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KARABAKH AFTER KAZAN

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No meeting of Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders in the past decade generated such widespread expectations that there would be a breakthrough toward a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as did the June 24th session of Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan hosted by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Kazan.

To a large extent, this reflected not so much a change in Baku or Yerevan, but rather the actions of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries, whose leaders not only issued a joint statement at Deauville calling for progress toward a settlement, but also personally lobbied for a breakthrough in Kazan, telephoning or meeting with the presidents and other leaders of the two sides in advance of the meeting.

But while the summit appears to have been more successful than some earlier meetings—the session lasted longer than most recent meetings; the sides did manage to produce a joint communiqué, something that has not always happened; and spokesman for both sides and for the OSCE Minsk Group countries, while expressing disappointment, nonetheless said that there had been progress—it did not achieve the progress even on the basic outline of a resolution of the conflict.

On the one hand, of course, boosting expectations in advance of talks is simply a normal diplomatic tactic designed to put pressure on the sides to come to an accord. But on the other, the failure of the Kazan meeting to result in a breakthrough has been all the more disappointing because of just how high these expectations were and because they were raised by the remarkable joint action of the presidents of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries. And those factors, in turn, have contributed to a deepening of widespread skepticism that any negotiated settlement is possible anytime soon.

Officials in both Azerbaijan and Armenia and in the three OSCE Minsk Group countries have sought to put the best face on things, suggesting that significant progress did occur at Kazan, even though all of them expressed disappointment that there had not been more. And they have suggested that the Kazan talks set the stage for more progress toward an agreement on principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at future negotiations in the OSCE Minsk Group format.

Moreover, this view has been reinforced by some commentators in each of the three OSCE Minsk Group countries who argue that Moscow is losing patience with Armenia—which unlike Azerbaijan has not accepted the modified Madrid Principles—and may be prepared to apply more pressure to its longtime client state in the South Caucasus or who suggest that Yerevan will sooner or later have to yield to the united front of Russia, France and the United States.

If in fact the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries do maintain a united front on the modified Madrid Principles and if they are willing to put real pressure on Armenia and force Yerevan to agree in the next few months, then the optimism of these officials and commentators may prove justified. But if there is no progress of that kind and soon—and progress would have to include both Armenian withdrawal from the majority of the Azerbaijani territory Yerevan now occupies and an Armenian commitment to a timetable for the restoration of full Azerbaijani sovereignty over the rest—then the voices of skeptics about the OSCE Minsk Group process and more generally about a peaceful resolution of the conflict are likely to become even more insistent.

In the days since Kazan, these skeptics have suggested that if the combined efforts of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair presidents to achieve a settlement did not work at that meeting, such efforts are unlikely to work in the future or even to continue, given that the three do not have an identical set of interests in the South Caucasus. And at the same time, they have argued that the international community has not given Armenia any reason to change its position that is based on the idea that with each passing year, the settlement of the conflict on the basis of a return to the *status quo ante* becomes more difficult rather than more likely.

Such commentators, in turn, have suggested that the failure at Kazan reflects a deeper failure, that of the OSCE Minsk Group itself, a body that one Azerbaijani

parliamentarian suggested was little more than a “touristic” enterprise and that other commentators have pointed out has achieved little beyond avoiding a new war. But they have divided as to what should be done. Many, despite their skepticism about the Minsk Group, argue that the two sides have no choice but to go forward with it, given that all the alternatives are perhaps worse. Others argue that a new negotiating forum should be created, with the possible inclusion of Turkey and Iran, and possibly a new road map as well. And still others say that Armenia’s unwillingness to agree at Kazan means that a military solution is the only one Azerbaijan has been left with.

Such statements, of course, reflect real views and represent diplomatic feints designed to put pressure on one or another of the sides. But the increasing frequency and volume with which they are voiced suggests that time is running out for the OSCE Minsk Group approach and that unless the Minsk Group countries move quickly to force Armenia to agree to the principles everyone else has accepted, Kazan will indeed be remembered as a turning point in the Karabakh conflict—but not in the direction that the OSCE Minsk Group countries and their leaders want.

AZERBAIJAN AND THE REVISION OF TURKEY’S REGIONAL POLICY

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Azerbaijan has always played a special role in Turkey’s foreign policy, a role that reflects what Heydar Aliyev famously called their existence as “one nation, two states.” Indeed, over the last century, Turkey’s foreign policy cannot be understood without reference to Azerbaijan, and in the last several years, Baku has played a key role in prompting the Turkish political elite to revise its plans for a “zero problem” situation with its neighbors, first and foremost Armenia.

The relationship between the two Turkic countries in fact predates both of the modern states that exist today. The short-lived Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), established in 1918, was the first democratic and secular Muslim state, predating Republican Turkey. But even before that, given the close linguistic and cultural ties between Baku and Istanbul, Azerbaijan had played a significant role in the development of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire through the works of writers such as Mirza Feth Ali Ahundzade (or Akhundov, to stick with the Russified version of the name). Other representatives of Azerbaijani intelligentsia, such as Hüseyinzade Ali Bey and Ahmet Agaoglu, were members of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in the late 19th—early 20th centuries. Furthermore, Hüseyinzade Ali Bey, of Azeri Turkish origin, was the first Turkish-speaking intellectual to call for the unification of all Turkish speaking peoples into a single Turkish nation—a project that inspired Ziya Gökalp, a principal Turkist ideologist in the Ottoman Empire (Arslan and Bagdadi 2005).

