



## School of International Affairs

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### Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

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[adabiweekly@ada.edu.az](mailto:adabiweekly@ada.edu.az)

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#### **AZERBAIJAN AND PAKISTAN**

An Interview with H.E. Mr. Abdul Hamid  
Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the Republic of Azerbaijan

February 12, 2010  
Baku, Azerbaijan

*Azerbaijan and the World:* What do you see as the most significant characteristic of the relationship between Pakistan and Azerbaijan?

*Ambassador Hamid:* The core of relations between Pakistan and Azerbaijan is the existence of the highest level of political and diplomatic relations between the two countries. In both countries, there exists a tremendous goodwill for each other and both have supported each other in times of trial and tribulation. This goodwill is not only at the level of their leadership and government, but also among their population

at large. Our countries have a lot of similarities and have gone through almost similar crises in their post-independence periods.

*AIW:* How have Azerbaijan-Pakistan relations evolved in the post-Soviet era and how would you describe their current status?

*Amb. Hamid:* Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize independence of Azerbaijan on the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. It was a time when Azerbaijan was facing its worst crisis and was fighting for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan's recognition of Azerbaijan's independence was prompt and timely. Similarly, Pakistan played a pivotal role in 1993 in adopting UN Security Council Resolutions in support of Azerbaijan and its territorial integrity. Interestingly, Pakistan was a Non-Permanent member of the UN Security Council at the time and used its influence to support Azerbaijan. Similarly, Pakistan played an important role in the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 10693 supporting Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, one which was passed in March 2008.

Pakistan has trained a number of both civil and military personnel in a number of areas like military training, training of diplomats in its foreign service academy, revenue collection, banking, rail transport, postal, life insurance and range of other services.

Our countries enjoy excellent relations, and yet, there is potential to further improve upon in certain areas like trade and economics.

*AIW:* What is the state of energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and Pakistan?

*Amb. Hamid:* Pakistan's economy had been growing rapidly, although its growth slowed down over the past few couple of years. In the coming years, the economy is expected to accelerate again and create more demand for energy supply. At present, no significant cooperation exists in the energy sector between Pakistan and Azerbaijan. One of the reasons for this could of course be the distance between the two countries.

*AIW:* What are the main components of trade and areas of cooperation between Azerbaijan and Pakistan?

*Amb. Hamid:* Although we enjoy very close friendly relations at diplomatic level, these close ties have not been translated into significant commercial gains. Currently, the trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Pakistan stands at about six million US dollars. We are mostly exporting rice, industrial lubricants, medicines, polyethylene products, textiles and garments. However, we feel there is a lot of untapped potential for promotion of bilateral trade. One way of enhancing the interaction between the business communities of our two countries could be through more frequent trade delegations and assisting businesspersons with issues like visa and targeted market research.

*AIW:* What is the state of bilateral cooperation in the military field?

*Amb. Hamid:* Defence Cooperation between Pakistan and Azerbaijan is governed by a bilateral agreement which provides for cooperation in almost every field, including training and defence production. Furthermore, both countries sign a defence cooperation plan every year covering activities and events scheduled for the

following year. There is a regular exchange of high level (military) visits to both countries. So far, Pakistan has trained 75 Azerbaijani defence officials gratis, while 19 are currently undergoing training in different military institutions in Pakistan. Similarly, we have a robust cooperation in the defence industries.

*AIW:* What is the state of bilateral cultural and social cooperation?

*Amb. Hamid:* Pakistan and Azerbaijan are bound by historical ties of a common religion and various cultural affinities. However, during the Soviet era, these links were temporarily severed. The post-Soviet period has seen revival of these cultural links and efforts are underway to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the field of culture. Both countries acknowledge the fact that people-to-people interaction plays an important role in bringing the nations together.

*AIW:* Do you see any hurdles that Pakistan and Azerbaijan will have to overcome in order to improve their relationship? What are the plans for the future?

