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MOSCOW AND THE DELIMITATION OF KARABAKH IN THE 1920S **PART II (1)**

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Editorial Note: As a contribution to the unveiling of the history of Soviet policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan in the World offers what is the second (first half) of a three part article on the origins of Soviet policy on this region that was prepared by distinguished Azerbaijani historian Jamil Hasanly. It originally appeared in Russia's Regnum News Agency at <http://regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/armenia/1429237.html>. The remaining sections of Professor Hasanly's account will be published in the following issues of Azerbaijan in the World.

— Why is it that the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) wanted to resolve the Karabakh question “in complete secrecy”?

The establishment of Soviet power in Armenia on November 29, 1920, created suitable conditions for the communists to again put the Karabakh problem forward for discussion. In connection with the proclamation of Soviet power in Armenia, Nariman Narimanov, the president of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, and Mirza Davud Huseynov, the Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs, sent on November 30, a telegram of greeting to the Armenian Revolutionary Committee. There was a serious difference between the text of this telegram and the decision of the joint session of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee of the AKP(b). A whole list of contradictory moments were contained also between the well-known speech of N. Narimanov at the celebratory session of the Baku Soviet on the occasion of the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia and the declaration read out by him on December 1, 1920.

The declaration read that “Soviet Azerbaijan, in support of the struggle of the fraternal Armenian toiling people against the power of the Dashnaks which have shed and continue to shed the innocent blood of our best comrade communists in the borders of Armenia and Zangazur declares that from now on, no territorial issues can become the course of mutual bloodletting of the two neighboring peoples, the Armenians and the Muslims, that the territory of the Zangazur and Nakhchivan districts are an indivisible part of Soviet Armenia, that the toiling peasantry of Nagorno-Karabakh is given the complete right of self-determination, and that all military actions in the borders of Zangazur are to be stopped and the forces of Soviet Azerbaijan withdrawn.” [1]

It should be immediately noted that the text of the December 1 declaration contradicts the decisions taken by the Central Committee of the AKP(b) of November 4 and November 30. At the session of November 4, when the corresponding paragraph of a draft Russian-Armenian Treaty was discussed in the presence of I. Stalin and G. Ordzhonikidze, it was decided that “the paragraph with the proposal about the transfer of Nakhchivan and Zangazur to Armenia is not profitable either from a political or from a strategic perspective.” However, in contradiction to this decision, in connection with the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, a decision was taken at a the November 30 session of the Central Committee of the AKP(b) to transfer Zangazur to Armenia, but there was no mention of Nakhchivan. This is why B.V. Legran on December 2 of the three designated territories speaks only about the inclusion of Zangazur within the borders of Armenia as a fact recognized by Soviet Russia. [2]

But in the Declaration read out by N. Narimanov on December 1, along with Zangazur is also mentioned Nakhchivan as territories handed over to Armenia. Iorg Baberovsky, a professor of Humboldt University, asserts that already in the summer of 1920, under pressure from Ordzhonikidze, Narimanov was forced to promise to concede Zangazur, Karabakh and Nakhchivan to Armenia (Baberovski 2010, p. 237).

The text of the Declaration published in the Baku media was distorted by Ordzhonikidze even before it reached the press. On December 1, in a code cable to B. Legran and G. Chicherin, he wrote that “Azerbaijan has already conceded and transferred to Soviet Armenia Nakhchivan, Zangazur and Nagorno-Karabakh.” [3] He sent a similar report on December 2 to V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin. In that message,

he said, "Azerbaijan yesterday already declared in favor of transferring to Soviet Armenia Nakhchivan, Zangazur and Nagorno-Karabakh." [4]

On December 4, this "happy" news on the initiative of I. Stalin was published in *Pravda*, and on the basis of the distorted telegram of G. Ordzhonikidze on the same day on the pages of this same paper was published an article of I. Stalin in connection with the proclamation of Soviet power in Armenia. Then, that article passed into the fourth volume of the collected works of I. Stalin, which remains often cited to this day. The question arises: Was G. Ordzhonikidze fully informed or did he intentionally make this error?

After the establishment of Soviet power in Dilizhan, G. Ordzhonikidze had a conversation by direct line with Amayak Nazaretyan, in which, referring to the Declaration of N. Narimanov, he said, "Today in Baku was a celebratory meeting of the Soviet at which Narimanov read the Declaration of the Azerbaijani government indicating that borders between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan no longer exist, that from today, the territory of the Zangazur and Nakhchivan districts have become an indivisible part of Soviet Armenia and that the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are offered the right of self-determination. The wealth of Azerbaijan, oil and kerosene, are the common property of both union republics." Delighted by this, A.M. Nazaretyan exclaimed "Bravo, Azerbaijanis!" [5]

This is how the December 1 Declaration of N. Narimanov, the president of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, underwent an "easy" correction by the Bolsheviks. In the Baku newspapers, *Kommunist* on December 2 and *Bakinsky rabochy* on December 3, there was reference to offering the toiling peasantry of Nagorno-Karabakh "the right to self-determination," but in the *Kommunist* published in Armenia on December 7 there was reference to "the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as a constituent part of the Armenian Socialist Republic."

Such a crude falsification of the text of the Declaration infuriated N. Narimanov. In the course of a discussion of the Karabakh question at the session of the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), he assigned M.D. Huseynov, the peoples commissar of international affairs, who was in Tiflis in June 1921 to inform the Caucasus Bureau of his opinion about Nagorno-Karabakh. [6]

Thus, the question arises: did anyone in Armenia and in Russia see the true text of the Declaration? In addition to the notes and correspondence of G. Ordzhonikidze, there was also a telegram with the text of the Declaration sent to the Armenian Revolutionary Committee over the signatures of N. Narimanov and M.D. Huseynov. Precisely on the basis of this document, Askanaz Mravyan, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee, reported to Saak Ter-Gabrielyan, the Armenian representative in Moscow, that Azerbaijan had declared about the unification [with Armenia] of Zangazur and Nakhchivan and about a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh. [7] And even later, in the collection of documents published in Yerevan in 1957 entitled *The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia* was published the correct text of the December 1 declaration as preserved in the Central State Archive of Armenia. [8]

Despite all this, from the mid-1980s, Armenian authors, and recently Russian political scientists as well, have preferred to refer not to the original of the text, but to its "corrected" version. Unfortunately, this operation with documents about Karabakh is not the first and not the last such case.

