AZERBAIJAN IN THE NEW GEO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

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The increasing importance of oil and gas in both domestic and international affairs presents Azerbaijan with enormous opportunities—and equally enormous challenges. As a major oil and gas producer in its own right and an important transit country by virtue of its location, Azerbaijan has seen its own economy boom and its importance internationally rise dramatically over the last two decades. Precisely because of its importance as an oil and gas supplier, however, Azerbaijan must navigate among a variety of other power centers—including China and India, which with their rising markets are shifting the balance of the international order; the Russian Federation and the desire of its leadership to use oil and gas as the...
country’s most important foreign policy tool; Turkey and its interests as a rising power in its own right; as well as the European Union member states and the United States with their increasing energy dependence—in order to maintain its ability to define its own future.

In this new geo-economic environment, Azerbaijan in particular—and the wider Caspian/Black Sea region more general—are far more significant than their collective four percent of the world’s oil and gas reserves would otherwise suggest. That is because the European Union, overwhelmingly dependent on Russia for its gas, now views Azerbaijan not only as a supplier, but as a transit country for gas that is not subordinate to Moscow. This new reality is underlined not only by the content of the EU’s 2006 Action Plan for Azerbaijan under the European Neighborhood Policy, but also by the European Commission’s Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan on Energy Partnership and its current mandate to negotiate a treaty between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian Pipeline System.

From the point of view of the EU as a consumer, Azerbaijan is geopolitically important, because it can help limit European dependence on Russian fuel exports and thus serve as a hedge against Moscow’s use of “soft power” to promote its broader agenda in Europe and elsewhere. As Europeans are well aware, Russia’s August 2003 Energy Strategy bluntly states that “the role of the country in world energy markets to a large extent determines its geopolitical influence.” To that end, then-President Vladimir Putin nationalized the oil and gas sectors, gaining a near monopoly leverage in the European fossil fuel market by promoting two major pipeline projects bypassing Ukraine, North Stream and South Stream. Most seriously from the EU’s perspective, Moscow has effectively weakened the Union’s common front by pursuing bilateral arrangements with its member states on energy supplies.

The European Commission subsequently published a policy paper An Energy Policy for Europe (2007) and a Strategic Energy Review (2008) calling for a series of steps to loosen Gazprom’s grip on the European market. But to date, these steps have had little impact. Vladimir Putin signed deals with the major German energy companies and even secured the services of former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder as Gazprom lobbyist-in-chief. As a result, the Baltic Sea pipeline project seems secure, despite Commission objections, and on the South Stream front, Vladimir Putin has made deals with Austria, Bulgaria and Greece, as well as Turkmenistan, clearly intending in this way to diminish the significance of the EU Commission-preferred Nabucco pipeline (Roubanis & Koppa 2010; Cameron 2010). Given this state of affairs, the EU has little choice but to expand its engagement with Azerbaijan.

Closely related to the importance of Azerbaijan for the EU in this regard is the European Union’s relationship with Turkey. At present, Turkey mediates EU-Azerbaijan relations in significant ways. First of all, Turkey is bounded to Azerbaijan geographically, and more often than not, Turkish analysts stress the centrality of Turkey as an energy hub, since it is the indispensable transit country connecting the EU market with the Russian Caucasus (Blue Stream Pipeline) and the Caspian basin (South Caucasus Pipeline, BTC). For Europe, the road to Baku goes through Ankara. However, Turkey is not single-mindedly committed to enhancing EU’s energy security. Instead, it is boosting its geopolitical significance as a complementary building block to Russia’s in the European energy-security
architecture, even as it keeps its options open for future business ventures at variance with Moscow’s preferences.

In the words of the former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2010) and chief Nabucco-project lobbyist:

“It can't be said often enough: Turkey is situated in a highly sensitive geopolitical location, particularly where Europe’s security is concerned. The eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, the western Balkans, the Caspian region and the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all areas where the West will achieve nothing or very little without Turkey’s support. And this is true in terms not only of security policy, but also of energy policy if you’re looking for alternatives to Europe’s growing reliance on Russian energy supplies. (...) Europe’s security in the 21st century will be determined to a significant degree in its neighborhood in the southeast—exactly where Turkey is crucial for Europe’s security interests now and, increasingly, in the future. But, rather than binding Turkey as closely as possible to Europe and the West, European policy is driving Turkey into the arms of Russia and Iran.”

All competing scenarios for the emerging European energy architecture are built around the notion of Turkish centrality. However, and this is the key point, that outcome is the result of Turkish diplomacy, rather than the country’s location alone. Turkey only reluctantly endorsed the official Russian offer for the Blue Stream II project in 2005, giving priority to the US-EU sponsored Nabucco project. In response, Russia turned to the Balkans, established an alliance with Italy, and pursued the design of an alternative route from the Russian Black Sea coast via an offshore pipeline to Bulgaria (Yurdakul 2010). Bulgaria, however, is stalling the project either on the basis of economic or environmental considerations, which seems to be favoring the Nabucco project (EuroActiv 2009). Until a final investment decision is made, neither Russia nor the EU can afford to exclude Turkey from their fossil fuel grand strategy (Roubanis & Koppa 2010).

The second reason that Baku’s relationship with the EU is mediated by Ankara is political, and—like the first—reflects Turkish arguments rather than underlying realities. Starting from the premise that the ENP is a system intended to foster progressive integration with its neighbors on the basis of (EU) values, norms and practices, Turkish analysts are at pains to suggest that this is not possible in Azerbaijan or the wider Caspian region. For example, Turkish commentator Unar Eris (2010) routinely argues that Azerbaijan will fail to meet the Action Plan because, he says, European standards and values are not “shared values.” But his argument is undercut by his equally frequent assertion that Turkey as the only secular Muslim democracy in the region can somehow help “these countries,” including Azerbaijan, to meet these standards.

Many in Turkey share Eris’ views, although none of them has made it clear how Turkish proximity will help “bridge the gap” between the two political cultures they point to. Indeed, as Katharina Hoffmann (2011) argues, the Azerbaijani culture of multilateral engagement is informed by structural realities not uncommon to former CIS countries: Projects directly and immediately benefiting Azerbaijan are welcomed, with little attention to those devoted to long-term structural integration projects and steps toward supranational structures. Hence, a cooperation practice within a regional Organization is preferred, which does not limit the sovereignty of Azerbaijan on any issue.
Viewed in broadest terms then, the EU-Azerbaijani relationship is an independent variable in the equation of EU-Russian relations and, a dependent variable in the EU-Turkish relationship. As a result, there is a compelling need to address the theme of threats and opportunities for Azerbaijan in the current geopolitical environment. Recently, Philip Hanson (2011) prepared a briefing paper that helps us do just that. He examines the shifting dynamic of EU-Russia-Turkey relations and discusses how the transformation of this geopolitical environment should inform Azerbaijani foreign policy. Hanson argues that the EU remains for both Russia and the EU an unparalleled economic and gravitational force both politically and economically. At the same time, he suggests, the dynamics of these two relationships are neither homogenous nor necessarily parallel to EU’s objectives.