In the years leading up to World War I, Azeri and Turkish nationalist intellectuals worked together, with many opposing socialism and preferring nationalism to “unite

all the classes of a community" (Swietochowski 1988, p. 87). During that war, the region became a war zone among the rival Ottoman and Russian empires and with the October Revolution and ultimate Bolshevik takeover of the Russian Empire in 1917, Committee of Union and Progress government served as a mediator between Moscow and the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, all seeking independence from Russia in the Peace Conference of Batumi in May 1918. On September 16, 1918 Ottoman and Azerbaijani forces defeated a coalition of British-Armenian-Russian forces and occupied Baku, albeit for only a short period of time. By 1920, Azerbaijan had forcibly subordinated to Soviet Russia along with Georgia and Armenia. While with the 1921 Treaty of Kars, Turkey recognized Azerbaijan's incorporation into the USSR, the treaty also gave Turkey a special guarantor status over Nakhchivan, the exclave territory of Azerbaijan which shares a 9 km border with Turkey. [1]

Turkey and Azerbaijan had relatively few contacts during most of the Soviet period, but in the late 1960s, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel led a large delegation to Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, a visit that caused many in Turkey to believe that if Moscow were to loosen its grip on the Turkic republics, Ankara could become the major source of inspiration for them (Harris 1995). Subsequent events proved them to be correct. After visiting Moscow in March 1991, Turkish President Turgut Özal received Soviet agreement to re-establish a consulate general in Baku. With the collapse of the USSR, Turkey rapidly expanded its contacts with the Turkic republics, a trend that brought it into conflict with Moscow's desire to retain the dominant position there (Kardas 2010).

Turkey tried to avoid an open confrontation with the Russian Federation, but the Karabakh war forced Ankara to choose sides. In 1993, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, invoking the 1921 Kars Treaty, even declared that if Armenian forces entered Nakhchivan, Turkey would have no option but to respond (Harris 1995). Then, following the Armenian occupation of the Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan later in that year, Turkey officially closed its border with Armenia, and it remains closed to this day. At the same time, while Turkey did not officially provide military assistance to Azerbaijan, Turkish volunteers and informal aid from various Turkish sources did flow to Baku.

In support of Azerbaijan's quest for territorial integrity, Turkey became its most important partner, even to the point of upsetting Russia. Even Iran, which shares the Shia faith of the majority of Azerbaijanis, was reluctant to choose sides, preferring instead to promote economic ties with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a result, to this day, Iran and Azerbaijan at most have cordial relations, a situation that also reflects Tehran's concerns about the roughly 20 million Azeri Turks who live in northern Iran and Baku's wariness about Iran's religious influence on Azerbaijanis (Demirtepe 2011).

Turkey's support of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh war, of course, did have benefits, as the oil-rich Azerbaijani state needed to find outlets for getting its natural resources to the world market. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in fact made Turkey a major energy transit hub. That contributed to a growing closeness in relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, with scholars, tourists, and others going back and forth between the two Turkic countries. But this relationship was strained when Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party began its quest to implement Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's principle of zero-problems with neighbors.

The zero-problem policy, by definition, required that Turkey have no problems with Armenia, a neighbor with which it had no official trade or diplomatic relations. In 2009, once the news was leaked to Azerbaijan by the Russians that Turkey was having secret negotiations with Armenia and planned to open its borders, Azerbaijan began to question its relations with Turkey (Erhan 2010). Although Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sought to persuade Azerbaijan that these protocols could not be implemented without tangible advancement on the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan was very much offended by Turkey's actions (Eurasianet 2010).

Indeed, the 2009 Protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia made no mention of the Karabakh conflict, even though Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish President Abdullah Gül repeatedly stated that no advancement in normalizing relations with Armenia could be made without Armenia evacuating some of the districts of Azerbaijan that it had occupied (Today's Zaman 2009). After Turkey began negotiating with Armenia, Baku showed its displeasure by announcing that it was planning to boost the price of natural gas Turkey was receiving at outdated prices (Finchannel.com 2010). Erdogan immediately visited the Azerbaijani capital and again stated that there would be no change in Turkey's policy of full support for Azerbaijan and that Ankara would consult with Baku before taking any steps to fulfill the protocols. Several months later, in April 2010, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership agreement calling for further cooperation in military, political, security, humanitarian, economic and civil society issues (Zaman 2010). In this way, Azerbaijan underlined the limits of the AKP's zero-problem policy, having made it clear that at a time your neighbors have problems with each other, it may well be impossible to enjoy zero problems with both at the same time.

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Note

[1] Archives du Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Carton No. 7 N 1639, "Les Nouveaux Etats du Caucase, Interview of Ahmet Djevdet Bey, le premier secrétaire de la délégation de l'Azerbaïdjan à la conférence de Constantinople", 24 June 1918. As cited in Arslan and Bagdadi (2005).

AZERBAIJAN, TURKEY, AND ENERGY MARKETS: THE EVOLUTION OF A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

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Over the last 20 years, Azerbaijan and Turkey have experienced a complex evolution of their relationship in the energy sector, with now one and now the other taking the leading and with shifts sometimes coming because of changes in each of their capitals but more often happening because of pressure from third countries. The very complexity in this sector helps to provide texture to the overarching spirit of cooperation between the two Turkic states.

After Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country, Turkey was among the very first outside powers to get involved with Azerbaijan's energy sector. In early 1993, the Turkish state company BOTAS produced a map of potential export routes for Azerbaijani oil and gas and argued that the one with the greatest potential was between Baku and the Turkish port on the Mediterranean, Ceyhan. At the same

time, the other Turkish state oil company was part of the international consortium negotiating for the production of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields.

At that time, Turkey believed that it could benefit from the pro-Turkey and pro-Western foreign policy of President Abulfaz Elchibey, but his replacement by Heydar Aliyev in June 1993 changed the situation. President Aliyev insisted on a more balanced foreign policy, especially in the area of energy; and Azerbaijan thus stopped viewing Ankara as its only strategic partner. As a result, TPAO obtained less than a two percent share in the consortium of AIOC, a blow for Ankara's policies and one which many felt pointed to the direction Azerbaijan's foreign policy was likely to take (Hemming 1998).

Turkish leaders were especially resentful that President Aliyev planned to allocate five percent of AIOC to the Iranian oil company NIOC, a share more than twice the size of the one Turkey was being given. As a result, Ankara decided that its best hope for the future was to focus on transport routes, and in early 1995, it became a leading advocate of exporting Azerbaijani early oil through Georgia, an approach that Turkish officials believed would lead to the ultimate implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan project.

Baku's original AIOC plan collapsed because of pressure from the US government and the threat of US-based companies to pull out of AIOC if an Iranian firm were to be part of it. As a result, in early 1995, SOCAR sold half of its share in AIOC, with TPAO buying half of it, thus raising its AIOC share to 6.75 percent. But that still left open the question of the pipeline route that would carry the oil to foreign markets.

The founding president of AIOC, Terry Adams, favored using both the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk pipelines, even though after February 1995 the institution had to argue in public for the Russian option (Adams 2009). And after almost a year of tense discussions, President Heydar Aliyev opted for such a compromise and asked that early oil be sent both north and west. That constituted a major victory for Turkey; indeed, one could describe this decision as the high point of their energy involvement in Azerbaijan. Building on that success, Ankara succeeded in obtaining a nine percent share for TPAO in the giant gas field of Shah Deniz in June 1996.

As a result of these maneuvers and of Azerbaijan's growing income, Turkey became more an energy partner with Azerbaijan than an energy investor in that country. In November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Construction began in 2004 and was completed in June 2006. In the meantime, this new relationship opened the door for a gas line—the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)—thus paving the way for a new Silk Road.

While this East-West Energy Corridor reinforces political and economic cooperation between Ankara and Baku, it has not led to increasing Turkish investments in Azerbaijan. Turkey has been purchasing up to 6.6 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas a year, but Turkish companies play a largely passive role in Azerbaijan. Having the smallest share in Shah Deniz, TPAO never had a large voice on strategic matters. The situation has deteriorated since Ankara and Baku started to renegotiate the 2001 gas contract. Because TPAO is a state-owned company, other members of the operating consortium—led by BP—asked it to stay away from the discussions. As a result, within TPAO, no one is specifically in charge of Azerbaijani gas transportation issues anymore.

In the last few years, Turkish investments in the Azerbaijani energy sector have been quite limited. The two largest state-owned companies—BOTAS and TPAO—are not investing at all. Frustrated with the outcomes of Azerbaijani oil prospects, these companies are now looking at Iraq. BP and Statoil respectively own 25.5% of the Shah Deniz field, while the Iranian NICO and the Russian Lukoil have a 10% share each in it. According to this contract, it was planned that Azerbaijan and Turkey would renegotiate the purchasing price of Azerbaijani gas a year after the delivery began. This process thus started in April 2008.

Because of dry holes in Azerbaijan in the last decade, many of the majors have left the exploration area. Turkish companies have followed such a trend and rather focused on other components of Azerbaijan's energy sector. TEKFEN Construction, for example, has been regularly awarded contracts for the building or rehabilitation of energy infrastructures in Azerbaijan. It most notably built the gas export terminal of the SCP in Sangachal in 2007. A transportation company—IKRA—also acquired AzTransRail in 2006 (Lussac 2010). This Azerbaijani firm manages the transport of oil through the Baku-Batumi railroad. Despite this and despite increasing cooperation between Baku and Ankara, new Turkish investments in the Azerbaijani energy sector have remained relatively small during the last few years.

There are two main reasons for this outcome. On the one hand, only upstream gas is still attractive in Azerbaijan, and no Turkish company has the technological capacity or financial resources to produce gas in the challenging Caspian environment. And on the other hand, Turkey's other neighbors have become more attractive investment areas, with Iraq having become a major site of Turkish investment given its huge gas potential.

Turkey's limited investment in Azerbaijan has followed limited Azerbaijani investment in Turkey for the first decade of their relations. Until about 2005, Azerbaijan was unable to invest in Turkey, especially in the energy sector. Until 2000, most of the oil payment bonuses were allocated to compensate state budget deficits (Bagirov 2007). And after the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan began functioning, some oil revenues were used to support the Azerbaijani economy. But, becoming the largest contributor to the state budget, SOCAR used its increasing net profits to expand beyond Azerbaijan's borders.