Why is it that the idea of transferring Zangazur to Armenia was mentioned in N. Narimanov's Declaration at all? In fact, this idea came from Moscow, from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b). The initiator of this declaration was G. Ordzhonikidze. And why did G. Ordzhonikidze, who before this had recognized the attachment of Zangazur to Azerbaijan, suddenly change his convictions? The answer is that by means of transferring Zangazur to Armenia, he wanted to drive a wedge between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which in the future would reduce the threat from Turkey to Azerbaijan. While travelling from Baku to Moscow, I. Stalin on November 23, 1920, from Rostov-na-Donu by direct line reported to Lenin that according to Ordzhonikidze, at that moment the basic danger consisted in the striving of the Turks to have a common border with Azerbaijan. In connection with this, Ordzhonikidze proposed to block the intentions of the Turks by means of the transfer of Zangazur to Armenia. [9] Therefore, the Turks considered the treaty between Soviet Russia and Dashnak Armenia and also friendly relations between these countries after the Sovietization of the latter as an obstacle on the path of Turkey to the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus. [10]

However, already on November 4, 1920, during the well-known trip of I. Stalin to the Caucasus, a joint session of the Central Committee of the AKP(b) and the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) took place, at which the report of B. Legran on the situation in Armenia was heard and a corresponding resolution adopted. Point B of this document, which concerned the treaty under discussion between Russia and Armenia, noted, "at the same time, to communicate to the Politburo that the point proposed in the treaty about the transfer to Armenia of Nakhchivan and Zangazur [which Moscow had proposed] is unsuitable politically and strategically and can be carried out only in an extreme case." In point G, N. Narimanov was assigned the task of composing the opinion of the Politburo about Nakhchivan and Zangazur. [11]

As we see, at this time, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in general did not exist and therefore it was not discussed. On November 20, 1920, the diplomatic mission of Soviet Russia arrived in Yerevan. One of the first steps of the mission was the tracking of the course of negotiations between Turkey and Armenia in Gyumri, as well as investigating the territorial claims of Armenia against Azerbaijan and Georgia. G. Chicherin, the peoples commissar of foreign affairs of the RSFSR, received a report that "now, the existence of the Armenian people depends not so much on military force as on diplomacy. It is necessary to avoid party romanticism and arm oneself with tough realism." As concerns Armenian claims to Karabakh, the diplomatic mission reminded Chicherin: "In Batumi, Kachaznuni and Khatisan, while conducting talks with the Turks [this refers to the peace conference in Batumi in May-June 1918], agreed to give Karabakh to Azerbaijan." [12]

Despite the declaration of N. Narimanov on December 1, Nakhchivan and also Karabakh with both its lowland and mountainous parts continued to be left within Azerbaijan. However, after the signing of the Moscow treaty between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey on March 16, 1921, according to which the Nakhchivan oblast was formed as an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan with the condition that Azerbaijan would not yield its protectorate to a third state, the question relative to the mountainous part of Karabakh was again advanced to the first place in the order of the day in the relations of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

On June 3, 1921 a session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) took place with the participation of Ordzhonikidze, Makharadze, Narimanov,

Myasnikov, Orakhelashvili, Nazaretyan, Figatner, as well as a secretary of the Azerbaijan KP(b) Kaminsky and a member of the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Georgia Eliava. At its evening session, three questions were discussed: 1. The Azerbaijan question; 2. The Zangazur question; and 3. Concerning nomads. The decisions on the first and third questions are reflected in protocol Number 6; but concerning the second question, in place of a decision there is the note "see the attachment to the protocol." [13] Here, as they say, is the root of the evil.

First of all, the decision of the Kavburo of the Central committee of the RKP(b) on the Zangazur question, which consists of seven points, was adopted with the mark "top secret," although protocol number 6 as a whole does not have this classification. Second, of the seven points of this secret decision, only six concern Zangazur and point five is exclusively about Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter reads as follows: "to note in the declaration of the Armenian government that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Armenia." [14] That is, in a "top secret" form, Armenia was directed to issue a government declaration, where it would specify that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Armenia.

Following such a decision, on June 12, the Soviet of Peoples Commissars of Armenia published a decree about joining the mountainous part of Karabakh to Armenia. It said that "on the basis of the declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and agreement between the socialist republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan it is proclaimed that from now on Nagorno-Karabakh is an inalienable part of the Socialist Republic of Armenia." [15] This decree signed on June 12 by A. Myasnikov (Martuni) and M. Karabekyan was discussed in the Central Committee of the KP(b) of Armenia on June 14, after which a decision was taken about its publication. There it was stated: "To publish the decree about the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Armenia." At this same session, the fifth point of order was the question "about the direction of a representative to Karabakh." In the decision it was written: "Comrade Mravyan together with Pirumov, Akop Ioanisyanyan, Ter-Simonyan and a group of other comrades are to be sent to Karabakh. [16] In correspondence with this decision, only on June 19, that is after a whole week had gone by, the Armenian Revolutionary Committee published in the press the government decree. Askanaz Mravyan was confirmed as the extraordinary plenipotentiary to Nagorno-Karabakh.

An examination of the text of the June 12 decree of the Sovnarkom of Armenia reveals some interesting moments: In spite of what was written in the decree, neither in the declaration of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee was anything said about the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, nor between the republics was there formed any juridically significant agreement. Apparently, the authors of the decree were inspired by the "top secret" decision on the "Zangazur question," adopted by the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) under the chairmanship of G. Ordzhonikidze and the secretaryship of Y. Figatner of June 3, 1921. And somehow, the decision of the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) is not mentioned in the June 12 decree. Apparently, first of all, the "top secret" stamp prevented such a reference, and second, the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) did not have the power to take such a decision.

References

Baberovsky, Iorg (2010) *The Enemy is Everywhere: Stalinism in the Caucasus* (Vrag Yest Vezde: Stalinism na Kavkaze), in Russian, Moscow.

Notes

[1] *Kommunist*, 2 December, 1920.

[2] Radiogram of B. Legran to G. Ordzhonikidze, 2 December 1920, *Russian State Archive of Social-Political History* (hereafter RSASPH), f. 85, op. 14, d. 33, l. 16.