*Amb. Hamid:* Pakistan and Azerbaijan have excellent bilateral cooperation in different fields except in the field of trade and economics. We feel that relations in trade and economics are not commensurate with the potential and the level of relations between the two countries in other fields. The current international relations are shaped by bilateral trade volume and economic cooperation. Pakistan feels that both our countries will have to do a lot in this regard. So we can say, that not having addressed relations in the field of trade and economics up to their potential may be regarded as hurdle to further improve relations between the two countries.

*AIW:* Some analysts have suggested that 2009 was dominated by an effort of all countries in the region to adjust to the new conditions created by the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. How well do you think Baku has done in this regard?

*Amb. Hamid:* Yes, of course, the war between Russia and Georgia and subsequent events, have led the countries in the region to adjust to the new realities. In my opinion, the policy pursued by Azerbaijan is pragmatic and in line with the realities in the region, as no country in the Caucasian region can ignore the neighbouring countries and their regional politics. Azerbaijan has successfully and skilfully maintained the balance.

*AIW:* Given your own experience, what advice would you give to young Azerbaijanis beginning their careers in diplomacy?

*Amb. Hamid:* The diplomatic career is the world's best profession. A diplomat always gets opportunities to rub shoulders with the elite of the world, and indeed diplomacy is the first line of defence for any country. For wars don't result in the solution of different issues faced by the world and, ultimately, countries have to seek negotiated solutions through diplomacy. I would like to advise young entrants to broaden their horizon and to get to know world history and politics by finding and keeping abreast of relevant literature. As this career provides the opportunity to move around in the world on different postings and assignments, the knowledge of various languages would always be an added value for interaction. Thus, they should concentrate to have a working knowledge of at least two major languages. I would like young people to feel encouraged to join this elite profession. The

diplomatic profession is to be full of challenges, opportunities and privileges throughout their career.

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## **TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: FROM "EITHER-OR" TO "BOTH AND"**

Paul Goble  
Publications Advisor  
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

The evolution of discussions about the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the last 15 years provides some important lessons about the complex and evolving interrelationship of two principles of international law: the territorial integrity of states and the right of nations to self-determination.

In the early years of that conflict, both sides argued that the conflict in the South Caucasus required a decision as to which of these principles was the more important, with those who believed in the primacy of the territorial integrity of states generally dismissive of the right of nations to self-determination and those who believed in the right of nations to self-determination equally dismissive of the principle of the territorial integrity of states.

These polar positions, of course, reflected the specific features of the immediate post-Soviet period. On the one hand, Azerbaijan like the other former Soviet republics and like many powers around the world had a vested interest in arguing that the maintenance of territorial integrity of states against challenges based on claims by minorities for self-determination was absolutely critical for stability and development. And they did so even though, as the most thoughtful participants acknowledged, these states themselves had burst on the international scene on the basis of the principle of the right of nations to self-determination.

From the perspective of the governments of the new countries, the paramount question was this: how could the international community expect them to survive if it did not close the door to ethnically-based challenges to their borders or even existence?

And on the other, ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan, like minorities in other post-Soviet states, had an obvious interest in arguing that self-determination as a principle was more important than territorial integrity – not least because they could see around them the results of massive claim of the rights of various peoples to self-determination against the assertion of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. And they took this position even though they too concluded that without effective state power, something they sought for themselves, there could be no hope for the nations on whose behalf they spoke.

Consequently, from the perspective of the minority nationalities, the overriding question was entirely different: how could the international community deny them the very right to self-determination that it had clearly recognized and supported in the case of the former Soviet republics?

Given these arguments, it is not surprising how the sides formed up around the world. The international community, a euphemism for the states of the world, came down hard on the side of territorial integrity either because its members faced or feared challenges to themselves or because they were fearful of the way in which any recognition of the right of nations to self-determination except post facto and in rare instances could trigger instability over large swaths of the world, particularly in what many chose to call "the newly independent states" of Eurasia. Indeed, as early as February 1992, the US government declared that it would support "no secession from secession" in the post-Soviet world, a statement that called into question what it had done in recognizing the former Soviet republics but that also indicated it would oppose any acts in the future in that region based on claims of national self-determination.