SOCAR first started to invest in Georgia, but in the last several years, it has been investing more often in Turkey. In late 2006, for example, it formed a strategic partnership with Turcas Petrol, which is deeply involved into the Turkish petroleum distribution market. The two companies then set up a joint-venture called STEAS (SOCAR Turcas Enerji AS) in order to pursue opportunities in Turkey. The first of these came in July 2008 when the Turkish government decided to privatize half of the petrochemical company PETKIM. A consortium consisting of SOCAR, Turcas and the Saudi company Injaz sought to purchase a 51% share, but its bid of \$2.04 billion fell short. Subsequently, however, the Turkish Privatization Administration (OIB) decided to reverse its decision and gave this consortium the victory, even if Injaz left the project.

PETKIM is supposed to become the cornerstone of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey. STEAS has launched an ambitious business plan for the company for the next decade, including the construction of a new refinery in Aliaga, with a capacity up to 200,000 barrels a day. This four billion US dollar plant should enter service in 2014.

PETKIM will also diversify its petrochemical production in the hopes of earning the largest market share in Turkey. STEAS fits into a larger strategy aiming at making SOCAR the leader in petrochemicals in the Black Sea region. In April 2010, President Aliyev issued a decree incorporating the state-owned petrochemical company Azerkimya into SOCAR.

Azerbaijan thus hopes to improve the efficiency of its company. In this perspective, it appointed Mukhtar Babayev, former vice-president of SOCAR in charge of ecology, as the new president of Azerkimya. By 2020, this company should closely cooperate with PETKIM, thereby optimizing the cost and production of petrochemicals in the region. In the meantime, SOCAR Trading, established in December 2007 in Switzerland, is in charge of purchasing naphtha for both firms. In this way, PETKIM stands in the middle of an ambitious SOCAR strategy for the petrochemical market in the Black Sea. Thanks to its partnership with STEAS, SOCAR may play an even stronger role in the Turkish energy market in the out years.

In December 2010, the Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) granted a 30-year gas marketing license to STEAS. This is the logical outcome of the memorandum of understanding signed between SOCAR and BOTAS in early June 2010. It then stated that the Azerbaijani company would be allowed to deliver up to 1.2 bcm of gas a year to PETKIM and the Turkish domestic consumers. The remainder will then be sold by STEAS to Turkish consumers. This is a rare privilege for a foreign company while local Turkish companies and state monopoly still dominate the Turkish gas distribution market and is a reflection of the difficulties in negotiations about Azerbaijani gas supplies to Turkey and Europe. Azerbaijan would have linked low purchasing gas prices to Turkey and the right to directly sell gas to Turkish and European consumers. It obtained both according to the memorandum. Therefore, Azerbaijan is experiencing a new dawn in Turkey. After settling down in Georgia, SOCAR is likely to hold an increasingly active role with the Turkish energy markets, either in the refining sector, the petrochemical one or even the gas one (Roberts 2010).

The shift in the investment practices in both Azerbaijan and Turkey reflects the new economic position of these countries. After failing to economically establish in the post-Soviet space, Turkey has progressively limited its energy investments in this region, favoring cooperation with the hydrocarbons-producing states. In the meantime, recovering from economic and political meltdown, Azerbaijan has begun to invest in the energy sector beyond its borders, including in Turkey. From a Turkish investments recipient, Azerbaijan has been transformed into an investment-maker in Turkey. Such a trend falls into the framework of the rising regional economic leadership held by Baku in the Black Sea region. It also lays the basis for a new relationship based on energy partnering.

With the completion of the BTC pipeline in 2006, Azerbaijan and Turkey became energy partners. Subsequently, the SCP pipeline helped them to reach a new level of cooperation with SOCAR being allowed to sell 1.2 bcm a year to Turkish consumers through its STEAS and 2 bcm a year to either Bulgaria or Syria. The next step will be the implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad and the Southern Gas Corridor. The former is scheduled to be completed by late 2012. It aims at linking Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and, more broadly, Central Asia and Europe. Mostly funded by Azerbaijan, this project will reinforce the energy partnership between Ankara and Baku.

At present, three major projects—the Interconnection Turkey-Greece-Italy, the Nabucco project and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline—are underway that will further link Azerbaijan and Turkey in the energy sector. All of them require an expansion of the capacity of the SCP pipeline to at more than 20 bcm a year, and that too will increase the energy partnership between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In this situation, while it may be unlikely that Turkey will be a major investor in the Azerbaijani energy market anytime soon, Baku almost certainly will continue to play an active role in that market in Turkey.

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A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

President Ilham Aliyev, on the occasion of the 93rd anniversary of the formation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, says that Azerbaijan "lives under conditions of war. The war is not yet ended. Only its first stage is completed, and a country living under conditions of war must devote attention to the building of the army." In other remarks, he reaffirms that "the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is not, was not and will not be a theme of negotiations. However, this occupation cannot last for long" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275340.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that the Kazan summit was "one of the longest" of such meetings among the presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia, but that "unfortunately," despite progress on some issues, on a number of "principle questions, we were still not able to achieve a compromise resolution because the

Armenian side required maximum concessions from Azerbaijan by distorting the essence of the negotiation process begun seven years ago” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275307.html>).

Deputy Prime Minister Ali Hasanov says that providing Azerbaijani citizenship to ethnic Azerbaijanis who had to flee from Armenia will not create any problems for their return to their former place of residence after the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/273535.html>).

II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan

Michal Labenda, Poland’s ambassador to Baku, says that “the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is not frozen; what is frozen is its resolution” (<http://news.day.az/politics/276059.html>).