In fact, Hanson continues, the European Union is losing its gravitational pull in the region for two reasons. On the one hand, its economic clout is increasingly uncertain. Both Turkey and Russia doubt that European recovery, if and when it occurs, will sustain their current growth and are “hedging their bets” by cultivating relationships with other markets. And on the other, the EU’s community-building policies have been discredited, because there is ever less belief that the acquis provide a common basis for ties and because many countries, especially Russia, favor bilateral ties over multilateral ones.

In this environment, what is Azerbaijan to do? There is no right theoretical framework in diplomacy. More often than not, the theoretical perspective or “diplomatic culture” of a state tends to operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The spill-over of a human rights agenda to energy decisions is obviously daunting for many states that engage with the EU; it is less of a concern for Russia. The differences in style and traditions of diplomacy are linked to the self-perception of individual “actors.” And quite obviously, as an ever-closer union founded on theoretical assertions of functionalism, the EU has emerged as a post-state actor that regards itself as one of the most advanced organizations of multilateral governance in the world. Russia in contrast has always perceived itself as a post-imperial Great Power of global or regional gravity, as Russians themselves admit. In sum, rather than opting for one paradigm or another, it is worth noting that different diplomatic cultures are applicable in a different context.

If Hoffman’s (2011) assessment is right, Azerbaijani diplomatic culture is informed by a realist or actor-centered perspective. This has not prevented Azerbaijan from creating “an impressive list” of Regional Organization (RO) memberships: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Organization for Economic Development and Democracy (GUAM), the Council of Europe, the Non-Alignment Movement and, since 2004, a corporate relationship with the EU within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. In short, even though Azerbaijan has a culture oriented toward the fortification national sovereignty, it has established a nexus of RO memberships which—as Hoffman notes—fortifies its sovereignty. But, the question is of course how.

First of all, by gaining access to a number of international policy forums, Azerbaijan has managed to transcend the nexus of bilateral relations, sideling their inherent asymmetry. It has been able to attract Foreign Direct Investment in the energy sector through projects like Nabucco, by dealing simultaneously with the EU and
Turkey; which has vastly increased the negotiating leverage of Azerbaijan more generally. Moreover, this variable membership has allowed Azerbaijan to capitalize on its strategic significance as an energy producer in order to promote a greater foreign policy agenda. As Hoffman notes, within the realms of OIC and GUAM alone, Azerbaijan has managed to gain a legal or ethical upper hand in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Thus, multilateral engagement has clearly benefited Azerbaijan. The “unprecedented commitment” of the European Commission to elevate the status of diplomatic engagement with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to a bilateral Treaty—committing all parties to the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline system—for example, is especially promising. And on the other hand, because such infrastructure promises to offer Caspian nations a more substantial alternative to the Russian pipeline network (Tsereteli 2008), it will help smoothen relations with other states in the region.

Of course, a treaty calling for infrastructural development is not a substitute for real infrastructure, and given the current decline in EU’s economic weight, there are entirely reasonable doubts as to whether envisioned projects can actually materialize. If that proves to be true, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are being asked to potentially alienate Russia for a project that is still on the drawing board with no certain financial foundations. Moreover, as Turkey distances itself from the EU over Cyprus, Azerbaijan risks becoming a hostage to this collision. Meanwhile, as promising and flourishing the relations between Ankara and Moscow are, the solidity of this relationship for the future to come should not be taken for granted.

At the same time, on the part of the EU, “upgrading” the framework of bilateral relations to a treaty status probably signals that the Turkish “political argument” for a politically mediated relationship between Baku and Brussels is also currently loosing currency. In the near future, the EU will be able to negotiate with Azerbaijan without a rigid set of value/normative demands. In addition, Azerbaijan and other Caspian nations cannot really afford to invest either Moscow or Ankara with an effective veto over market access.

In this situation, Azerbaijan faces a difficult task of hedging its strategic policy risks. Any grand strategy policy recommendations by analysts need to be treated skeptically, because analysts usually lack the kind of critical intelligence available only at the highest levels. However, as Azerbaijan-EU relations are structurally tied to EU-Russian and EU-Turkish relations, it is clear that the road toward the realization of much needed investment in the energy sector of the Black Sea/Caspian region will remain filled with uncertainty, even though at least at a tactical level, the combination of relatively high fossil fuel prices—that has kept Azerbaijani growth going at a healthy pace—combined with the unfolding public debt crisis in the EU, may indeed offer significant opportunities for Azerbaijan.

On the one hand, following the Kazakh example, Azerbaijan is now presented with the unprecedented opportunity for asset acquisition in Southern Europe and the Balkans at low prices. Such “strategic acquisitions” would allow for the replenishing of know-how reserves of the Azerbaijani energy industry. At the same time, direct access to transit infrastructures and the European retail market would “enlarge the pie” of negotiation with regional energy powers, transcending the seemingly inescapable determinism of geographic location. SOCAR could even expand the scope of this strategy. That would provide Azerbaijan with the opportunity to make
a qualitative leap in the diversification of its economic foundations and limit its
dependence on FDI and foreign know-how.

On the other, Azerbaijan could pursue a more active engagement in the political
process at sub-state level, that is, a self-referential capacity to be present, lobby
and gather intelligence in major energy-decision power centers: Moscow, Ankara,
Washington, and Brussels. This will enable Baku to participate in strategic policy
development, rather than simply face a series of either/or dilemmas. Baku has a
competitive advantage in this particular power-game, which is non-other than its
traditional cultural ties with the former FSU space, the Turkic communities of the
Black-Sea/Caspian region and the close ties with the Euro-Atlantic community that
it has so laboriously cultivated.

* The ideas expressed in this article reflect the personal views of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions of which they are a part.
Written largely in a polemical style, the article is meant to introduce some food for
thought and remains open for further elaboration and discussion.