Meanwhile, many in the human rights and academic communities plumped for the other side in this debate, arguing that right of self-determination must take precedence over territorial integrity not so much because the world had just recognized the consequences of the former but much more because of the conviction that the rights of people, both individually and collectively, are more important than lines on the map. And consequently, unlike the governments which form the international community, they were deeply skeptical about any shift that appeared to downplay the rights of people at the expense of elevating the rights of the state.

The author of these lines, as some readers know, was among the latter camp. Having spent much of my career focusing on the way in which the lines Moscow drew in the South Caucasus were designed to create imbalances and hatreds, with none of the peoples involved getting the borders any of them believed were properly theirs and all of them seeing territories they were convinced belonged to them being handed over to the control of others. I was convinced that in the fluid situation that existed in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there would have to be border changes to achieve peace. Without them, I was certain, there would either be serious continuing ethnic problems with minorities mistreated or forced to move or the renewal of hostilities when the losing side felt it had a chance to win. In short, I believed that without changing the borders, the best that could be hoped for would be an unstable armistice rather than a genuine peace (Goble 1992).

In short, all concerned with this issue almost two decades ago conceived it as a classical case of "either/or" – either those involved must subordinate the right of nations to self-determination to the principle of the territorial integrity of states, with all the risks to human rights and democratic development that could entail, or subordinate the principle of the territorial integrity of states to the right of nations to self-determine, even at the risk of the spread of instability within existing states or among them.

Over the last 15 years, however, three developments have pushed those who would like to see some resolution of the Karabakh conflict from this "either/or" paradigm to a "both and" one, toward the conviction that the only way forward will inevitably involve the respect of both principles – however naïve or even impossible that may sound to anyone who has been involved with or tracked this intractable conflict and however many steps those on both side of the "either/or" divide will have to make in order to achieve this outcome.

The first of these developments is that the situation in the post-Soviet world has become distinctly less fluid. The kinds of things that seemed possible or even natural in 1991 now seem farfetched and dangerous. If the international community welcomed or at least sanctioned the disintegration of the Soviet Union, its members are certain to oppose any diplomatically arranged change – even if once such a change happens through force, they are likely to find ways to live with a world of “partially recognized” states.

That shift has given aid and comfort to the governments of the post-Soviet states who regularly invoke the principle of the territorial integrity of states – even as it has led many in the human rights world to despair about the future of minorities now that it appears the ultimate sanction of such minorities against the powers that be under which they live appears to have been taken away from them by the same community many of whose members have benefited from that very right.

The second development, however, has had exactly the opposite effect. Far more than was the case before the end of the Cold War, European institutions in particular have dramatically expanded the number and kinds of monitoring that they do within countries to protect a wide range of rights. The Council of Europe, for example, has created a large number of special representatives, offices and missions. And the European Court of Human Rights has become a court of last resort for people in countries whose regimes mistreat their populations. Not surprisingly, minorities of various kinds view these institutions as key allies, even though they recognize that such agencies have little power to compel governments to behave. And equally unsurprisingly, governments view these groups as nuisances, accusing them of “double standards” or ignorance of local conditions, but often over time at least improving their treatment of their population in order to avoid continuing criticism.

As a result, these institutions are playing a key role in transforming the Westphalian world in which governments were more or less free to act as they liked within their borders into a post-modern one in which governments no longer have such complete freedom of action, unless they are prepared to be isolated internationally, a state which carries with it increasingly high costs. And that in turn reduces the significance of borders and their maintenance under the principle of the territorial integrity of states even as it opens the way for the manifestation of the right of nations to self-determination within existing borders.

But it is the third development, one within the South Caucasus region in particular, that is perhaps the most important in changing the discussion from an “either/or” to a “both and” paradigm. And it is this: both the proponents of the principle of the territorial integrity of states and the backers of the right of nations to self-determination have come to see that each of their positions requires the recognition of the validity of at least part of the argument of the other and that the promotion of one of these values to the complete exclusion of the other is not only counterproductive but potentially self-destructive.