The US Department of State says that it is disappointed that the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia were unable to reach agreement on the basic principles for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at their Kazan meeting, but expressed the hope that they will be able to build on the measure of agreement they have achieved so far at future meetings (<http://news.day.az/politics/275547.html>).

Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad tells Azerbaijan’s National Security Minister, Eldar Makhmudov, that Tehran and Baku will be expanding cooperation in the struggle against terrorism (<http://news.day.az/politics/275328.html>).

III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy

June 29

President Ilham Aliyev tells Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian president, that “Azerbaijan supports the Palestinian state in all international organizations” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275718.html>).

Novruz Mammadov, the head of the foreign relations department of the Presidential Administration, says that Armenia’s refusal to negotiate in good faith is “leading Armenia into a catastrophic dead end” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275879.html>).

Ali Hasanov, head of the social-political department of the Presidential Administration, says that “the unconstructiveness of Armenia is preventing moving the talks from a stalemate” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275954.html>).

The Defense Ministry announces that it will provide training for officers from Kazakhstan (<http://news.day.az/politics/275829.html>).

Azerbaijan and Moldova sign a cooperation agreement on the provision of welfare payments (<http://news.day.az/economy/275842.html>).

Movlud Chavushoglu, the head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that PACE “supports dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia and

hopes that in the future it will lead to concrete results”
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275860.html>).

Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that “American-Azerbaijani relations are strong and will strengthen even more”
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275812.html>).

June 28

President Ilham Aliyev receives Abdul Hamid, Pakistan’s ambassador to Baku, on the occasion of the latter’s completion of his appointment in Azerbaijan
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275663.html>).

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva receives the wives of the ambassadors accredited to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/275719.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov tells the Astana ministerial of the Organization of the Islamic Conference that “thousands of monuments of the history and culture of Islamic heritage are being destroyed on the occupied territories” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275697.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov tells the Astana ministerial of the Organization of the Islamic Conference that there must be “a struggle against religious slander and the exacerbation of religious hatred”
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275714.html>).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov and his Russian counterpart Rashid Nurgaliyev sign a cooperation agreement in Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/275599.html>).

Eynulla Madatly, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Kyiv, visits Dnepropetrovsk oblast of Ukraine and meets with its head, Aleksandr Vilkul, to discuss cooperation
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275603.html>).

Farid Shafiyev, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Canada, visits Nunavut and other north-western portions of that country (<http://news.day.az/politics/275554.html>).

Nazim Ibrahimov, chairman of the State Committee for Work with the Diaspora, says that “the Azerbaijani diaspora is capable of reducing the threat posed by the activity of the Armenian lobby” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275664.html>).

Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, says that Tehran is ready to play a mediating role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275593.html>).

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the executive secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, expresses concern about the lack of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/275654.html>).

The French Foreign Ministry says that the results of the Kazan summit among the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia “must not be considered insignificant” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275589.html>).

June 27

President Ilham Aliyev receives Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev (<http://news.day.az/politics/275540.html>).

Elin Suleymanov, Azerbaijani consul general in Los Angeles, announces that the Californian city of Monterey has become a sister city of Lankaran (<http://news.day.az/politics/275438.html>).

Albania eliminates the visa requirement for Azerbaijanis visiting that country for less than 90 days (<http://news.day.az/politics/275537.html>).

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signs the law of ratification on the border treaty between Russia and Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/275520.html>).

The Turkish and Azerbaijani communities in the US send a letter to President Barak Obama, Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton objecting to US use of the term "population of Nagorno-Karabakh" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275474.html>).

June 26

Fazail Agamaly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the military parade shows that the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan have the ability to liberate the occupied territories" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275366.html>).

Aydyn Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Azerbaijani army is "one of the strongest armies of Europe" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275364.html>).

June 25

President Ilham Aliyev receives Massimo Moratti, the owner of the "Inter" Milan football club (<http://news.day.az/politics/275286.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that the Kazan summit was "one of the longest" of such meetings among the presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia but that "unfortunately," despite progress on some issues, on a number of "principle questions, we were still not able to achieve a compromise resolution because the Armenian side required maximum concessions from Azerbaijan by distorting the essence of the negotiation process begun seven years ago" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275307.html>).

Aydyn Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Azerbaijani army is "a measure of the strength of the state" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275306.html>).

Elman Mammadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "in Azerbaijan, an army corresponding to world standards has been created" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275284.html>).

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tells Azerbaijan's National Security Minister, Eldar Makhmudov, that Tehran and Baku will be expanding cooperation in the struggle against terrorism (<http://news.day.az/politics/275328.html>). Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, reiterates this point in a meeting

with Javanshir Akhundov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tehran (<http://news.day.az/politics/275336.html>).

Audronius Azubalis, Lithuanian foreign minister and OSCE chairman-in-office, says that the Kazan summit shows that it is important to continue efforts to achieve "an all embracing peaceful resolution" of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/275311.html>).

Movlud Chavushoglu, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that although "Armenia is against the sub-committee on Karabakh, it must participate in it" (<http://news.day.az/politics/275196.html>).

Iranian officials announce that Baku and Tehran have signed a protocol on the use of the water and energy resources of the Araz River which marks the land border between the two countries (<http://news.day.az/economy/275251.html>).