[3] Cable of G. Ordzhonikidze to B. Legran and G. Chicherin, 1 December, 1920, *RSASPH*, f. 85, op. 14, d. 33, l. 12.

[4] Report of G. Ordzhonikidze to V. Lenin and I. Stalin, 2 December, 1920, *RSASPH*, f. 85, op. 14, d. 33, l. 20.

[5] Conversation of A.M. Nazaretyan and G.K. Ordzhonikidze by direct line, 1 December, 1920, *RSASPH*, f. 85, op. 14, d. 37, l. 1.

[6] *On the History of the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan Republic: Documents and Material* (K Istorii Obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki: Dokumenty i materialy), in Russian, Baku, 1989, p. 89.

[7] From the member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (A. Mravyan) to the representative of Soviet Armenia in Russia Ter-Gabrielyan, 4 January, 1921, *Foreign Policy Archive of Russian Federation* (hereafter FPA RF), f. 04, op. 39, papka 232, d. 53001, l. 14.

[8] *The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet Victory in Armenia* [Velikaya Oktyabrskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Revolyutsiya I Pobeda Sovetskoj Vlasti v Armenii], in Russian, Yerevan, 1957, pp. 437-438.

[9] Conversation of I. Stalin by direct line with V. Lenin, 23 November, 1920, FPA RF, f. 04, op. 39, papka 232, d. 52987, l. 47.

[10] Letter of B. Legran to G. Chicherin, 22 December, 1920, *RSASPH*, f. 5, op. 1, d. 212733, l. 5.

[11] Protocol Number 4 of the joint session of the Central Committee of the AKP(b) and Kavburo, 4 November, 1920, *Political Documents Archive under the President of Azerbaijan Republic* (hereafter PDA PAR), f.1, op. 1, d. 22, l. 20.

[12] To People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin from the diplomatic representation of Soviet Russia in Yerevan, November 1920, *State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic* (hereafter SA AR), f. 28, op. 1, d. 38, l. 15.

[13] Protocol Number 6 of the Evening session of the Plenum of the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), 3 June, 1921, *RSASPH*, f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l.76.

[14] Attachment to protocol number 6 of the evening session of the Plenum of the Kavburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), 3 June, 1921, *RSASPH*, f. 64, op. 1, d. 1, l. 77.

[15] *Bakinsky rabochy*, 22 June, 1921.

[16] Protocol number 8 of the session of the Central Committee of the KP RKP(b), 15 June, 1921, *RSASPH*, f. 64, op. 1, d. 105, l. 11.

DESTRUCTION OF CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN SITES CONTINUES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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President Serzh Sargsyan's recent remarks about "Greater Armenia" have attracted widespread attention and much criticism, but an ongoing Armenian effort to lay claim to a community which formed part of the ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijani nation has not, even though its immediate consequences—the destruction, desecration or restoration of Caucasian Albanian historical monuments in the occupied territories—may be far more serious as an example of cultural imperialism and ethnocide.

In a new study, Azerbaijani historian Bakhtiyar Tuncay says that "Armenian historians have been trying to 'Armenianize' the history, culture, architectural monuments and language of Caucasian Albania" not only to lay claim to a more ancient cultural tradition than their own, but also to provide a cover to their desecration and even destruction of the historical monuments of this people who—despite their Christian religion—were in fact ethnic Turks and belonged to "the nomadic tribes of the Kipchaks." [1]

"Armenians admit," Tuncay continues, "that the language of Albanian historians does not resemble either ancient or modern Armenian." The two very different peoples shared only a common religion, but that is not enough to justify treating them as the same. "Albanians spoke the language of the Kipchaks," he notes. And they were thus a Turkic people whatever their religion. Suggesting otherwise is to fall into the trap of projecting today's clash of civilizations argument onto the past, something that may be politically useful, but is fundamentally wrong.

Saying that he hasn't "discovered America" in this case—earlier scholars such as Bartold had concluded the same—Tuncay points out that clarity on this matter has a number of consequences. On the one hand, "manuscripts in European archives presented as Armenian sources in fact belong to Albanians" and need to be understood in that way. Tuncay's work includes an Albanian grammar and a dictionary of some 1700 Albanian words to assist scholars making use of these texts.

But on the other hand, it means, according to Tuncay, that "all churches in the territory of modern Armenia, as well as stone monuments that they call "khachkars," are in reality Albanian monuments, which is proven by the inscriptions on them. For example, it is written on one of the churches there that it was built by an Albanian khan, while the grave of the Albanian Catholicos can be found and is clearly

identified. One of the cross stones bears a sign that Albanian Duke Kirikor erected the monument so that everyone who passed could pray there.”

This might be a historical curiosity were it not for the Armenian-Azerbaijani war. Because the Armenians have insisted on the “Armenianness” of the monuments of the Caucasian Albanians, they have felt justified in “restoring” or destroying them in the occupied territories, and they have denounced as a crime against Armenians any Azerbaijani actions involving Caucasian Albanian monuments on the territory of Azerbaijan.

Another Azerbaijani historian, G.G. Mammadova, expands on this point. She notes that all these monuments “were built on the land of Azerbaijan by Albanian princes and architects and are not Armenian,” whatever Armenians say. And she points to the “fierce fight” many Armenian scholars and officials have engaged in to “detach them from the Azerbaijani architectural heritage and to appropriate them to Armenia.” [2]

The Armenian occupation, she writes, “inflicted irreparable damage to the monuments on the territory of Karabakh and the surrounding districts.” Some of this destruction, of course, is “the consequence of hostilities, but another larger part is the result of cultural terror and systematic destruction of the traces of Azerbaijanis in the occupied territories.” Moreover, she continues, “if a policy of terror is being conducted against the monuments of Islam, then another part of the Azerbaijani cultural heritage, the Christian church architecture of Caucasian Albania, is being subjected to a policy of forcible ‘Armenianization.’”

At present, Mammadova points out, “Armenian researchers are carrying out so-called restoration work on these monuments” to that end. By its very nature, she says, “this is illegal work as it is done on occupied territory, on monuments that belong to others, and without the participation of Azerbaijani scientists.” Moreover, in certain cases, “traces showing that the buildings belong to Albanian culture are being erased,” with “specific features of Albanian Karabakh architecture being falsified and destroyed under the guise of restoration work.” And she adds that “unfortunately,” it sometimes happens that “foreign specialists” are employed in this, something the Armenians clearly believe gives “their fabrications ‘scientific authenticity.’”