That can be seen if one imagines a world in which either principle would be elevated to the point that the other could be entirely ignored. A commitment to the principle of the territorial integrity of states without an acknowledgement of the right of nations to self-determination would inevitably both undermine the possibility for the development of a participatory politics and an open-ended economic system and – and this is far more serious – raise questions about the basis of the state and its borders. If the state does not exist for its population, then what does it exist for? If

people begin to ask that question insistently, their governments are going to face difficulties.

Conversely, if the principle of self-determination is elevated to the point where that of the territorial integrity of states is ignored, ever more groups will invoke it, even to the point of inventing themselves or reviving an identity long lost as ethnic entrepreneurs challenge the existence of that within the current borders. That in turn means that the principle will implode because it will end by calling into question or even destroying the only institutions capable of protecting the groups advancing such claims.

While the logic of these competing vectors has long been known, at least in the scholarly community, the implications of it have increasingly been taken into account by policy makers in the South Caucasus, sometimes on the basis of their own experiences and reflections and sometimes under pressure from others, self-interested or not. As a result, both sides in the Karabakh conflict have been moving, as for example Azerbaijan did at the December 1996 Lisbon summit as expressed in an annex to the final communiqué, toward a settlement of the conflict that will take both the principle of the territorial integrity of states and the right of nations to self-determination into account.

As the two sides approach at least a partial resolution of the conflict, each is having to confront the implications of moving from the rhetorically and politically powerful claims of a world of "either/or" to the far more difficult but ultimately more sustainable outcome of "both and." Curiously, most discussions of the possible endgame of the Karabakh conflict have focused on what Azerbaijan will gain – restoration of control over its territory on the basis of the principle of the territorial integrity of states – and on what Armenia will lose – its insistence on the right of nations to self-determination. But as the discussions proceed, it is likely that all concerned will see that Azerbaijan will have to "pay" for its gains by making concessions to the principle of the right of nations to self-determination and Armenia will "recoup" some of its losses both by the concessions Baku is likely to make and by the benefits it will get from having borders recognized by the international community rather than being in dispute.

Exactly what formula it will employ is still unclear, but Azerbaijan is going to have to recognize the collective rights of the Armenian community within its borders if it is going to be able to maintain its position in the international community. That will require a fundamental revision of the understanding of what Azerbaijan is and who Azerbaijanis are, a revision that is going to be far more difficult than many in Baku now expect, albeit one that the historical tolerance of the Azerbaijani people may open the way forward if the horrors of the conflict can be overcome.

Meanwhile, Armenia, once it acknowledges the principle of territorial integrity of states in this dispute will to the surprise of many in Yerevan and elsewhere find that it will also see the right of national self-determination reaffirmed as well. That superficially counter-intuitive conclusion reflects the reality, not always recognized by Armenians, that an Armenian state which lives in peace with its neighbors will gain a far better chance to become a modern nation rather than an historical cause, thus able to achieve its self-determination rather than remaining hostage to history and the diaspora.

These reflections do not mean that a favorable outcome combining both principles is easily or immediately achievable, but they do mean that the analyses and policies of the 1990s, which were based on the notion that there is an "either/or" choice in this conflict, are at the very least out of step with the new conditions and that the "both and" approach provides the basis for a peace and not just an armistice.

#### References

Goble, Paul (1992) "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis", *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 16:2, Summer, pp. 19-26.

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### **THE PROS AND CONS OF WTO MEMBERSHIP FOR AZERBAIJAN**

Vugar Bayramov  
Chairman of Board  
Center for Economic and Social Development of Azerbaijan

Since the recovery of its independence, Azerbaijan has constantly been pursuing opportunities to expand its foreign trade, an effort that some argue would be helped if Baku were to become a member of the World Trade Organization. In fact, Azerbaijan began the accession process in 1997 but submitted the required memorandum on its foreign trade regime on April 22, 1999. And since that time, there have been a series of exchanges between Azerbaijan and the WTO working party on Azerbaijan which includes, among others, Australia, Japan, the European Union and the United States.

During a meeting in June 2009, Azerbaijan and these governments discussed a variety of issues related to import customs duties, subsidies in agriculture and the like but failed to reach a consensus. As a result, the working party submitted a series of new questions to the Azerbaijan mission. At the same time, Azerbaijani officials have been working with the WTO to develop legal arrangements and to come up with amendments to existing laws and rules on tariffs and services.