June 24

At the conclusion of their meeting in Kazan, President Ilham Aliyev and his Russian and Armenian counterparts issue a joint statement noting that they had not achieved agreement on the basic principles of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but had made "progress" toward that goal, and the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia increased their gratitude to the leaders of the Russian Federation, the US and France for their support of the negotiating process (<http://news.day.az/politics/275129.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev meets with the Minsk Group co-chairs in Kazan (<http://news.day.az/politics/275179.html>).

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva is presented with the gold medal at the 22nd Annual Crans Montana forum in Brussels (<http://news.day.az/politics/275175.html>).

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva tells a meeting of the Crans Montana Forum that "relations between the EU countries and Azerbaijan are based on mutual profit and respect" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274993.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov says that Gabala has "great importance for Azerbaijan and also plays an enormous role in providing security for Russia" after Andrew Shapiro, US assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, says that the US may continue its dialogue with Azerbaijan on it (<http://news.day.az/politics/275131.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov says the next round of security talks between Azerbaijan and the United States will take place in Washington in 2012 (<http://news.day.az/politics/275127.html>).

The Ecology and Natural Resources Ministry dismisses as without foundation Iranian complaints that "a large part of the contamination" of the Caspian Sea is the result of Azerbaijani activities (<http://news.day.az/politics/275100.html>).

Mubariz Gurbanly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party believes that "the result of the Kazan meeting of presidents creates the basis for

the next stage of the negotiating process”
(<http://news.day.az/politics/275281.html>).

Elman Mammadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the Council of Europe shows a lack of respect in itself by allowing “a military criminal” like the president of Armenia to address it (<http://news.day.az/politics/274771.html>).

Azerbaijan accedes to the European Landscape Convention
(<http://news.day.az/economy/275022.html>).

US President Barak Obama calls President Ilham Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan to urge them to find a compromise at their Kazan meeting (<http://news.day.az/politics/274944.html>).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy telephones his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan and urges him to accept the basic principles for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/275005.html>).

Robert Bradtke, the US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, says that the sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are “at the most important stage of the negotiating process” (<http://news.day.az/politics/275089.html>).

The Turkish embassy in Baku says that media reports that a Turkish firm is providing construction materials for the building of an airport in Khankandi are untrue (<http://news.day.az/politics/275126.html>).

June 23

President Ilham Aliyev says that “the personal participation of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev gives a chance to the sides for coming to an agreement.” In other comments, he says that he is “optimistic” about that possibility, that for Baku, there is no particular problem “to begin serious programs for the economic and social development of Nagorno-Karabakh” and that Azerbaijan is currently spending ten times as much on its armed services as Armenia is on its military (<http://news.day.az/politics/274659.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva participate in a working dinner at the Crans Montana Forum in Brussels
(<http://news.day.az/politics/274537.html>).

Defense Minister Safar Abiyev receives US Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste Wallander (<http://news.day.az/politics/274866.html>).

Polad Bulbuloglu, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Moscow, says that Azerbaijan like any other country which wants to live in peace must prepare its military in order to be able to defend itself and be respected
(<http://news.day.az/politics/274841.html>).

Vilayat Guliyev, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Budapest, opens a photographic exhibit on the common ancestors of Azerbaijanis and Hungarians
(<http://news.day.az/society/274939.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says it will check to see if media representatives from Georgia have travelled to the occupied territories and take measures if that turns out to be the case (<http://news.day.az/politics/274836.html>).

The Permanent Representation of Azerbaijan to the United Nations says that the member states of the UN support Azerbaijan's position on territorial integrity and hence on Nagorno-Karabakh (<http://news.day.az/politics/274783.html>).

Lt. Gen. Vahid Aliyev, assistant to President Ilham Aliyev for defense issues, says that Azerbaijan's armed forces are "completely prepared for the liberation of our occupied lands" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274740.html>).

Bahar Muradova, the vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says high level international pressure "gives hope that the Kazan meeting could be a turning point in the resolution of the conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274900.html>).

Asaf Hajiyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, is confirmed as head of the international relations department of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party (<http://news.day.az/politics/274930.html>).

Mazahir Efendiyev, the head of the office of national propaganda against narcotics, says that Azerbaijan has joined the Container Program in order to block shipments of narcotics via the Caspian Sea (<http://news.day.az/politics/274892.html>).

Vidadi Salakhov, the president of the Union of Cultural Centers of Azerbaijanis in Kazakhstan, says that "the greatest contribution of the diaspora is to tell the entire world about the realities of Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/society/274933.html>).

Azerbaijan can develop 19 of its 30 islands in the Caspian Sea for tourism, Baku State University expert says (<http://news.day.az/economy/274867.html>).

The Russian foreign ministry releases a statement saying that the Kazan summit of the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia will play a significant role in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/274825.html>).

The US Department of State says that there currently exists "a definite possibility" for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and calls on the sides to "use this chance" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274810.html>).

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, leader of the opposition Armenian National Congress and former president of Armenia, says that if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, "on the next day the borders with Turkey will be opened" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274796.html>).

Iraqi officials say both Azerbaijan and Turkey are seeking to open a consulate in Kerbala (<http://news.day.az/politics/274787.html>).

June 22

President Ilham Aliyev meets in Brussels with José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission; Herman van Rompuy, the president of the Council of the European Union; Jerzy Buzek, the president of the European Parliament; and

Štefan Füle, EU commissioner for enlargement and European neighborhood policy (<http://news.day.az/politics/274628.html>).