To stop this cultural vandalism, she calls for the “international monitoring of monuments of material culture” in the occupied territories, something that Mammadova says “will reveal all the consequences of the war and cultural terror.”

Five years ago, the Azerbaijani government estimated that “the overall damage inflicted to Azerbaijan’s cultural heritage” by the Armenian occupation had reached 7 billion US dollars, although in fact the destruction of many historical monuments has resulted in losses to which no one can put a price. At that time, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said that “the protection of all historic and archaeological sites is a priority for us” and warned that Baku’s diplomatic missions will challenge all Armenian claims against Azerbaijan and document all Armenian destruction of Azerbaijan’s heritage. That process continues, and that heritage now includes the Caucasian Albanians, regardless of Armenian efforts to claim that community for its own.

Notes

[1] See <http://www.news.az/articles/society/35054> (accessed 12 September 2011).

[2] See <http://www.visions.az/culture,71/> (accessed 12 September 2011).

CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION PLAY A BALANCED ROLE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS?

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The common features of the Action Plans (APs) that the European Union has enunciated for its partner countries in the European Neighborhood Program (ENP) have attracted a great deal of attention. But the differences, especially concerning conflict resolution, are striking, not only in the APs for the three South Caucasus countries, but also in the policies the EU has pursued in the region. And that pattern raises the question as to how balanced a role the European Union can and will play in the resolution of conflicts there. Indeed, there is a very real risk that some of the language in these documents may exacerbate rather than mitigate existing conflicts in that region (Wolff & Whitman 2008, p. 7).

All three APs in the region set out a five-year program, but the priorities the EU and these countries have set are very different. For example, the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is defined as the top priority by the EU in the Azerbaijani document, but ranks only seventh in the AP for Armenia. Given the continuing impact of this conflict on the region, such a difference in the APs of the two parties to the conflict is hardly justified, all the more so because portions of Azerbaijan are occupied by separatist and Armenian Republic forces and the principle of the priority of the territorial integrity of states is almost universally recognized, including by the EU.

Even worse, a close reading of the APs suggests that the EU is tilting toward Armenia. While the EU urges both parties to use peaceful means to achieve a settlement and to follow international norms, the European Union AP for Armenia includes support for "the principle of self-determination of peoples," a principle that is not accepted by the Azerbaijani side, at least in the form preferred by Yerevan. The AP for Georgia only promises that support for Tbilisi will be part of EU discussions with the Russian Federation.

The three APs vary in other ways as well. The AP for Azerbaijan ranks security and border management ninth among its priorities, the one for Georgia ranks these fourth, but the one for Armenia does not even mention this task. At the same time, the AP for Azerbaijan ranks regional cooperation tenth, the AP for Armenia eighth, and the one for Georgia fifth. This pattern suggests that Georgia must increase its efforts at regional cooperation even as Armenia and Azerbaijan exist without it. That is interesting given that recent events clearly show that the tandem of Azerbaijan as an oil/gas producer and Georgia as an oil/gas transit country can not only survive but even increase economic turnover without Armenia.

The participation as a moderator in the conflicts within ENP area is a new function for the European Union and is to take the form of the CFSP and ESDP. By this involvement, the EU seeks to take a leading role within its immediate neighborhood and compete with the UN, OSCE and other international institutions in peacekeeping and peace monitoring operations. Prevention of trafficking of people and weapons as a result of the conflicts are other key arguments for the EU presence there. Wolff and Whitman (2008) investigated most of the conflicts in ENP area and prepared a comprehensive report for the European Parliament.

The Eastern ENP area is noted for the Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. In addition, stability of the Caucasus also depends on how the Georgian government treats its Azerbaijani and Armenian minorities. In the Georgian case, the Armenians seek autonomy while the Azerbaijanis often complain of social injustice and economic discrimination (Malek 2006, p. 146). But it is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that is the most important for the EU, because it challenges that institution to live up to basic norms of international law that it supports elsewhere.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the first major violent conflict on the territory of the former USSR, but its history is not our subject here. Instead, the issue is the present positions of the parties and their relationship to the EU. The Azerbaijani government invokes international law and norms as the only means of solving the problem, but it nonetheless reserves the right to employ force to recover the occupied territories. Here it is worth underscoring that Azerbaijan at no point threatens the territorial integrity of Armenia, the occupying power.

The integrity of Azerbaijan and other Caucasus Republics was recognized by the international community as soon as the USSR collapsed. Armenia was also among the countries, which had recognized Azerbaijan in its former Azerbaijan SSR boundaries and did not recognize self-proclaimed "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic." But invoking the right for self-determination, Armenia has ignored four UN Security Council Resolutions which "demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories and also the establishment of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of residence in their native land." [1] Such a position of Armenia undercuts the 1994 cease-fire agreement and limits the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs.

Licinia Simão (2010, p. 3) argues that, "the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is best portrayed as an interstate conflict, with visible impact on the domestic constituencies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, making any analysis of civil society engagement in conflict resolution highly incomplete, if this interstate dimension is not reflected. It can therefore be said that the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethno-territorial conflict of an interstate nature with elements of irredentism and separatism."

EU participation in the solution of the conflict is limited to cooperation with and full support of the OSCE moderation and acceptance of a peaceful solution within the Minsk Group framework and Priority Areas of ENP APs. [2] The failure of the EU in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also explained by Nicu Popescu (2011, p. 95) as "lack of demand from either Armenia or Azerbaijan" and strong opposition by France to the idea of being replaced by the EU in the negotiation process. Nonetheless, the 2006 European Parliament Resolutions stresses that the EU shall be actively involved and "must help settle conflicts in the Caucasus region" (Moustakis & German 2009,

p. 130) and should not count only on the acting co-chairs, but also on the other member states of the Minsk Group, [3] such as Turkey, which is an associated member to the EU from 1963.

Turkey is very influential in the region and supports Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. According to Roberto Aliboni (2005, p. 10), regardless of whether Turkey remains a neighbor or becomes a member of the EU, Turkey will play a major role and the EU should be able to expect that this role will be collaborative and constructive—even though the EU at present is not directly represented in the mediation effort there. France is one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, and the EU fully supports that framework. Moreover, the newly opened EU Delegations in Azerbaijan and in Armenia, together with the office of the EUSR in the region provide a key channel for the exchange of information between the parties and among the EU and OSCE representatives (Simão 2010, p. 16).