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MOSCOW AND THE DELIMITATION OF KARABAKH IN THE 1920S
Part III (1)
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Editorial Note: As a contribution to the unveiling of the history of Soviet policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan in the World offers what is the first half of the third (and final) of a three-part article on the origins of Soviet policy on this region that was prepared by distinguished Azerbaijani historian Jamil Hasanly. It originally appeared in Russia’s Regnum News Agency at http://regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/armenia/1429705.html. The previous sections of Professor Hasanly’s account were published in the preceding issues of Azerbaijan in the World. The remaining final section will be published in the following issue of the journal.

The well-known session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) on June 27, 1921 adopted a statute about the objectively existing economic linkage of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, while leaving the historical and ethnographic factors aside. However, a week later, on July 4, the next session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), one held with Stalin’s participation, featured another voting in which S. Kirov, the future leader of the party organization of Azerbaijan (three weeks later he became secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Azerbaijan), and G. Ordzhonikidze who directly controlled the Trans-Caucasus republics, voted “in favor of” the resolution which said “to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian SSR and to conduct a plebiscite only in Nagorno-Karabakh.” [1]

Among those who took part in the work of that plenum were: Stalin, a member of the Central Committee of the RKP(b); Ordzhonikidze, Makharadze, Narimanov, Myasnikov, Kirov, Nazaretyan, Orakhelashvili, and Figatner, all of the latter being members of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b); Breitman, the secretary of the Caucasus Bureau RKP(b) Komsomol; as well as Tsintsadze, Mdivani and Svanidze, members of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Georgia.

Two different perspectives were voiced during the session in the course of discussions over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the following questions were put to a vote: a) to keep Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan (those voting in favor were Narimanov, Makharadze, and Nazaretyan; those opposed: Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, Kirov, and Figatner); b) to conduct a plebiscite throughout Karabakh with the participation of the entire population of Armenians and Muslims (those voting for: Narimanov and Makharadze); c) to include the mountainous part of Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakh, that is) within Armenia (those voting for: Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, and Kirov), and d) to conduct a plebiscite only in Nagorno-Karabakh (those voting for: Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, Kirov, and Nazaretyan). [2]
There is a note in the protocol indicating that during the voting on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh, Comrade Orakhelashvili was absent. This seems to have been a more honest approach than the one adopted by S. Kirov—then the most likely candidate to assume leadership of the party organization of Azerbaijan—and G. Ordzhonikidze—who had previously written to Lenin and Chicherin numerous times with appeals to retain both the mountainous and lowland portions of Karabakh in Azerbaijan—both of whom now voted for the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh within Armenia, an act which in the first instance compromised the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

An interesting question arises here: Why would G. Ordzhonikidze and S. Kirov, who had both only a few months earlier insisted in the preservation of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan—because “they could not imagine Azerbaijan without Karabakh”—now, beginning in June and July 1921, changed their opinion in a fundamental way? Were both of them, as trusted representatives of Moscow in the South Caucasus, fulfilling a secret directive from the Center by simultaneously voting against Azerbaijan at the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) on July 4? Indeed, the transformation of Nagorno-Karabakh in June-July 1921 into an object of secret—and shortly afterwards open—discussions of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) and the efforts to forcibly hand over Nagorno-Karabakh were connected with the conclusion—on March 16, 1921—of the Moscow Treaty between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, the latter document featuring a clause specifying that the Nakhchivan oblast is formed as an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan with the condition that Azerbaijan not concede its protectorate to a third state.

The text and the political meaning of the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) were subjected to varied readings and even falsifications from the very first day of its adoption on July 4, 1921. What happened was that Armenian authors replaced the verb “include” in the text with the verb “leave.” N. Narimanov’s statement calling for transferring consideration of the Nagorno-Karabakh question to a final decision of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) put a fait accompli before the participants of the session. To be precise, he said the following: “In view of the importance, which the Karabakh question has for Azerbaijan, I consider it necessary to transfer it for final decision to the Central Committee of the RKP.” Only thanks to the sharp protest of Narimanov, the wording of the final decision that the assembly adopted came to be as follows: “In view of the fact that the question about Karabakh has called for a serious disagreement, the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee considers it necessary to transfer it for a final decision to the Central Committee of the RKP.” [3]

As we can see, one and the same session featured the discussion over the Karabakh question under the fifth point, followed by the discussion—under the sixth point—of Narimanov’s statement concerning the fifth point of the plenum’s decision about that question. That is, the decision taken on the sixth point superseded the results of the previous voting. One way or the other, a majority of the participants of the plenum voted for the decision called for by N. Narimanov. Subsequently, however, this issue was not transferred to discussion in the Central Committee of the RKP(b) in the first instance, because G. Ordzhonikidze decided to retreat from his mistaken position and along with A. Nazaretyan a day later raised the question about the review of the decision of the previous plenum about Karabakh. [4]
On July 5, the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the RKP(b) continued its work. As noted, during that session, G. Ordzhonikidze and A. Nazaretyan raised the question about the review of the decision of the previous plenum about Karabakh. Following the discussions, the plenum decided: "a) in view of the need for national peace between Muslims and Armenians and the economic ties of Upper and Lower Karabakh and its continuing linkages with Azerbaijan, to keep Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR and give it broad oblast autonomy with its administrative center in the city of Shusha located within the borders of the autonomous oblast. Four attendees vote in favor; three abstain; b) to assign the Central Committee of Azerbaijan to define the borders of the autonomous oblast and to present them for confirmation by the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP; c) to assign to the Presidium of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee to negotiate with the Central Committee of Armenia and the Central Committee of Azerbaijan about a candidate for the role of the extraordinary comissar of Nagorno-Karabakh; d) to have the Central Committee of Azerbaijan define the extent of the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and to present this for confirmation to the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee." [5]

The Armenian side tries to connect the fact of the replacement of the first “just decision” about the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia with the “unexpected” arrival in Tiflis of I. Stalin, who—they argue—must have offered protection to Azerbaijan in his own unique manner. We, however, know that Stalin had been in Tiflis since the end of June and could not therefore “unexpectedly” come to the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) on July 5. Why then do Armenian historians, when falsifying the well-known documents of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), ascribe primarily to Stalin “the leaving” (“the transfer,” according to the Armenian treatment of the term) of Nagorno-Karabakh within the confines of Azerbaijan? The answer is simple: given the background of the revelation of new Stalinist crimes during the period of the collapse of the USSR, the Armenians wanted to profitably present themselves to the entire world as victims of the Stalinist regime and in this way, by eliciting pity, to demand the restoration of what they understand to be historical justice.

