azerbaijani people (<http://news.day.az/politics/297275.html>).

Bayram Safarov, head of the Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan, says that "the election of Azerbaijan as a temporary member of the Security Council is a major diplomatic victory" and that "naturally, our country will use this opportunity also for the resolution of the Karabakh problem" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297347.html>).

Petros Efthymiou, president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, says that recent activity by the Minsk Group "testifies to our support for the strengthening of the activity of the OSCE concerning the resolution of conflicts" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297332.html>).

Ireland names Kenneth Thompson as its ambassador to Ankara and Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/297297.html>).

3 November

President Ilham Aliyev receives Asad Alam, the World Bank's regional director for the South Caucasus (<http://news.day.az/politics/297142.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Wolfgang Ischinger, the president of the Munich Security Conference (<http://news.day.az/politics/297142.html>).

Leyla Aliyeva, the vice president of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, visits New York to take part in discussions on children's health (<http://news.day.az/politics/296814.html>).

Defense Ministry Safar Abiyev receives Peter Bateman, Britain's ambassador to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/297100.html>).

Economic Development Minister Shahin Mustafayev signs a cooperation agreement with his Argentine counterpart Lino Baranao (<http://news.day.az/economy/297067.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that the election of Azerbaijan to the UN Security Council shows that Baku "has the support of the majority of countries of the world," something that can only disturb Armenian leaders (<http://news.day.az/politics/297222.html>).

Bahar Muradova, the vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says that "the economic and social crisis of Armenia is now manifesting itself in politics as well" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297135.html>).

Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says the current situation in the Armenian elite reflects the problems in Armenia as a whole (<http://news.day.az/politics/296991.html>).

The Milli Majlis hosts the first session of the commission on international ties of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Language Countries (<http://news.day.az/politics/297077.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, the deputy chairman and executive secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, says that "Azerbaijan is now in a position to restore its own history" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297106.html>).

Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammadov says that the Trans-Caspian pipeline is an important project which "testifies to the willingness of Turkmenistan to engage in mutually profitable cooperation with all interested sides" (<http://news.day.az/economy/297132.html>).

The Russian Foreign Ministry welcomes Azerbaijan's election to the UN Security Council (<http://news.day.az/politics/297157.html>).

The Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement reminding Russians that entry into the occupied territories is seriously complicated by the positions of the sides and the absence of international ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia (<http://news.day.az/politics/297159.html>).

Valery Chechelashvili, the secretary general of GUAM, says that the GUAM member countries intend to expand cooperation with Japan in transportation, energy and nano-technology (<http://news.day.az/politics/297182.html>).

Maharram Inci, a member of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, says that he does not believe the Zurich Protocols can be submitted for ratification to the Turkish parliament (<http://news.day.az/society/297097.html>).

Milan Tsabnokh, the co-chair of the commission for parliamentary cooperation between Armenia and the European Union, says that "the current status quo on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh is unacceptable" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297154.html>).

Joseph Owen, the head of the Baku office of the World Bank, says that his organization has conducted a review of the World Bank-backed projects in Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/economy/297228.html>).

2 November

President Ilham Aliyev receives Lino Baranao, Argentina's minister for science, technology and productive innovations (<http://news.day.az/politics/296951.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives the letters of credence from incoming United Arab Emirates ambassador Salem Khalif Muhammad al-Hafli (<http://news.day.az/politics/296951.html>).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov receives Sergey Stepashin, head of the Russian Accounting Chamber (<http://news.day.az/politics/296937.html>).

Justice Minister Fikrat Mammadov meets with his Turkish counterpart Sadullah Ergin and the two establish a joint working group to promote cooperation (<http://news.day.az/politics/296877.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that Yerevan regularly tries "to show that the situation in the Armenian army is better than it in fact is" (<http://news.day.az/politics/297020.html>).

Ogtay Asadov, speaker of the Milli Majlis, receives Turkey's Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin (<http://news.day.az/politics/297021.html>).

Zahid Orudzh, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the current level of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations makes the conduct of joint military training exercises a necessity" (<http://news.day.az/politics/296998.html>).