The duplication of the activities by the EU and the OSCE reflects the geographical enlargement of the Union and its increasing involvement in classical OSCE areas. Problems arise when the EU and MS are unable to “clearly decide on where they want the OSCE to go and what they want it to do” (Graaf & Verstichel 2008, pp. 275-276). For example, by appointment of the EUSR to Moldova, the South Caucasus and Central Asia within the ENP, the EU ignored the OSCE, which “has developed much expertise based on its long-established missions” (Ham 2006, p. 31). Emma Stewart (2006, pp. 199-200) finds the reason for misunderstanding in the EU’s wish to cooperate more with the UN, rather than with the OSCE. However, this discriminative approach is harmful, as the OSCE scope of activity covers not only Russia and the Caucasus, but also Central Asia and sometimes is present where there is no UN interest at all.

Unfortunately, many EU figures extrapolated from the resolution of the tensions in the Balkans to the successful implementation of the ENP. In reality, the perspective membership in one of the leading economic and political powers was a stimulus for the sides to come to the agreement, but the ENP itself has not been designed as a conflict prevention policy, though it had contained security and stability issues. It is more about soft power application, an invitation to cooperation, rather than an obligation. Given that membership of the Caucasus republics in the EU is not on the agenda anytime soon, the effect of the ENP instruments was quite small compared to their impact in the Balkans.

In addition, the contrasting understandings of conflict management by the Commission and the Council of Ministers have not contributed to the involvement of ENP in the field of conflict management. It has been suggested that since the ENP was proposed by the Commission and is implemented by its instruments, there is no foundation for the other instruments within ESDP/CFSP (Crombois 2008, pp. 3-4) and instead of extending the areas of cooperation, it is better to remove the deficit of instruments (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2008, p. 1). Nonetheless, the EU can contribute to the conflict resolution process by bearing the possible financial and political costs, defining the limits of its “neighborhood,” working out a clearer political stance, sounding the EU voice by replacing France in OSCE Minsk Group, increasing the confidence and cross-border cooperation between the parties, and promoting the greater involvement of the civil society into the negotiation process (Wolff 2007, pp. 4-5).

The Lisbon Treaty with instruments like the CSDP missions, development cooperation, and mediation activities may help realize the aims, though it would require the EU to be patient while consensus and trust is built up. [4] According to the treaty's provisions, a range of institutions including the Council Secretariat, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), CPMD, and EUMS, will make the EEAS a key player in the crisis management (Hynek 2011, p. 84). The involvement of Russia and Turkey, the players with a strong influence on the region, in the ENP as the strategic partners is also a positive contribution. And the recently opened fully fledged EU delegation to Azerbaijan and Armenia could promote the EU's ends and redress some of the imbalances in the APs.

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Notes

[1] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations Secretary General, 4 April 2001, available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5662.pdf> (accessed 10 September 2011).

[2] European Union // External Actions, Summary on EU—Azerbaijan Relations, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/eu_azerbaijan_summary/index_en.htm (accessed 10 September 2011).

[3] For more information on the composition of the OSCE Minsk Group, please consult <http://www.osce.org/mg/66926> (accessed 07 September 2011).

[4] Memorandum of Quintet Group, *Concerns and Recommendations on European Neighborhood Policy*, 2010, available at http://eap.pauci.org/file/ZWFwX3BhdWNpX2ZpbGVzMjY2Ng__.doc?n&d (accessed 10 September 2011).

A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

President Ilham Aliyev says that "after a few years, Azerbaijan will join the ranks of developed countries" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286841.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev welcomes the discovery of a new gas field in the Caspian Sea off the Absheron peninsula (<http://news.day.az/politics/287594.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that Azerbaijan will not stop negotiating to seek a settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/286133.html>).

II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan

Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that the United States "will remain in solidarity with friends who extended to it the hand of help at the difficult moment" of September 11, 2001 (<http://news.day.az/politics/287954.html>).

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says that "nothing can have an impact on the fraternal relations between Azerbaijan and Iran" and that "Iran is a fraternal state to Azerbaijan and supports its independence" (<http://news.day.az/politics/288449.html>).

Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, a member of the Israeli Knesset and former defense minister, says that he does not think that the current state of relations between Turkey and Israel will influence Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, because the latter are "strong and deep" and thus not affected by "external factors" (<http://news.day.az/politics/288389.html>).

III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

September 15

The Foreign Ministry criticizes two US congressmen for their "unconstructive" position relative to the occupied territories and aggression by Armenia (<http://news.day.az/politics/288427.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that so-called "elections" held in Karabakh are intended to "cover the occupation policy of Armenia" and are thus illegitimate (<http://news.day.az/politics/288463.html>).

Industry and Energy Minister Natic Aliyev meets in Paris with his French counterpart Eric Besson (<http://news.day.az/economy/288545.html>).

Yashar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Washington, makes a public protest against various measures connected with the self-proclaimed separatist regime in Karabakh (<http://news.day.az/politics/288406.html>).

Tofiq Zulfugarov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tallinn, says that Azerbaijan and Estonia plan to expand cooperation in the information technology and banking sectors (<http://news.day.az/economy/288533.html>).

Zahid Oruj, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that it is "absolutely clear" that recent declarations by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan "are nothing more than a bluff" (<http://news.day.az/politics/288434.html>).

Tahir Rzaev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "it is well known to the entire world and even more to the countries of the South Caucasus that Armenia does not have any economic or political potential" (<http://news.day.az/politics/288360.html>).

Andrzej Kasprzyk, the personal representative of the chairperson-in-office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, visited the occupied territories

and met with Bako Saakyan, the leader of the Karabakh separatists (<http://news.day.az/politics/288431.html>).

The Council for Cooperation of Turkic Language States supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/288468.html>).

Hulusi Kilic, Turkey's ambassador to Baku, says that "the ties of friendship and brotherhood between Azerbaijan and Turkey have passed along a large historical path and therefore are indestructible" (<http://news.day.az/politics/288465.html>).