In the course of this process, some concerns have been raised about accession and its implications for Azerbaijan. Since Azerbaijan's tariffs on imported goods are quite low and far lower than those of neighboring countries, Azerbaijan may not see the increase in trade from WTO membership that other states could expect. At present, Azerbaijani important customs duties range from zero to 15 percent, with an average of about 10 percent, and it has committed to lowering this average to a range of 5-6 percent. Many other countries had far higher tariffs: Turkey for example imposed a duty on seasonal agricultural products of as much as 200 percent.

Another concern is that the WTO is now taking a tougher line on those countries, like Azerbaijan, currently seeking membership even though the Doha round suggested that the countries now applying are precisely the ones who need the benefits the WTO can provide as long as their domestic industries enjoy some protection from the exports of countries who have benefited from earlier development.



After Azerbaijan formally applied to the WTO for membership, Baku established a National Coordination Group to oversee the problems of adapting Azerbaijani laws and rules to WTO requirements. The Group consists of representatives from relevant ministries, state committees, other agencies. Subsequently, in order to be in a position to continue negotiations, Baku created a special commission of senior government officials in August 2003. And it in turn formed nine working groups to analyze such issues as agrarian financing, intellectual property rights, social issues, investment adjustments, service issues, technical barriers, and the like. Overseeing these various bodies and ensuring they work in parallel is special secretariat.

As part of the accession process, Azerbaijan must review all its international trade arrangements and train local specialists on the WTO, as well as arranging visits for the Negotiating Party. All this taken together will allow Azerbaijan to expand its relations with other countries on the basis of ever greater trust. Azerbaijan already has relations with some international trade organizations, such as the Islamic Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. As Azerbaijan pursues WTO membership, it must work with each of these under the aegis of the UN and IMF.

To achieve WTO status, Azerbaijan must amend some of its existing laws to bring them into correspondence with WTO rules. One area where there are going to be particular difficulties concerns agricultural subsidies because, just as in the case of tariffs, Azerbaijan starts with a very low amount compared to other countries and thus has less to trade away for other goals. Azerbaijan faces the challenge of protecting domestic agriculture against massive imports from countries where there are high agricultural subsidies, such as Sweden where farmers receive on average 33,000 US dollars in government aid each year.

In addition to these substantive issues, there are some procedural problems in the accession process. Some officials in Azerbaijan do not fully understand the requirements of the WTO process, and thus it is essential that Baku form a group of competent cadres to make sure the process works to Azerbaijan's advantage. That will require a clear division of responsibilities between the WTO and Azerbaijan and among various Azerbaijani institutions, government and private.

At present, Azerbaijan ranks 140th among 146 states in terms of corruption and 103rd out of 16 states in terms of economic liberalization, thus creating other challenges for WTO accession. And all these things worsen Azerbaijan's position now and after accession.

It is far from certain whether the government will be able to take all the steps necessary to address these problems. But that by itself does not mean that Azerbaijan should not or cannot pursue accession. WTO membership will bring significant benefits to society, especially among those involved in the export market, and it will help Azerbaijan integrate itself into the world with far greater access to the markets of other countries.

But besides real benefits, WTO access will involve some real losses as well, something that should be both acknowledged and addressed. Among these are:

adaptation regress as a result of the production of non-competitive goods and provision of services;

reduced receipts from customs duties;

increased expenses for patents for technology imports;

government spending to compensate for local industries driven out of business by foreign competition;

societal adjustments of expenditure patterns given new flows of imports; and

reduced efficiency of investments because of changes in the relative efficiency of domestic and foreign producers given reduced customs duties.

If WTO accession is to be a success, Azerbaijan must promote the development of the economy with an eye on the consequences of that accession. Baku officials must not forget that WTO accession is not so much a goal as a means to achieving broader goals. Having become members, we can increase our integration into the world economy, achieve more liberalization in foreign trade, and simplify customs supervision procedures, among other things. And we hope that accession will also give Azerbaijan greater access to international financial institutions, something that should by means of careful negotiation boost the country's economic well-being.