Deputy Prime Minister Ali Hasanov says that the United Nations does not include in its reports information about the illegal production of narcotics on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/274598.html>).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov receives the European Parliament delegation visiting Baku to take part in the 11th session of the Committee of European Union-Azerbaijani Parliamentary Cooperation (<http://news.day.az/politics/274543.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that it is checking on the accuracy of the statement of Andrey Gusev, the head of the administration of military cooperation of Russia with CIS countries, that surplus weapons and ammunition at the Gumri base will be transferred to Armenia (<http://news.day.az/politics/274750.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that there were no discussions about invitations of Azerbaijani officials to the United States during Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov's recent visit to Washington (<http://news.day.az/politics/274697.html>).

Namig Aliyev, incoming Azerbaijani ambassador to Chisinau, presents his credentials to Marian Lupu, the speaker of the Moldavian parliament and acting president of Moldova (<http://news.day.az/politics/274748.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, urges PACE to push Armenia toward a legitimate settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/274577.html>).

Ziyad Samadzade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that it is "absolutely illegal" for Armenia to exploit the natural resources on the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/274527.html>).

Arif Rahimzade, a Milli Majlis deputy, takes part in a United Nations—CIS Parliamentary Assembly seminar in St. Petersburg on the defense of reproductive rights (<http://news.day.az/politics/274520.html>).

Aytan Mustafayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Yerevan is stealing from not only its own citizens" but from others as well (<http://news.day.az/politics/274532.html>).

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, OSCE secretary general, says that "the meeting in Kazan can lead to the resolution" of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/274685.html>).

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan says that Yerevan is "dissatisfied" with the renewal of the activity of the Nagorno-Karabakh subcommittee of PACE (<http://news.day.az/politics/274638.html>).

Todd Young, a Republican representative from Indiana, becomes the 41st member of the Congressional Working Group on Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/274684.html>).

Catherine Boynton, a US State Department official responsible for supervising the liquidation of mines and other weapon systems, visits Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/274664.html>).

Russia's Federation Council completes the ratification of the September 2010 border accord between Russia and Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/274594.html>).

Fifty NGOs from the European Union and Azerbaijan take part in a seminar on civil society and human rights in Baku (<http://news.day.az/society/274640.html>).

June 21

The Foreign Ministry says that "any form of activity on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan without the agreement of official Baku and permission from our state is illegal" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274476.html>).

Emil Karimov, Azerbaijani ambassador to Sofia, meets with the chairman of the Bulgarian Popular Assembly, Tsetska Tsacheva (<http://news.day.az/politics/274341.html>).

Samad Seyidov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that "the non-participation of the Armenian side in the work of the sub-committee creates problems only for them" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274288.html>).

Rafael Huseynov, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, prepares a report for discussion in PACE about "military conflicts and the environment" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274450.html>).

Bayram Safarov, head of the Azerbaijan Community of Nagorno-Karabakh, says that "Armenians who were living in Nagorno-Karabakh before 1992 and their children may receive documentation and become citizens of Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274359.html>).

Eldar Guliyev, executive director of the All-Russian Azerbaijani Congress and former permanent representative of Azerbaijan to the United States, says that the Minsk Group has had "absolutely no impact" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273876.html>).

Egemen Bagysh, head of the Turkish delegation for talks on European Union accession, says that the Armenian-Turkish border will be opened "immediately after" Armenia and Azerbaijan solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/274518.html>).

Milan Cabrnoc, co-chair of the EU-Azerbaijan parliamentary cooperation committee, says that the European Union considers Azerbaijan to be "its close partner" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274428.html>).

June 20

Vice Prime Minister Ali Hasanov says that the world will eventually recognize what Azerbaijan now faces when Armenians make "pretensions to France and California" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274295.html>).

Vagif Sadykhov, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Rome, says that the main task before Azerbaijan and Italy is to increase the ties to a still higher level of strategic cooperation (<http://news.day.az/politics/274173.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that Armenia's actions against the decisions of PACE and its bureau demonstrate that "the Armenian side does not intend to take any steps toward the resolution of the conflict" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274282.html>).

Mubariz Gurbanly, deputy executive secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, says that Russia is changing its position in the South Caucasus in order to show that "the application of force in this or that region creates a boomerang effect" and that this shift benefits Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/274235.html>).

Samad Seyidov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that "the Armenian delegation has refused to take part in sessions of the PACE sub-committee on Karabakh" (<http://news.day.az/politics/274327.html>).

Asef Hajiyeu, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the cause of Armenia's economic difficulties is Yerevan's war of conquest against Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/273992.html>).

Grigory Karasin, Russia's deputy foreign minister, telephones his Azerbaijani counterpart Khalaf Khalafov (<http://news.day.az/politics/274353.html>).

Movlud Chavushoglu, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is "closely connected" with the next meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia (<http://news.day.az/politics/274249.html>).

The European Neighborhood Program announces that from now on it will offer aid to its partner countries on the basis of the principle that the more reforms are carried out, the greater the assistance the ENP will provide (<http://news.day.az/politics/274302.html>).

June 19

President Ilham Aliyev receives a telephone call from Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (<http://news.day.az/politics/274090.html>).

June 18

Ombudsman Elmira Suleymanova hosts her counterparts from Europe and Asia at the 9th Baku International Conference of Ombudsmen, on the subject of "The Cultural Rights of National Minorities and Migrants" (<http://news.day.az/society/273999.html>).