September 14

President Ilham Aliyev telephones his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev to extend his greetings on the latter's birthday (<http://news.day.az/politics/288316.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives the letters of credence from incoming Montenegrin ambassador Ramo Bralic (<http://news.day.az/politics/288266.html>).

Ombudsman Elmira Suleymanova issues a statement detailing Armenia's criminal activities in the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/288361.html>).

First Deputy Prosecutor General Rustam Usubov participates in a Minsk meeting of the Coordination Council of Procurator Generals of the CIS States (<http://news.day.az/politics/287911.html>).

Tahir Tagizade, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Prague, says that the legislatures of the two countries plan to expand their cooperation (<http://news.day.az/politics/288318.html>).

Isfandiyar Vahabzade, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Minsk, says that trade between Azerbaijan and Belarus is expected to increase to 800 million US dollars in 2011 (<http://news.day.az/economy/288329.html>).

Rovnag Abdullayev, head of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, says that the discovery of new gas fields in Azerbaijan further "strengthens its position in the world" as a supplier of gas (<http://news.day.az/economy/288308.html>). He adds that Azerbaijan is "an open transit country" (<http://news.day.az/economy/288294.html>).

The State Committee for Work with Religious Structures of Azerbaijan is investigating the US Department of State's report on religion in 2010 (<http://news.day.az/politics/288333.html>).

Eldar Ibrahimov, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, says that the international community should be putting pressure on Armenia to achieve a settlement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/288213.html>).

Vahid Ahmadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Armenia's economy is in such a state that "the second wave of the world crisis" could destroy it entirely (<http://news.day.az/politics/288220.html>).

The European Commission says that the mandate of the European Union for talks between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on a Trans-Caspian pipeline is an essential step forward in the realization of this project (<http://news.day.az/economy/288229.html>).

September 13

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva meets in Paris with Gérard Larcher, president of the French Senate (<http://news.day.az/politics/288190.html>).

Health Minister Ogtay Shiralyev chairs the 61st session of the European Regional Committee of the World Health Organization in Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/288081.html>).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov meets in Tashkent with his Uzbek counterpart Bakhodir Matlyubov (<http://news.day.az/politics/288015.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov signs a memorandum of understanding with the German organization GIZ on the provision of technical assistance to the Foreign Ministry's Administration for Support of International Development (<http://news.day.az/politics/288159.html>).

The Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy begins its sixth program for training state employees on foreign affairs (<http://news.day.az/politics/288179.html>).

The Russian Foreign Ministry expresses "regret and surprise" at the decision of the European Union regarding a Trans-Caspian pipeline (<http://news.day.az/economy/288161.html>).

Margaret Chan, the director general of the World Health Organization, says that Azerbaijan has made great strides over the last five years in the area of health care (<http://news.day.az/society/288039.html>).

Agis Tsouros, head of the strategic programs and special projects committee of the European Regional Committee of the World Health Organization, says that trading in human organs as Armenia has been accused of doing in the occupied territories is "absolutely impermissible and completely contradicts human rights" (<http://news.day.az/politics/288100.html>).

September 12

President Ilham Aliyev receives Margaret Chan, secretary general of the World Health Organization (<http://news.day.az/politics/287950.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Thierry Mariani, the French state secretary for transport (<http://news.day.az/politics/287950.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Joschka Fischer, former foreign minister of Germany (<http://news.day.az/politics/287950.html>).

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva tells the World Health Organization meeting in Baku that "our constant interaction with a number of leading world companies in the sphere of wealth and with humanitarian foundations is bearing fruit"

(<http://news.day.az/politics/288005.html>). In other comments, she says that "today, Azerbaijan is a contemporary country, which is dynamically developing in all spheres of life, including in culture, science and education" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287983.html>).

Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev, Azerbaijan's permanent representative to the United Nations, says that Yerevan is attempting to "blackmail" several members of the UN (<http://news.day.az/politics/287901.html>).

Sabir Rustamkhanly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that it is no surprise that Armenians are now talking about "preparation for a constitutional revolution" given that country's politics (<http://news.day.az/politics/287786.html>).

Rasim Musabayov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the return of former Armenian president Robert Kocharyan to office would spark "a civil war" there (<http://news.day.az/politics/287697.html>).

Iranian Vice President Mohammad Javad Mohammadzade says that waters from the Araz will be diverted to Lake Urmia in the near future (<http://news.day.az/politics/287988.html>).

Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt says that "the European Union must support the process of Karabakh peace-making" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287872.html>).

Irina Bokova, the secretary general of UNESCO, thanks First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva for Azerbaijan's assistance in overcoming the consequences of the earthquake in Haiti (<http://news.day.az/politics/287926.html>).

Georgian First Lady Sandra Roelofs visits Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/287937.html>).

St. Petersburg Governor Georgy Poltavchenko says that the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia's northern capital has made a major contribution to the life of that city (<http://news.day.az/politics/287908.html>).

September 11

Rasim Musabayov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Azerbaijan has made a contribution to the struggle with international terrorism (<http://news.day.az/politics/287765.html>).

Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that the opening of a major new gas field in Azerbaijan is "good news both for Azerbaijan and Total and also for the Southern Corridor project which will help Europe diversify its supplies of natural gas" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287766.html>).

The US embassy in Baku says that the United States "highly values the support which Azerbaijan is making to ensuring international security" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287764.html>).

September 10

The Azerbaijan government presents its fourth report to the UN Committee on the Rights of Children (<http://news.day.az/society/287691.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the discovery of large reserves of gas in the Absheron field increases the role of Azerbaijan in providing energy security to Europe" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287701.html>).

Uruguayan Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto Carreras tells Mammad Ahmadzade, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Buenas Aires, that Uruguay supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the mediation effort of the OSCE Minsk Group (<http://news.day.az/politics/287694.html>).

Mustafa Kabakci, a member of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, says that cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the energy sphere is entering a new stage of development given the opening of the new Absheron gas field (<http://news.day.az/economy/287708.html>).

September 9

President Ilham Aliyev welcomes the discovery of a new gas field in the Caspian Sea off the Absheron peninsula (<http://news.day.az/politics/287594.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Michael Borrel, the vice president of Total (<http://news.day.az/politics/287634.html>).

Hafiz Pashayev, deputy foreign minister and rector of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, says that ADA will expand to 1500 students by the 2015-2016 academic year and be an important institution for Azerbaijani higher education (<http://news.day.az/politics/287556.html>).