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## **A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY**

### **I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy**

President Ilham Aliyev reaffirms that "Azerbaijan will never agree to the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh and will not adopt any mechanisms or procedures which will potentially lead to its separation" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193557.html>).

Novruz Mammadov, head of the foreign relations department of the Presidential Administration, says that the Sochi summit was "one of the important moments in the current stage of the negotiation process concerning the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192796.html>).

### **II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan**

The Embassy of Kazakhstan in Azerbaijan says that "during its presidency in the OSCE, Kazakhstan will maintain a neutral position on Nagorno-Karabakh in order that [Astana] will not be accused of Turkic solidarity" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194633.html>).

Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstan foreign minister and chairperson-in-office of the OSCE, says "a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh can be conducted only after the return of internally displaced persons" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194922.html>).

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Islamic Conference declares the Khojaly tragedy to be “a crime against humanity” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192480.html>).

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman says that “Israel respects the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and that we hope that all the agreements which have been achieved within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group will be realized” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194016.html>).

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman says that “in Azerbaijan there exists a unique model which can serve as an example for many parts of the world” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194406.html>).

### **III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy**

15 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Kanat Saudabayev, foreign minister of Kazakhstan and chairperson-in-office of the OSCE (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/195036.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/195039.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives the letters of credence from the incoming ambassadors of Slovakia, Spain, and Kyrgyzstan (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/195042.html>).

First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva, the president of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, and good will ambassador for UNESCO and ISESCO, is decorated by the president of France as an officer of the Legion of Honor (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/195032.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that “Azerbaijan is interested in the adoption of the updated variant of the Madrid Principles” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194910.html>).

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives a delegation of US Congressional staff members (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/195041.html>).

Yashar Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to China, is awarded the honorary rank of “Ambassador of International Friendship” by the Chinese government (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194851.html>).

14 February

Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstan foreign minister and OSCE chairperson-in-office arrives in Baku (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194821.html>).

13 February

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says that Kazakhstan as chair of the OSCE should undertake steps for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194788.html>).

12 February

President Ilham Aliyev congratulates Viktor Yanukovich on his election as president of Ukraine (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194554.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev authorizes Azerbaijani ministries to sign memoranda on cooperation with UNICEF (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194469.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev confirms a December 2009 agreement between Azerbaijan and France on financial cooperation arrangements (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194470.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev confirms the December 2009 agreement between the border services of Azerbaijan and Estonia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194465.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev confirms the June 2009 agreement on cooperation between the Azerbaijani and German justice ministries (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194464.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev confirms the November 2009 sports cooperation agreement between Azerbaijan and Cuba (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194463.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev confirms the November 2009 accords between Azerbaijan and Slovenia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194462.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev confirms the November 2009 accords between Azerbaijan and Belarus (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194461.html>).

Azerigaz announces its intention to build a new pipeline for the export of gas to Iran (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/194545.html>).

Ziyafat Askarov, first deputy speaker of the Milli Majlis, calls on the three co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group to put pressure on Armenia in order to achieve a settlement of the Karabakh conflict (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194574.html>).

Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, calls on the Azerbaijani parliament to appeal to the US Congress not to take up the question of "the Armenian genocide" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194601.html>).

Gabriel Keller, French ambassador to Baku, says that Paris "strives for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194562.html>).

11 February

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says that Ankara will take “serious steps” for assuring “stability and peace in the Caucasus” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194357.html>).

10 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Andres Herkel and Debon Grekh, PACE Monitoring Committee Co-Rapporteurs on Azerbaijan (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194232.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev appoints Vahdat Sultan-zade Azerbaijani ambassador to Turkmenistan (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194235.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives the letters of credence from the incoming ambassadors of Canada, Serbia, and Mali (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194237.html>).

Ogtay Asadov, speaker of the Milli Majlis, receives Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and says that he hopes the latter’s visit to Baku will give “a boost to the further development of relations” between Azerbaijan and Israel (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194199.html>).