Notes

[1] Protocol No. 11 of the evening session for the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), 4 July 1921, Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (hereafter RSASPH), f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 118.

[2] Protocol No. 11 of the evening session for the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), 4 July 1921, Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (hereafter RSASPH), f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 118.

[3] Protocol No. 11 of the evening session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP, 4 July 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 114.

[4] Protocol No. 12 of the session of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP, 5 July 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 122.

[5] Protocol No. 12 of the session of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP, 5 July 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 122.
MOSCOW SEEKS BAKU’S HELP IN DEVELOPING THE NORTH CAUCASUS

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The visit of Aleksandr Khloponin, Russian vice prime minister and the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian president in the North Caucasus Federal District, accompanied by the leaders of seven republics in that region to Baku at the beginning of October, "opens a new and extremely promising page" in the relationship between Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus and, what may be even more important, between Baku and Moscow, according to an unsigned Day.az commentary. [1]

That is because, as the commentary continued, this visit, during which Khloponin and his colleagues sought expanded Azerbaijani assistance in developing the economy of what has long been the Russian Federation’s most troubled region, bore "a strategic character." To put it openly, the commentary continued, "on the results" of these talks "depends part of the success of the Russian economic strategy in the North Caucasus," a strategy Moscow has long identified as the key to stabilization there.

The Khloponin delegation came, as Day.az pointed out, in order to make a presentation concerning their plans and "with the goal of interesting Azerbaijani investors in long-term investments in the North Caucasus projects, including 33 industrial plants, 88 agro-industrial concerns, 13 energy projects, and 210 transportation facilities. For that ambitious program to be realized, Day.az noted, "it became obvious already several years ago" that Moscow would have to involve Azerbaijan in cooperative efforts.

Up to now, as Yury Shedrin, the economic representative of the Russian Federation in Azerbaijan pointed out, "only Stavropol kray and the Republic Dagestan are actively cooperating with Azerbaijan in the trade and economic sphere." He said that Moscow hopes that Azerbaijan will move beyond "the low level" of economic activity in the other regions and republics of Russia’s North Caucasus.

Azerbaijani Prime Minister Arthur Rasizade told Khloponin that Baku is "interested in broadening cooperation with the North Caucasus with which [his] country is connected by deep historical relations." [2] The Russian plenipotentiary noted during his visit that "Azerbaijan is a strategic partner with which we will further develop the potential of relations." And the leaders of the republics who accompanied him said that Azerbaijani investors would enjoy special treatment if they chose to invest more in the North Caucasus region.

While the impact of these meetings is not yet fully clear—many of the agreements must still be worked out—Khloponin’s visit is truly a strategic turning point for at least three reasons. First, the Russian deputy premier met not only with economic and political officials, but also with Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus, and said that he and Moscow welcomed the Azerbaijani Muslim leader's advice in solving many of the problems of the North
Caucasus, an indication that Khloponin at least is prepared to have the Azerbaijani-Russian relationship in the North Caucasus to be about more than just economics. [3]

Second, Khloponin was emphatic in saying in his various meetings that Moscow and the North Caucasus as well are upset by the continuing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied territories, a possible indication that the Russian side may be prepared to increase its recent efforts to resolve that conflict in order to offer Azerbaijan an additional and compelling inducement to help develop the North Caucasus.

And third, Khloponin’s visit suggests that Moscow is feeling its way toward a new approach to dealing with the North Caucasus. Historically, from the 18th through the early 20th centuries, Russian governments have not been able to pacify and control the North Caucasus without having first gained control of the South Caucasus. Given the independence of the three countries in the South Caucasus, Moscow cannot hope to achieve similar political control. But by moving into the economic sphere and inviting cooperation with Azerbaijan, far and away the strongest economy in the South, Russia appears to be moving in a new direction, one that is certain to have consequences not only in the North and South Caucasus but more broadly as well.

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A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy

President Ilham Aliyev tells Al-Jazeera’s Arabic Service that Azerbaijan “has the complete right by any means to establish [its] territorial integrity” (http://news.day.az/politics/292890.html; http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/frostovertheworld/2011/10/20111015143746924445.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that at present “the main goal” of talks is the return to Azerbaijan of the occupied territories and not the definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, something that “will require the return there of internally displaced people” (http://news.day.az/politics/292601.html).

Yevda Abramov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says “neither Jewish politicians, nor financiers, nor cultural figures recognize as genocide the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire” and that “the recognition of ‘the Armenian genocide’ would be an insult to the memory of the victims of the Holocaust” (http://news.day.az/politics/293471.html).
II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan

Aleksandr Khloponin, deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District, says that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “is a matter of concern for everyone” (http://news.day.az/politics/291829.html).

The Iranian foreign ministry says that if Azerbaijan and Armenia are interested, Tehran is ready to propose a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem (http://news.day.az/politics/293590.html).

Herbert Quelle, Germany’s ambassador to Baku, says that Germany “just like other member countries of the European Union” supports the Southern Gas corridor “independently of which pipeline will be built within the framework of this project” (http://news.day.az/economy/291319.html).

III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy

October 15

Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev, Azerbaijan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, says that the “impermissibly aggressive tone” of the recent speech of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan shows that Yerevan continues to ignore its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter (http://news.day.az/politics/293591.html).

Siyavush Novruzov, a Milli Majlis deputy and executive secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, says that the political leadership of Armenia is not permitting a meeting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Nagorno-Karabakh (http://news.day.az/politics/293647.html).

Elkhan Suleymanov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of Euronest, says that “Armenia has recognized its defeat” (http://news.day.az/politics/293634.html).

The Azerbaijani government says it will purchase 60 drones from Israel by the end of the year (http://news.day.az/economy/293635.html).

Columbia’s Vice-Minister of Multilateral Affairs Patti Londoño Jaramillo says that her country supports the candidacy of Azerbaijan for a seat on the UN Security Council (http://news.day.az/politics/293601.html).

The Iranian foreign ministry says that if Azerbaijan and Armenia are interested, Tehran is ready to propose a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem (http://news.day.az/politics/293590.html).
Dashgan Shikyarov, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Islamabad, says that Azerbaijani-Pakistani relations can be “significantly” increased (http://news.day.az/politics/293679.html).