Military Procurator Khanlar Valiyev takes part in the 10th International Conference on Criminal Law in Budapest (<http://news.day.az/politics/287616.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the recent declaration by ASALA in Yerevan "yet again demonstrates to the entire world that Armenia is a state which openly supports terrorism" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287462.html>).

Koray Targay, the head of the Baku office of the OSCE, says that the OSCE maintains close ties with the Azerbaijan government and looks forward to the adoption of a new law on defamation (<http://news.day.az/politics/287502.html>).

September 8

President Ilham Aliyev receives Ilyas Umakhanov, the deputy chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation (<http://news.day.az/politics/287405.html>).

The Azerbaijan government and Russia's Astrakhan oblast sign an intergovernmental agreement on trade, science, and cultural cooperation (<http://news.day.az/politics/287363.html>).

Bahar Muradova, the vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says that the discussion of the

Karabakh conflict at the UN General Assembly is important for Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/287417.html>).

Bakhtiyar Sadykhov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “the current situation of Armenia clearly shows that Azerbaijan has far surpassed this state” (<http://news.day.az/politics/287263.html>).

Khady Rajabli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Yerevan should pursue the kind of constructive policy with its neighbors that Baku does (<http://news.day.az/politics/287053.html>).

Samad Seyidov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that it is not appropriate to say as Yerevan has that Armenia’s selection to the UN Security Council would increase the authority of that body (<http://news.day.az/politics/287226.html>).

The Congress of Azerbaijanis of the World stages a brief unsanctioned demonstration before being dispersed by police in front of the Iranian embassy in Baku to protest Tehran’s handling of Lake Urmia and to call for the unification of Northern and Southern Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/287362.html>).

Turkish President Abdulla Gul says that “the Karabakh problem is the main obstacle for the achievement of stability in the South Caucasus” (<http://news.day.az/politics/287282.html>).

Kazakhstan Defense Minister Adilbek Dzhaksybekov visits Azerbaijan to study the defense industry (<http://news.day.az/politics/287359.html>).

Ukrainian Energy Minister Yury Boyko says that Kyiv intends to purchase gas from Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/economy/287435.html>).

Paulo Antonio Pereira Pinto, Brazil’s ambassador to Baku, says that Brazil is interested in developing relations with Azerbaijan in many spheres (<http://news.day.az/politics/287264.html>).

Igor Bodiur, Moldova’s ambassador to Baku, says that Chisinau has presented its proposals for the next session of the intergovernmental commission on trade and scientific-technical cooperation (<http://news.day.az/economy/287308.html>).

Ersad Hurmusli, an advisor to the president of Turkey, says that “the strengthening of Azerbaijan in the region is very important both for Turkey and for the entire Turkic people” (<http://news.day.az/politics/287320.html>).

Aleksandr Zhilkin, governor of Russia’s Astrakhan oblast, says that ferry service will begin between Baku and Olya this year (<http://news.day.az/economy/287381.html>).

September 7

President Ilham Aliyev receives Aleksandr Zhilkin, governor of Russia’s Astrakhan oblast (<http://news.day.az/politics/287238.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Gerhard Roiss, chairman of the board of Austria's OMV (<http://news.day.az/politics/287211.html>).

Ramiz Rzayev, the chairman of the Supreme Court, says that Azerbaijan must do everything possible to eliminate the conditions that prompt the European Court to take decisions against Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/287254.html>).

Ecology and Energy Minister Huseyngulu Bagirov says that Iran must reach an agreement with Azerbaijan on any diversion of water from the Araz Riber to Lake Urmia (<http://news.day.az/society/287112.html>).

Ramiz Mehdiyev, head of the Presidential Administration, says that reports on the Wikileaks site about Azerbaijan are slanderous and untrue (<http://news.day.az/politics/287229.html>).

Elman Mammadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the OSCE Minsk Group "very softly" addresses the occupying country (<http://news.day.az/politics/287141.html>).

Malahat Hasanova, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that as long as it remains an occupying country, Armenia will encounter from day to day a decline in its economic potential and an increase in the poverty of its population (<http://news.day.az/politics/287117.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "it is well-known that elections in Armenia take place with serious inference by foreign forces" (<http://news.day.az/politics/287023.html>).

The tourism ministry says that "Azerbaijan will be able to receive all guests at Eurovision 2012" (<http://news.day.az/economy/287113.html>).

The World Economic Forum says that Azerbaijan has improved its ranking in competitiveness from 57th to 55th place over the last year (<http://news.day.az/economy/287177.html>).

The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group meet to discuss their program before the December OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius (<http://news.day.az/politics/287458.html>).

Zokir Vazirov, Tajikistan's ambassador to Baku, says that Dushanbe attaches great importance to the development of "all-sided cooperation" with Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/287255.html>).

Philippe Lefort, EU special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, says that the shortest path for association with the European Union for countries in the South Caucasus is the resolution of conflicts (<http://news.day.az/politics/287155.html>).

September 6

President Ilham Aliyev says that "after a few years, Azerbaijan will join the ranks of developed countries" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286841.html>).

A statue of First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva is erected in the Canadian city of Niagara on the Lake (<http://news.day.az/politics/287005.html>).

Vasif Talybov, head of the Supreme Majlis of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, visits Iran (<http://news.day.az/politics/286742.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov tells the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Belgrade that "Azerbaijan highly values the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on Karabakh" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286979.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov meets with Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković (<http://news.day.az/politics/287018.html>).

Defense Minister Safar Abiyev receives his Kazakhstan counterpart Adilbek Dzhaksybekov (<http://news.day.az/politics/286939.html>).

Economic Development Minister Shahin Mustafayev attends a celebration of the 20th anniversary of the independence of Uzbekistan hosted by Ismetulla Irgashev, Uzbekistan's ambassador to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/286887.html>).

Ali Hasanov, head of the social-political department of the Presidential Administration, says that the international norms which govern the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been known "already for many years," but Armenia either because it doesn't want to or can't has refused to recognize them and has thus delayed a resolution (<http://news.day.az/politics/286898.html>).

Deputy Youth and Sports Minister Intigam Babayev discusses cooperation with his counterparts in Portugal (<http://news.day.az/society/286848.html>).