Elman Mammadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Yerevan is doing everything it can to conceal the disorder in the ranks of the Armenian army (<http://news.day.az/politics/296948.html>).

Elman Mammadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Nagorno-Karabakh should discuss issues concerning their joint residency in that region (<http://news.day.az/politics/296948.html>).

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sends Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov a message of greetings on the occasion of Gurban Bayram (<http://news.day.az/politics/296890.html>).

Lino Baranao, Argentina's minister for science, technology and productive innovations, says that Argentina in a short time will open an embassy in Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/296934.html>).

Sergey Stepashin, head of Russia's Accounting Chamber, says that Azerbaijan's experience in constructing highways can be applied in Russia (<http://news.day.az/economy/296947.html>).

Sergey Stepashin, head of the Russian Accounting Chamber, says that Azerbaijan "effectively uses the resources of the State Oil Fund" (<http://news.day.az/economy/296914.html>).

Lamberto Zannier, the OSCE's new secretary general, says that Turkey is "an important player in the region" and "can offer political support in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/296891.html>).

Roland Kobia, head of the European Union representation in Baku, says that "the EU welcomes the signing of an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the transit of gas" (<http://news.day.az/economy/296895.html>).

Roland Kobia, head of the European Union representation in Baku, says that Azerbaijan must "continue the liberalization of its economy and the formation of free market relations in order to achieve still greater integration into the world economy" (<http://news.day.az/economy/296884.html>).

1 November

President Ilham Aliyev receives Sergey Stepashin, head of the Russian Accounting Chamber (<http://news.day.az/politics/296806.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Turkish Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin (<http://news.day.az/politics/296806.html>).

Ibrahim Hajiyeu, Azerbaijan's ambassador to India, presents his letters of credence to the president of that country (<http://news.day.az/politics/296808.html>).

Eleonora Huseynova, the permanent representative of Azerbaijan to UNESCO, tells that organization that Armenia continues to destroy historical and cultural monuments of Azerbaijan and to fail to stop the illegal distribution of drugs and human organs in the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/296658.html>).

Fazail Ibrahimli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Yerevan authorities lack "the political will" to hold normal elections and take decisions on the problems of Armenia (<http://news.day.az/politics/296656.html>).

Eldar Ibrahimov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that he is "pleased" that there are some people in Armenia who understand "the real situation" and are ready to act on it (<http://news.day.az/politics/296637.html>).

Ayдын Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis, says that "Armenia has again shown its medieval thinking" in its talk about the borders of the Armenian people in the past (<http://news.day.az/politics/296585.html>).

The Second Forum of Azerbaijani Youth of Ukraine opens in Kyiv (<http://news.day.az/politics/296730.html>).

The International Monetary Fund says that the holdings of the Azerbaijani Central Bank and the State Oil Fund are "sufficient for overcoming the consequences of the world financial crisis" (<http://news.day.az/economy/296815.html>). It adds

that it supports Azerbaijan's shift from annual to mid-term budgeting (<http://news.day.az/economy/296791.html>).

Muhammadbaqir Bahrami, Iran's ambassador to Baku, greets the Azerbaijani people on the occasion of Gurban Bayram (<http://news.day.az/politics/296796.html>).

Turkey's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz says that Azerbaijan and Turkey have reached agreement on gas prices which will remain unchanged until 2018 (<http://news.day.az/economy/296655.html>).

The Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development says that "the study of international experience in increasing the role of ecologically pure agriculture in the export of non-petroleum production has great importance for Azerbaijan and Turkey" (<http://news.day.az/economy/296795.html>).

Maharram Varly, a deputy of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, says that "a complete collapse awaits Armenia" (<http://news.day.az/politics/296377.html>).

The US Department of State annual report on human trafficking says that in 2010 Azerbaijan devoted significant efforts to defending and protecting the victims of such trafficking (<http://news.day.az/society/296678.html>).

Peter Semneby, former special representative of the European Union for the South Caucasus, says that "the crisis around Nagorno-Karabakh continues to intensify, and the situation up to now seems at a dead end and unresolvable ... A real danger of a sharp escalation exists" (<http://news.day.az/politics/296717.html>).

Note to Readers

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