Members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in London demonstrate against the visit to the United Kingdom of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194448.html>).

Asef Hajiyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the policies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan have led Armenia into “a deep economic crisis” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193844.html>).

9 February

President Ilham Aliyev appoints Altay Efendiyev Azerbaijani ambassador to Spain (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194025.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev receives Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193882.html>).

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman says in Baku that he and his Azerbaijani counterpart have agreed on expediting the process of eliminating visas for the diplomatic staff of the two countries (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194029.html>).

Elmira Suleymanova, ombudsman of Azerbaijan, says that “the admission of representatives of separatist Nagorno-Karabakh into the European Institute of Ombudsmen contradicts the statute of that organization” (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/194022.html>).

8 February

Justice Minister Fikrat Mammadov receives Norwegian Minister of Justice and the Police Knut Storberget (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193827.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, a member of the political council of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party and a Milli Majlis deputy, says that Baku was successful in presenting its positions on all key issues at the Munich Security Conference (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193822.html>).

The Azerbaijani embassy in Washington sends a letter of protest to the *Prescient Worldwide* telephone company for showing Karabakh as part of Armenia on its official website (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193811.html>).

7 February

President Ilham Aliyev says that "today a balance of forces between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not exist" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193807.html>).

6 February

President Ilham Aliyev tells the Munich Security Conference that "Azerbaijan and its partners are ready to invest billions of dollars to develop natural gas supplies" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193262.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in Munich (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193564.html>).

Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstan foreign minister and chairman-in-office of the OSCE, says that "the last meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia in Sochi gave new breath to the negotiation process on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193511.html>).

Azay Guliyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Armenia should understand" that the negotiation process cannot continue "eternally" and that it is putting itself at risk by failing to negotiate seriously (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193339.html>).

5 February

President Ilham Aliyev meets in Munich with US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193453.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev meets in Munich with members of the German-Azerbaijan forum (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193411.html>).

President Ilham Aliyev meets in Munich with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193414.html>).

The Foreign Ministry says that the "elections" that the separatist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh plans to conduct on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan "will not be recognized by the international community" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193377.html>).

Zahid Oruj, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the resolution of the Karabakh conflict by military means is completely possible." His comments come following the statement of US Intelligence Director Dennis Blair that military acitons might resume between Azerbaijan and Armenia (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193146.html>).

Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Presidential Administration of Russia, says that "Russia and Azerbaijan need one another" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193439.html>).

Havva Mammadova, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "Armenia's new ambassador to Russia, Oleg Yesayan, was one of the organizers of the Khojaly genocide" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193403.html>).

James Jeffrey, US ambassador to Turkey, says that "several conflicts must be resolved in the Caucasus" and that "the decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia has given 'the green light' to the ratification of the [Turkish-Armenian] protocols" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193396.html>).

Temur Yakobashvili, Georgian re-integration minister, says that Tbilisi "hopes that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia will lead to the resolution of the Karabakh problem" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193276.html>).

Iranian Health Minister Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi says that "at present, there are no obstacles to cooperation between Baku and Tehran in the area of health care, and both countries are interested in broadening ties in that sphere" (<http://www.day.az/news/society/193382.html>).

The health ministers of the OECD adopt the Baku Declaration on expanding cooperation among their countries (<http://www.day.az/news/society/193331.html>).

#### 4 February

President Ilham Aliyev meets with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193205.html>).

Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mammadgulyev says that the OECD should carry out "serious reforms" during this year when Azerbaijan assumes a leadership role in it (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/193145.html>).

Indonesia announces that it will open an embassy in Baku (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193127.html>).

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Qashqavi says that Tehran and Baku are "renewing discussions on consular affairs" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193075.html>).

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon says that his organization is not directly involved in the process of talks about the resolution of the Karabakh conflict (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193071.html>).

Gudrat Hasangulyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says if the US Congress votes to declare the events of 1915 an Armenian "genocide," that will work to Turkey's benefit because then Ankara will be able to act independently of the United States (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192936.html>).

### 3 February

Prime Minister Artur Rasizade receives Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Omani foreign minister (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/193025.html>).