October 14

President Ilham Aliyev receives Italian Senator Rossana Boldi, head of the Italian-Azerbaijani interparliamentary group (http://news.day.az/politics/293508.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Turkish Religious Affairs Minister Mehmet Gurmez (http://news.day.az/politics/293508.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Columbia’s Vice-Minister of Multilateral Affairs Patti Londoño Jaramillo (http://news.day.az/politics/293521.html).

Elnur Aslanov, head of the political analysis and information support department of the Presidential Administration, says that “the leadership of Armenia must consider the strengthening position of Azerbaijan” (http://news.day.az/politics/293433.html).

Bahar Muradova, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE, says that that body is considering the possibility of organizing a meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Karabakh, possibly in Baku (http://news.day.az/politics/293451.html).

Bayram Safarov, the head of the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh, says that his community is ready for talks with the Armenian community there (http://news.day.az/politics/293467.html).

Azerbaijan chairs a Kyiv meeting in the GUAM secretariat on counter-terrorism (http://news.day.az/politics/293546.html).

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin meets with his Turkish counterpart Firudin Sinirlioglu in Ankara to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (http://news.day.az/politics/293603.html).

October 13

President Ilham Aliyev receives Turkish National Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz (http://news.day.az/politics/293289.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives the letters of credence from incoming British Ambassador Peter Bateman (http://news.day.az/politics/293289.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Frederick Kempe, president of the Atlantic Council (http://news.day.az/politics/293289.html).

President Ilham Aliyev says that Azerbaijan “intends to export our gas to existing markets in a still greater amount” (http://news.day.az/politics/292928.html).

Defense Minister Safar Abiyev receives his Turkish counterpart Ismet Yilmaz (http://news.day.az/politics/293299.html).

Ali Hasanov, head of the social-political department of the Presidential Administration, says that “the preservation of the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can become the cause of the beginning of a new war in the region” (http://news.day.az/politics/293267.html).

Novruz Mammadov, head of the foreign relations department of the Presidential Administration, says that Serzh Sargsyan’s recent statements show that he “cannot adequately react to what is taking place” in his country and the region (http://news.day.az/politics/293276.html).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov takes part in the meeting in Yerevan of his CIS counterparts (http://news.day.az/politics/293253.html).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov says that Azerbaijan is “not thinking about changing the format of the Minsk Group” (http://news.day.az/politics/293252.html).

Altay Efendiyev, Azerbaijan’s ambassador in Madrid, says that relations between Azerbaijan and Spain have “entered a new stage,” with economic ties being the area of greatest activity (http://news.day.az/politics/293195.html).

Officials of the State Customs Committee sign an agreement in Baku with their Ukrainian counterparts to develop joint measures against contraband (http://news.day.az/economy/293322.html).

Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz says that Turkey will provide Azerbaijan with the necessary military support (http://news.day.az/politics/293183.html). He adds that “the presence of the strong armed forces of Azerbaijan is becoming the greatest guarantee of peace in the region” (http://news.day.az/politics/293326.html).

October 12

President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva receive Austrian President Heinz Fischer and his wife Margit Fischer (http://news.day.az/politics/293163.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel (http://news.day.az/politics/293084.html).

The Finance Ministry says that Azerbaijan plans to increase its defense spending in 2012 by 1.9 percent over 2011 and that defense spending next year will constitute 14.8 percent of the budget (http://news.day.az/economy/293024.html).
Samad Seyidov, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that a document circulated in PACE about the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state reflects the position only of those who signed it and is not an official document of the Council of Europe (http://news.day.az/politics/293039.html).

Siyavush Novruzov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Azerbaijani army corresponds to NATO standards (http://news.day.az/politics/293148.html).

The Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus is considering Austria’s proposal to organize a meeting of religious leaders of the countries of the South Caucasus (http://news.day.az/society/293023.html).

Under the chairmanship of Azerbaijan, the secretariat of GUAM completes a two-day session on the struggle with illegal drugs (http://news.day.az/politics/293144.html).

October 11

President Ilham Aliyev receives Movlud Chavushoglu, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (http://news.day.az/politics/292610.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Ahmad Zevayla, Nobel laureate in chemistry and director of the Center of Physical Biology of the California Institute of Technology (http://news.day.az/politics/292610.html).

President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva receive Kōichirō Matsuura, the former director-general of UNESCO (http://news.day.az/politics/292720.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Suleyman Demirel, the former president of Turkey (http://news.day.az/politics/292610.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Movlud Chavushoglu, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (http://news.day.az/politics/292776.html).


Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Dora Bakoyannis, former foreign minister of Greece (http://news.day.az/politics/292926.html).

Ramiz Mehdiyev, head of the Presidential Administration, says that “the atmosphere of Azerbaijan is giving a new impulse to dialogue in the contemporary globalizing world” (http://news.day.az/politics/292724.html).

Novruz Mammadov, head of the foreign relations department of the Presidential Administration, says that the investment of First lady Mehriban Aliyeva with the French Republic Order of the Officer of the Legion of Honor “demonstrates the
high level of relations between France and Azerbaijan” (http://news.day.az/politics/292891.html).

Fazil Mustafa, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the current regime in Armenia “simply has nothing to offer the population” there (http://news.day.az/politics/292768.html).

Fazail Ibrahimli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Armenia faces a potentially bloody transfer of power (http://news.day.az/politics/292625.html).

Govhar Bakhshaliyeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that soon everyone will forget about the Armenian-Turkish protocols (http://news.day.az/politics/292690.html).

Elchin Huseynli, a second secretary in the Security Department of the Foreign Ministry, says that “the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group are creating the possibility for the artificial dragging out of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (http://news.day.az/politics/292856.html). He adds that Armenia is currently preparing for war with Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/politics/292792.html).

The Baku International Humanitarian Forum adopts a declaration saying that "globalization can acquire a just character only through the realization of broad efforts on the formation of a common future based on common membership in humanity in all its multiplicity” (http://news.day.az/politics/292929.html).

Ali Masimli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “frozen conflicts” in the South Caucasus create "a serious threat to communications” across the region (http://news.day.az/politics/292868.html).

Telman Zeynalov, president of the National Center for Ecological Prediction, says that by 2020 the shore districts of Baku will be flooded because of the rising level of the Caspian generated by climate change (http://news.day.az/society/292692.html).

The State Committee on Standcards, Metrics and Patents signs an agreement with the Korean ministry of foreign affairs and trade to upgrade automatic systems in Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/economy/292893.html).

Telman Zeynalov, president of the National Center for Ecological Prediction, says that by 2020 the shore districts of Baku will be flooded because of the rising level of the Caspian generated by climate change (http://news.day.az/society/292692.html).