Ambassador Emin Eyubov, head of Azerbaijan's representation at the European Union, says that there exists in Europe "a clear understanding of the importance of Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286862.html>).

Hikmat Osmanov, the head of the Republic Committee of the Trade Union of Workers of Government Institutions and Social Services, signs a cooperation accord with his Ukrainian counterpart Tatyana Nikitina (<http://news.day.az/economy/286994.html>).

Musa Guliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Yerevan's approach is having the most negative impact on the Armenian people (<http://news.day.az/politics/286830.html>).

Giedrius Čekuolis, OSCE special representative for protracted conflicts, says that the OSCE believes that all sides must show political will in order to strengthen the ceasefire and reach a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/286941.html>).

Hulusi Kilic, Turkey's ambassador to Baku, says that Turkey does not devote any significance to Wikileaks reports concerning Azerbaijani-Turkish relations (<http://news.day.az/politics/286911.html>).

The embassy of Slovakia in Moscow issues a statement distancing itself from commemorations in Prague of the 20th anniversary of “the independence” of the self-proclaimed Karabakh republic (<http://news.day.az/politics/286856.html>).

The European Union journal *Europolitics* says that Azerbaijan and the European Committee are discussing an agreement on a common air space (<http://news.day.az/economy/286924.html>).

The German government says it will help Azerbaijan to deal with industrial pollution (<http://news.day.az/economy/286904.html>).

September 5

President Ilham Aliyev receives Philippe Lefort, EU special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia (<http://news.day.az/politics/286757.html>).

Ali Hasanov, head of the social-political department of the Presidential Administration, says that the latest Wikileaks reports concerning Azerbaijan are “a lie and a slander” (<http://news.day.az/politics/286815.html>).

Ilgar Mukhtarov, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Mexico city who is jointly accredited to Quito, presents his letters of credence to Columbian President Juan Manuel Santos (<http://news.day.az/politics/286686.html>).

Khanhuseyn Kazimly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “the Minsk Group does not have as its goal the resolution of the conflict” (<http://news.day.az/politics/286621.html>).

Grzegorz Juliusz Schetyna, marshal of the Polish Seim, says that “the European Union must not close its borders to neighboring countries who are trying to follow democratic values and be closer to Europe” (<http://news.day.az/politics/286894.html>).

Philippe Lefort, EU special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, says that the South Caucasus has great importance for the European Union (<http://news.day.az/politics/286647.html>).

Eldar Ismayilov, the president of the Association of Banks of Azerbaijan, is elected deputy chairman of the International Banking Council (<http://news.day.az/economy/286729.html>).

Mark Hereward, the head of the UNICEF office in Baku, says that Azerbaijan’s adoption of a juvenile justice law will help resolve many existing problems (<http://news.day.az/society/286770.html>).

Tedo Japaridze, former Georgian foreign minister, becomes co-director of the Research Center on Energy Security at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (<http://news.day.az/politics/286765.html>).

September 3

Prime Minister Arthur Rasizade says that the summit of the CIS "demonstrated the unconstructive quality of the position of Armenia"
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286549.html>).

Samad Seyidov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that the resolution adopted by PACE on political prisoners in Azerbaijan is "not objective"
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286553.html>).

September 2

President Ilham Aliyev receives Switzerland's vice president, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf (<http://news.day.az/politics/286397.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Christos Pourgourides, the head of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286353.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov participates in the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CIS in Dushanbe (<http://news.day.az/politics/286173.html>).

Chingiz Huseynzade, vice president of Azerbaijan's national Olympic committee, says that Baku has been confirmed as a candidate for the summer games in 2020
(<http://news.day.az/sport/286188.html>).

Bayram Safarov, head of the Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of the Azerbaijani Republic, says Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan awards those around him who are "murderers just as he is, guilty in the deaths of innocent people, children, the elderly and women"
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286342.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that Azerbaijan respects the will of the Libyan people and recognizes the National Transitional Council as the organ of power there
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286413.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that Azerbaijan does not recognize the voting in Abkhazia as legitimate and supports the territorial integrity of Georgia
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286438.html>).

Prime Minister Arthur Rasizade takes part in the CIS summit in Dushanbe
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286429.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Claudio Gugerotti, the papal nuncio to Azerbaijan on the completion of his assignment in Baku
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286371.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that the definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is "one of the main basic principles of the renewed Madrid document"
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286373.html>).

Justice Minister Fikrat Mammadov receives Christos Pourgourides, the head of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
(<http://news.day.az/politics/286268.html>).

Zakir Garalov, procurator general, receives Christos Pourgourides, the head of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (<http://news.day.az/politics/286368.html>).

The Transportation Ministry announces that Azerbaijan and Russia have agreed on the joint reconstruction of a bridge over the Samur River (<http://news.day.az/economy/286434.html>).

Mubariz Gurbanly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says the international community must apply sanctions against Armenia for its "destructive position" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286347.html>).

Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "problems within the ruling elite of Armenia will grow" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286208.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, takes part in Istanbul celebrations of Ramadan (<http://news.day.az/politics/286408.html>).

The Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy begins the third running of its special courses on the Caspian basin studies (<http://news.day.az/politics/286259.html>).

The Congress of Azerbaijanis of the World try to stage a protest before the Iranian embassy in Baku but are prevented from doing so by police (<http://news.day.az/politics/286384.html>).

Leaders of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Germany provide information to the city government of Magdeburg about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/286372.html>).

UNICEF's Baku office condemns the murder by Armenians of Azerbaijani children (<http://news.day.az/politics/286362.html>).

Goran Lennmarker, former head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, says that "the European Union is conducting itself in an extremely passive way on the question of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286335.html>).

September 1

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that Azerbaijan will not stop negotiating to seek a settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/286133.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov meets his Serbian counterpart Vuk Jeremić (<http://news.day.az/politics/286065.html>).

Tahir Tagizade, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Prague, says "the Armenian mafia" in the Czech Republic is spreading disinformation about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/285999.html>).

Rabiyat Aslanova, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Armenian president would not be making the statements he is if he was not getting support from abroad (<http://news.day.az/politics/286095.html>).

The German embassy in Baku says that "Germany continues its policy of non-recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and its structures" (<http://news.day.az/politics/286192.html>).

Note to Readers

The editors of "Azerbaijan in the World" hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email (adabiweekly@ada.edu.az). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.