Azay Guliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that conditions in Armenia are now so bad that President Serzh Sargsyan is afraid of being overthrown (<http://news.day.az/politics/274212.html>).

Rabiyat Aslanova, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Turkey is displaying firmness on principled questions in relation to Armenia" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273891.html>).

Bilge Cankorel, head of the OSCE Baku Office, attends a reception in his honor on the occasion of the completion of his assignment in the Azerbaijani capital (<http://news.day.az/politics/273901.html>).

June 17

Vice Prime Minister Ali Hasanov says that "until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, Azerbaijan should cooperate with international humanitarian organizations" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273693.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that an agreement between Azerbaijan and Spain has been prepared that would end double taxation on incomes by citizens and businesses in one of these countries in the other (<http://news.day.az/economy/273753.html>).

Education Minister Misir Mardanov receives his Georgian counterpart Dmitry Shashkin (<http://news.day.az/society/273840.html>).

Bahar Muradova, vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says that the US also ought to do more in the area of human rights (<http://news.day.az/politics/273700.html>).

Mubariz Gurbanly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the main question for Azerbaijan" regarding Nabucco is the protection of its national interests (<http://news.day.az/politics/273884.html>).

Fazail Agamaly, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Turkey will not betray the interests of Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273756.html>).

Azerbaijani Milli Majlis deputies participate in a session of the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly in Kazan devoted to culture, information, tourism and sports (<http://news.day.az/politics/273667.html>).

Vahid Ahmadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "in Armenia, corruption is flourishing, there is no stability, and all major business is concentrated in the hands" of the political elite. As a result, "businessmen in Armenia have nothing to do" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273588.html>).

Ali Ahmadov, the deputy chairman of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, says that the statement of Thomas Melia, US deputy assistant secretary of state, that Azerbaijan needs to do more in the area of human rights could be applied to the United States as well (<http://news.day.az/politics/273689.html>).

The Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences and the French CNRS announce a program of scientific cooperation (<http://news.day.az/society/273810.html>).

The Russian Duma ratifies the September 2010 Russian-Azerbaijani border accord (<http://news.day.az/politics/273889.html>).

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, tells Khazar Ibrahim, permanent representative of Azerbaijan to NATO, that the Western alliance is interested in "the further development of partnership with Azerbaijan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273872.html>).

An expert delegation completes its five-day visit to Baku to investigate the effectiveness of European Union assistance to Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/273682.html>).

Experts on migration from the European Union visit Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/273887.html>).

Igor Levitin, Russian transportation minister, says that as part of Moscow's talks concerning accession to the World Trade Organization, officials are examining the possibility of opening Russia's domestic waterways to foreign-flag ships. If that happens, he says, Azerbaijan would be able to send its ships from the Caspian into the Russian interior on a regular basis (<http://news.day.az/economy/273749.html>).

Igor Levitin, Russia's transportation minister, presents to Baku Moscow's proposals on easing the shipment of Azerbaijani goods into the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (<http://news.day.az/economy/273731.html>).

Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Baku, says that the educational exchange programs between Azerbaijan and the United States lay the foundations for friendly relations and mutual assistance (<http://news.day.az/society/273894.html>).

June 16

Deputy Prime Minister Ali Hasanov says that providing Azerbaijani citizenship to ethnic Azerbaijanis who had to flee from Armenia will not create any problems for their return to their former place of residence after the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (<http://news.day.az/politics/273535.html>).

Deputy Prime Minister Ali Hasanov says that international organizations are guilty of double standards because they routinely address Azerbaijan and Armenia together even though Azerbaijan fulfills all the requirements of these groups and Armenia refuses to do so (<http://news.day.az/politics/273525.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov meets in Madrid with Spain's State Secretary for Foreign Trade Alfredo Bonet Baiget (<http://news.day.az/politics/273558.html>).

Interior Minister Ramil Usubov receives Luc Truyens, Belgium's ambassador to Baku (<http://news.day.az/politics/273628.html>).

Eldar Ibrahimov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Azerbaijan will use the provisions of the international convention on landscapes to block the exploitation by the Armenians of Azerbaijani resources in the occupied territories (<http://news.day.az/politics/273542.html>).

Bakhtiyar Aliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the development of Armenia depends on Azerbaijan" and that "the reason for the exodus of population from Armenia is not only economic but also political" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273357.html>).

Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Armenia lives by medieval myths" in terms of its understanding of its place in the world (<http://news.day.az/politics/273373.html>).

Azi Aslanov, head of the Main Administration of the Interior Ministry for the Struggle Against Illegal Drugs, takes part in a meeting of Caspian region experts on that subject in the Iranian city of Bender (<http://news.day.az/politics/274322.html>).

Azerbaijani and Italian parliamentarians discuss cooperation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (<http://news.day.az/politics/273534.html>).

The Baku Slavic University announces that it will establish a Hungarian center and the Corvinus University in Budapest says it will create an Azerbaijani center (<http://news.day.az/society/273568.html>).

The Russian foreign ministry says that the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia "will take a decision on the draft of the bases of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at their meeting in Kazan" (<http://news.day.az/politics/273566.html>).

A European Union delegation of migration experts visits IDP settlements in Azerbaijan (<http://news.day.az/politics/273540.html>).

Note to Readers

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