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that French President Nicolas Sarkozy "should put his own country in order rather than give advice to Turkey about the so-called Armenian genocide” (http://news.day.az/politics/292861.html).

Jānis Reirs, vice president of the Baltic Assembly, says that no Latvian company has received a license to sell arms to Armenia and that any such sale would have “serious consequences” (http://news.day.az/politics/292910.html).

Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, says that the EU has decided to prepare a new program
for the good neighborhood policy for next year at a cost of 20 million euros (http://news.day.az/politics/292871.html).

Huseyn Sabiri, head of Iran’s Ardebil province, says that “if the government of Azerbaijan wants to open a border crossing point” with his province, “our government is ready to do so” (http://news.day.az/politics/292773.html).

Huseyn Pirmuazin, head of the Chamber of Trade, Industry and Metallurgy of Iran’s Ardebil Province, says that in the near future a joint Azerbaijan-Iranian trade house will open in Baku (http://news.day.az/economy/292925.html).

Mansour Afshar Mohammadian, the director of international affairs of Iran’s Gilan Province University, says that the Caspian littoral states will create a Caspian Floating University (http://news.day.az/society/292898.html).

October 10

President Ilham Aliyev receives Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation (http://news.day.az/politics/292610.html).

At the initiative of President Ilham Aliyev and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, the Baku International Forum assembles in Baku (http://news.day.az/politics/292638.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Rudolf Schuster, former president of Slovakia (http://news.day.az/politics/292610.html).

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva meets with the participants of the International Humanitarian Forum in Baku (http://news.day.az/politics/292702.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that at present “the main goal” of talks is the return to Azerbaijan of the occupied territories and not the definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, something that “will require the return there of internally displaced people” (http://news.day.az/politics/292601.html).

Natik Abbasov, deputy minister for industry and energy, says that Azerbaijan has the potential to create wind energy generation of 1500 to 2000 megawatts (http://news.day.az/economy/292570.html).

Elton Mammadov, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the parliamentary assembly of GUAM, says that the initiatives of that body on the resolution of conflicts in various regions are important (http://news.day.az/politics/292567.html).

Fazil Mustafa, a Milli Majlis deputy, says the Venetian Commission has presented its conclusions on the new draft bill “On political parties” and that the measure will be submitted to the Azerbaijani parliament for approval (http://news.day.az/politics/292635.html).

Asef Hajiyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “the president of Armenia resembles a cat caught in a corner” with no way out (http://news.day.az/politics/292387.html).
Azay Guliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that hearings conducted at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have “significantly strengthened the just position of Azerbaijan among member countries of that body” (http://news.day.az/politics/292520.html).

The Economic Development Ministry says that over the past 15 years, Azerbaijan’s GDP has increased 5.7 times, with the non-petroleum sector having increased 2.8 times over the same period (http://news.day.az/economy/292722.html).

Adil Garibov, the director of the Institute of Radiation Problems, says that his institution together with the International Agency for Nuclear Agency will present in the first half of next year a draft plan for the construction of a research reactor in Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/economy/292687.html).

Adil Garibov, director of the Institute of Radiation Problems of the Academy of Sciences, says that Azerbaijan could agree to the construction of a new atomic power plant in Armenia if Yerevan provided guarantees on its security (http://news.day.az/politics/292665.html).

The Baku Institute for Economic Reforms signs a cooperation agreement with the American EcoMod Research Center (http://news.day.az/economy/292626.html).

A meeting of experts in Batumi explores the possibility of the construction of a highway between Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi and Trabzon (http://news.day.az/economy/292565.html).

Movlud Chavushoglu, head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, calls on Armenian deputies to “respect the decisions” of that body and to take part in the work of the sub-committee on Nagorno-Karabakh (http://news.day.az/politics/292631.html).

Valery Chechelashvili, the secretary general of GUAM, says that his organization has a universal approach to all conflicts (http://news.day.az/politics/292615.html).

Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, says that “cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia in all sectors is strengthening” (http://news.day.az/politics/292662.html).

Herbert Quelle, Germany’s ambassador to Baku, says that “we completely support the Southern Corridor project” (http://news.day.az/politics/292649.html).

Yousif Halladzhoglu, a deputy in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, says that “Baku is one of the most beautiful cities in the world” (http://news.day.az/politics/292674.html).

Mikhail Gusman, deputy director of ITAR-Tass, says that “Baku is a center of eastern and European culture” (http://news.day.az/politics/292572.html).
Aleksandr Zavarzin, the director of the information analytic department of the executive committee of the CIS, says that the rapid development of Azerbaijan is impressive (http://news.day.az/politics/292697.html).

Suleyman Demirel, former president of Turkey, says that it is pleasing to see “how Azerbaijan has advanced” in recent years (http://news.day.az/politics/292569.html).

Goran Lenmarker, former chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE and former special representative of that body for the South Caucasus, says that “Armenian forces must leave the occupied territories” (http://news.day.az/politics/292705.html).

Rudolf Schuster, former president of Slovakia, says that “a forum like the one taking place in Baku is an important format for international exchange” (http://news.day.az/politics/292620.html).

Emil Constantinescu, former president of Romania, says that the time has come to build “capitalism with a human face” (http://news.day.az/politics/292592.html).

The Swedish parliament is to consider a resolution on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (http://news.day.az/politics/292575.html).

October 8

Novruz Mammadov, head of the foreign relations department of the Presidential Administration, says that French President Nicolas Sarkozy “noted on the basis of the impressions he received in Baku the need for making a return visit to Azerbaijan” in the future (http://news.day.az/politics/292428.html).

Sahib Alakparov, deputy minister for taxation, says that “Azerbaijan is integrating into the world tax system” (http://news.day.az/economy/292413.html).

Bahar Muradova, vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, tells the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Dubrovnik that the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “has a negative influence on the development of the region” and points to “the importance of dialogue between Azerbaijani and Armenian communities” as a confidence building measure (http://news.day.az/politics/292450.html).

Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, head of Ingushetia, says that his republic is ready to offer Azerbaijan “state guarantees for the realization of major projects” (http://news.day.az/economy/292382.html).

Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that relations between Turkey and Israel “were one of the most prospective and strategic factors in the near eastern region over the course of many years and the US very much hopes that these relations will again become what they were” (http://news.day.az/politics/292411.html).

Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that California legislator Joseph Simitian’s visit to Nagorno-Karabakh was “unplanned” and that the US like all other countries “does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh” (http://news.day.az/politics/292391.html).
Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that bilateral talks on security are intended to strengthen American-Azerbaijani cooperation in that sector (http://news.day.az/politics/292375.html).

Haidar Ali Fadyl, chairman of the investment commission of the Iraqi city of Basra, says that “the opening of air routes between Iraq and Azerbaijan is expected within two weeks” (http://news.day.az/economy/292376.html).

October 7

President Ilham Aliyev tells his visiting French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy that “France plays a very large role in the development of ties between Azerbaijan and the European Union” (http://news.day.az/politics/292185.html).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy invests First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva as an Officer of the Legion of Honor of the French Republic (http://news.day.az/politics/292261.html).

Ali Hasanov, the head of the social-political department of the Presidential Administration, says that Azerbaijan does not agree with the position of French President Nicolas Sarkozy on “the so-called ‘Armenian genocide’” (http://news.day.az/politics/292181.html).

Economic Development Minister Shahin Mustafayev signs a cooperation agreement with Jacques Muanville, the director of the French Development Agency (http://news.day.az/economy/292263.html).

The State Committee for Work with Religious Structures in Azerbaijan says that it considers the report of the US State Department about religious freedom to be a positive initiative overall, but considers that there needs to be clarification concerning a number of assertions about Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/society/292290.html).

Ganira Pashayeva, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that a document prepared by the Armenian delegation to that body and signed by ten members of the French delegation “does not have any legal force” (http://news.day.az/politics/292227.html).

Ziyad Samadzade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that over the next decade the strategic monetary reserves of Azerbaijan may rise to 100 billion US dollars (http://news.day.az/economy/292110.html).

Roman Aliyev, the head of the Azerbaijani diaspora organization Ojag in Riga, says that “Latvia as a European state and participant in all European structures can always support [Azerbaijan]” (http://news.day.az/politics/292247.html).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy says in Yerevan that he hopes for the achievement of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan through “the renewal of talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani side within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group” (http://news.day.az/politics/292144.html).
Aleksey Borodavkin, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, says that “Moscow does not consider probable the outbreak of conflicts between member states of the CIS” (http://news.day.az/politics/292205.html).

Stephen Lemme, a German parliamentarian from the ruling party, says that the Bundestag will not discuss “the invented ‘Armenian genocide’” (http://news.day.az/politics/292254.html).

Michael Labenda, Poland’s ambassador to Baku, says that the EU’s Eastern Partnership program is intended to draw the countries of the EU and the region closer together (http://news.day.az/politics/292196.html).

The European Union is conducting the last round of plenary discussions on the association agreement with Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/politics/292189.html). Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mammadguliyev heads the Azerbaijani negotiating team (http://news.day.az/politics/292005.html).

An expert at Platts, the international rating agency, says that “Azerbaijan is conducting the most stable oil and gas policy in the region” (http://news.day.az/economy/292285.html).

The Russian Academy of Sciences proposes that Azerbaijan and Russia conduct joint archaeological work in the Caspian Sea (http://news.day.az/society/292264.html).

October 6

President Ilham Aliyev receives the participants in the 14th session of the Conference of Special Services of the Turkic Language States (http://news.day.az/politics/292097.html).

National Security Minister Eldar Mahmoudov hosts the 14th session of the Conference of Special Services of the Turkic Language States (http://news.day.az/politics/292102.html).

Defense Minister Safar Abiyev takes part in a Brussels session of the defense ministers of NATO and its allies (http://news.day.az/politics/292095.html).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov receives Ronald Noble, the secretary general of Interpol (http://news.day.az/politics/292069.html).

Ali Ahmadov, the deputy chairman and executive secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, receives Matthew Bryza, the US ambassador to Baku (http://news.day.az/politics/292018.html).

Dovlatkhan Dovlatkhanov, the deputy chairman of the State Committee on Architecture and City Planning, says that greater Baku will become larger than Moscow in area by 2030 (http://news.day.az/society/292062.html).

Gasan Gasanov and Vilayat Guliyev, Azerbaijani ambassadors to Poland and Hungary respectively, take part in ceremonies in those countries marking the 20th anniversary of the independence of Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/politics/292036.html).
Ziyafat Askarov, first vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, heads an Azerbaijani delegation to the 57th session of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO (http://news.day.az/politics/291795.html).

Zahid Oruj, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to the Caucasus “shows first of all the interest of France” in the region and its development (http://news.day.az/politics/292038.html). He adds that Armenia lacks the resources to continue as it is (http://news.day.az/politics/291986.html).

Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the situation in Armenia may follow “the Egyptian scenario” of regime change (http://news.day.az/politics/291913.html).

Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev says his country supports the efforts of Lithuania as chairman-in-office of the OSCE to resolve longstanding conflicts in general and the Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria disputes in particular (http://news.day.az/politics/291948.html).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy tells the Armenian news agency Mediamax that the history of France and Germany shows that longstanding conflicts can be overcome and permanent friendship established (http://news.day.az/politics/291918.html).

Eric Rubin, US deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, says that the Nagorno-Karabakh talks are laying the foundation for “a lengthy peace” (http://news.day.az/politics/292027.html).

Ramil Hasanov, secretary general of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Language Countries, says his group will monitor the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan (http://news.day.az/politics/292024.html).

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopts a declaration sharply condemning the murder by Armenians of a 13-year-old Azerbaijani child (http://news.day.az/politics/291991.html).

The Baku office of the Council of Europe hosts a conference on the struggle against cyber-crime (http://news.day.az/politics/291933.html).

October 5

President Ilham Aliyev receives Ronald Noble, the secretary general of Interpol (http://news.day.az/politics/291847.html).

President Ilham Aliyev sends a message of greetings to Baku meeting of the International Congress of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (http://news.day.az/politics/291886.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh “must be defined jointly by the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities” of that Azerbaijani region (http://news.day.az/politics/291846.html).
Fuad Muradov, a member of the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, says that the representatives of Armenia “have come to carry out a diplomacy of hysteria in international organizations” (http://news.day.az/politics/291895.html).

Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus, receives Yunus-Bey Yevkurov, Arsen Kanokov and Magomedsalam Magomedov, the heads of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan respectively (http://news.day.az/politics/291889.html).

Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus, receives Aleksandr Khloponin, the first deputy prime minister of Russia and the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District (http://news.day.az/politics/291862.html).

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopts a declaration sharply criticizing “the so-called ‘municipal elections’ conducted by Armenia on the occupied Azerbaijani territories” (http://news.day.az/politics/291777.html).