National Security Minister Lt. Gen. Eldar Makhmudov receives Gerard Bauman, the director general of the Dutch Service of General Intelligence and Security (<http://www.day.az/news/society/193014.html>).

Sports Minister Azad Rahimov receives Kyrgyzstan deputy labor and migration minister Nuriyla Joldosheva to discuss a memorandum of cooperation in youth policy (<http://www.day.az/news/society/192931.html>).

Gultakin Hajibayli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "trade relations with poor Armenia will not give Ankara anything" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192749.html>).

A committee of representatives of the Council of Europe discuss the report of the Ago monitoring group which visited the South Caucasus in November 2009 (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/193060.html>).

Hasan Hami, Moroccan ambassador to Baku, says that "stability in Azerbaijan is very important for the stability of the region" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192883.html>).

Taner Yildiz, Turkish energy and natural resources minister, says that the Nabucco project is proceeding according to plan (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/192905.html>).

Iranian Vice-President Hamid Baghaei says that Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran are discussing the opening of ferry traffic among them on the Caspian Sea (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/192899.html>).

### 2 February

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov thanks Iran for ending the visa requirement on Azerbaijani citizens visiting or transiting that country (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192864.html>).

Ogtay Asadov, speaker of the Milli Majlis, receives Iranian deputy foreign minister Hassan Qashqavi (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192862.html>).

Industry and Energy Minister Natic Aliyev says that "Azerbaijan is acquiring every greater importance in terms of guaranteeing the energy security of Europe." He makes that comment after meeting with Romanian economics and trade deputy minister Tudor Sheban (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/192718.html>).

Omani Foreign Minister Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah says, after a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart, that "Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory, and we hope that this problem will be resolved in a peaceful way" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192708.html>).



Iran simplifies the rules governing trade with Azerbaijan  
(<http://www.day.az/news/economy/192736.html>).

1 February

The Milli Majlis approves a bill establishing a visa-free regime with Kazakhstan  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192618.html>).

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Qashqavi says that the Karabakh conflict  
"can be resolved by the actions of the states of the region"  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192622.html>).

The Azerbaijani-American Council begins a letter-writing campaign to the US  
Congress and President Barak Obama in connection with the 18<sup>th</sup> anniversary of  
Khojaly (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192565.html>).

Ali Masimli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that the UN Security Council resolutions on  
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict have not been fulfilled and that Azerbaijan's  
parliament should make an appeal to the UN about that  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192579.html>).

Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, calls for Baku to seek a decision of  
international courts on Khojaly as genocide  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192576.html>).

Mubariz Gurbanly, a Milli Majlis deputy who is also deputy executive secretary of  
the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, calls for the adoption of a law on the occupied  
territories (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192561.html>).

A defense ministry delegation met with the European Command of the United  
States in Stuttgart to discuss cooperation  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192548.html>).

Azerbaijan and the Comoro Islands establish diplomatic relations  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192680.html>).

Zokir Vozirov, Tajikistan's ambassador to Azerbaijan, says that in his country, "all  
the conditions for the participation of Azerbaijani [business] partners" have been  
created (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192479.html>).

Turkish Deputy Hakki Sukha Okay says that "the Ankara-Yerevan protocols have  
suffered a complete fiasco" (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192454.html>).

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Islamic Conference  
declares the Khojaly tragedy to be "a crime against humanity"  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192480.html>).

Aydin Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that "the sides are at the completion  
stage of the negotiation process" on Karabakh  
(<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192379.html>).

Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mammadbaqir Bahrami says that "the Caspian  
littoral states have achieved 70 percent agreement on the delimitation of the

Caspian” and that “Iran hopes for rapid achievement of a consensus” on that issue (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/192477.html>).

Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mammadbaqir Bahrami says that Iran hopes to increase its purchase of Azerbaijani gas from the current 1.2 million cubic meters a day to 14 million cubic meters (<http://www.day.az/news/economy/192471.html>).

### **Note to Readers**

The editors of “Azerbaijan in the World” hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email ([adabiweekly@ada.edu.az](mailto:adabiweekly@ada.edu.az)). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.