Turkish President Abdullah Gul says that “cooperation among the Turkic language countries is bearing fruit” (http://news.day.az/politics/291772.html).

Kestutis Kudzmanas, Lithuanian ambassador to Baku, says that the upcoming session of the Azerbaijani-Lithuanian intergovernmental commission, which will take place in the Azerbaijani capital, will lead to new agreements (http://news.day.az/politics/291849.html).

Jiha Lee, the ambassador of Korea to Baku, says that “the broadening of bilateral cooperation between Azerbaijan and Korea became possible thanks to the mutual interest of the two countries” and especially the involvement in the development of these ties of President Ilham Aliyev (http://news.day.az/politics/291888.html).

October 4

President Ilham Aliyev receives Aleksandr Khloponin, vice prime minister of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District (http://news.day.az/politics/291696.html).

Prime Minister Arthur Rasi-zade receives Aleksandr Khloponin, vice prime minister of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District, and tells him that “Azerbaijan is interested in broadening cooperation with the North Caucasus” (http://news.day.az/politics/291686.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that the recent statement of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan is “an open call to war” (http://news.day.az/politics/291545.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Geert Muylle, the director general of the Belgian foreign ministry (http://news.day.az/politics/291666.html).
Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives copies of the letters of credence from incoming British ambassador to Baku, Peter Bateman (http://news.day.az/politics/291653.html).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that Azerbaijan is seeking to broaden its cooperation with Arab countries (http://news.day.az/politics/291650.html).


Interior Minister Ramil Usubov and his Russian counterpart note “with satisfaction” the fulfillment of bilateral obligations on the land border between the two countries (http://news.day.az/politics/291618.html).

Industry and Energy Minister Natik Aliyev says that the Statoil company is interested in developing the recently discovered gas fields in Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/economy/291661.html).

Economic Development Minister Shahin Mustafayev says that “between Azerbaijan and Russia has been established a firm legal basis for cooperation” (http://news.day.az/economy/291643.html).

Bakhtiyar Sadykhov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “Armenia having set itself up on Azerbaijani lands does not have a single occasion for pride 20 years after acquiring independence” (http://news.day.az/politics/291615.html).

Azay Guliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that conflicts between Armenian leaders Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan are intensifying (http://news.day.az/politics/291522.html).

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan meets in Istanbul with Namik Aliyev, the first vice president of the Boxing Federation of Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/sport/291693.html).

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski says that the European Union plans to spend an additional 150 milllin euros in the period up to 2014 on the development of the Eastern Partnership program (http://news.day.az/economy/291651.html).

Lamberto Zannier, secretary general of the OSCE, praises Russia’s “active participation” in the Minsk Group and “the personal involvement of the president of the Russian Federation” in talks between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia (http://news.day.az/politics/291547.html).

The planned visit of Eric Rubin, US deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, to Baku is postponed (http://news.day.az/politics/291637.html).

Korea’s Development Bank agrees to provide a 22 million US dollar credit to Azerbaijan for the creation of a professional-technical complex in Baku (http://news.day.az/economy/291595.html).

October 3
President Ilham Aliyev receives Seyed Mohammad Hoseyn, the Iranian minister of culture and Islamic orientation (http://news.day.az/politics/291477.html).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Fatima Shahin, the Turkish minister for family affairs and social policy (http://news.day.az/politics/291477.html).

The Foreign Ministry puts California legislator Joseph Simitian on the list of those who will be refused entry to Azerbaijan after the latter visits the occupied territories of Azerbaijan without Baku’s consent (http://news.day.az/politics/291479.html).

The Azerbaijani embassy in Brussels says that Armenia has rejected an EU proposal for the presidents of the countries of the South Caucasus to meet in Warsaw during the Eastern Partnership summit (http://news.day.az/politics/291439.html).

Samad Seyidov, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that the Armenian delegation did not take part in the latest session of the PACE subcommittee on Nagorno-Karabakh (http://news.day.az/politics/291495.html). He also says that his group will speak out against double standards in the Council of Europe (http://news.day.az/politics/291472.html).

Bahar Muradova, the vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says that women must “more actively demonstrate” their positions on contemporary issues (http://news.day.az/politics/291360.html).

Ganira Pashayeva, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that PACE must not ignore or minimize Armenian killings of young Azerbaijanis (http://news.day.az/politics/291476.html).

Ali Huseynli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the legal system of Azerbaijan "completely corresponds to European standards" (http://news.day.az/politics/291446.html).

Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus meets with Iranian Interior Minister Mohammad Najar to discuss security for Azerbaijani hajis (http://news.day.az/politics/291441.html).

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receives Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus (http://news.day.az/politics/291421.html).

Movlud Chavushoglu, the head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that all members of PACE, including Armenia, “must respectfully relate” to the decision of that body to restore the activity of the subcommittee on Nagorno-Karabakh (http://news.day.az/politics/291426.html).

Turkish Family and Social Policy Minister Fatima Shahin says that the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is “the common task of all Turkic women” (http://news.day.az/politics/291376.html).
Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev visits Azerbaijan (http://news.day.az/politics/291374.html).

Herbert Quelle, Germany’s ambassador to Baku, says “we always have supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” (http://news.day.az/politics/291316.html).

Herbert Quelle, Germany’s ambassador to Baku, says that Germany “just like other member countries of the European Union” supports the Southern Gas corridor “independently of which pipeline will be built within the framework of this project” (http://news.day.az/economy/291319.html).

Zoran Vayovich, Serbian ambassador to Baku, says that “Armenian forces must leave Azerbaijan” (http://news.day.az/politics/291382.html).

TRACECA holds a conference in Tbilisi on the logistics of future sea routes (http://news.day.az/economy/291437.html).

Hulusi Kilic, Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan, says there are “no obstacles” to the signing of a bilateral gas contract between Azerbaijan and Turkey (http://news.day.az/economy/291400.html).

Allahshukur Pashazade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus, says that “Iran is a leading country in the defense of the rights of Muslims in the entire world” (http://news.day.az/society/291314.html).

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Nabucco Gas Pipeline International presents its proposal for transporting gas from the Shah Deniz field (http://news.day.az/economy/291205.html).

A World Bank delegation meets with Azerbaijani railroad officials to measure progress in transportation networks there (http://news.day.az/economy/291210.html).

Note to Readers

The editors of “Azerbaijan in the World” hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email (adabiweekly@ada.edu.az). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.